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THE UNITED STATES AND PACIFIC ASIA IN THE
SEVENTIES: APPENDICES. VOLUME III. THE
FUTURE OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN PACIFIC
ASIA

Doris Yokelson, et al


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APPENDICES

TO

THE UNITED STATES AND PACIFIC ASIA IN THE SEVENTIES

VOLUME III: The Future of the Nixon Doctrine in Pacific Asia

Articles by



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William H. Overholt

Alex Ghebhardt

Frank Armbruster

Herman Kahn



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13. ABSTRACT Analyses various formulations of the Nixon Doctrine for U.S. strategy and programs in East Asia and related areas with emphasis on the issues and possibilities of the late 1970 (and 1980) time period. The analysis considers the basic factors and context for U.S. policy, potential issues, crises, and policy choices and their likely implications for the U.S. and other nations. Presents the result of the analysis of implications and alternatives in terms of the basic strategic approaches to the area, the bilateral relations between the major countries in the area and the United States, and the advisory and assistance role for the DoD and other agencies of the U.S. Government.		

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Editor's Note

This appendix consists of a collection of essays written by Hudson Institute staff members on subjects of direct import for the Nixon Doctrine contract. All but two of these essays were written as part of the contract. Those two are included because of very direct relevance to the contract's conclusions.

The first chapter, on the reaction of public opinion to the Vietnam War as compared with other foreign policy issues, demonstrates rather dramatically that American public support--measured in gross numbers--followed the same patterns in the Vietnam years as in, for instance, the Korean War. But the Vietnam War lasted longer and so the patterns played themselves out further. The author does not wish to speculate beyond the data, but some Hudson staff members feel that these similar patterns of fluctuation disguise differences in the quality of support for (and opposition to) American policies; they would argue, for instance, that intellectual support for the Korean War was far stronger than for Vietnam and that such differences are more important than gross numbers. I shall limit my role to noting the controversy and let the reader draw his own conclusions.

Chapter II surveys the situation in the Philippines as of 1973.

Chapter III examines the record of the Chinese Communist Party in making deals with various foreign and domestic groups to judge the credibility of the CCP in various kinds of deals, and then speculates on whether the CCP could make credible deals in a potential rapprochement with Taiwan.

Chapter IV examines Soviet diplomatic activity in support of its Asian Security System, and provides evidence that the Soviet Union is taking this proposed Security System far more seriously than many American analysts have thought.

Chapter V examines military aspects of collective security in Pacific Asia in considerable detail. This is a major statement of views by an analyst whose views frequently differ from those of some of the other authors. Its wealth of military detail should make it of particular interest to military decision makers. To an extent that is not true of the other articles in this appendix, this essay concerns the central issues of the research report.

Chapter VI examines aspects of the Vietnam situation, speculating on the likely consequences of certain actions. Events have largely passed this essay by, but it contributed to the debate early in the period of this contract and is included for reference.

These signed chapters have not been edited for consistency in either substance or style with the other volumes of the report; in fact there are some flatly contradictory views. This reflects Hudson's belief that creativity can only be encouraged by diversity of views and that no single viewpoint has a monopoly on truth in complex political situations.

William H. Overholt

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I. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR, THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN RELATIONS*

INTRODUCTION

According to a great body of evidence, a large portion of the American public is politically uninformed. The American people at large are, for example, not familiar with international political events, places, and U.S. foreign policy, with the more complex domestic issues, with the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.** The overwhelming majority is not politically active--that is, they are not participants in the activity of any political party. And, according to sociological findings, the opinions of the general American public are flexible, oft times inconsistent, and contrary to earlier- or simultaneously-held opinions.

*By Doris Yokelson.

**"Data from the various polling organizations clearly show that the majority of Americans have paid relatively little or no attention to most international and national issues, and only relatively small minorities have possessed even rudimentary information about these issues. Such failure of knowledge and interest applies to both issue fronts, foreign and domestic.

In the area of foreign affairs, Americans have had little awareness of the nature and purpose of the reciprocal trade program, the Marshall Plan, or various later foreign aid programs. Majorities or large minorities of American citizens also have been unable to identify such leading international figures as Marshall Tito and the U.S. Secretary of State. Likewise, samples tested lacked information on such domestic issues as tax programs, farm policy, and even race relations.

Those who are knowledgeable about any one major issue or policy, whether foreign or domestic, usually are reasonably informed about most others. But such accurately informed persons are few--about 5 percent of the population--whereas the chronic 'know nothings' have declined from roughly 35 percent in the 1930's to 15-20 percent in the late 1960's. On most of the questions discussed here, however, a third to as much as two-thirds of the samples may be typed as ignorant, apathetic, or both." (Alfred Hero, "Public Reaction to Government Policy" in John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, Kendra B. Head, Measures of Political Attitudes [Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2nd Printing, July 1969], p. 24.)

Yet, despite this seeming ignorance, the American public has a record which defies the common assumptions many of us have about it today. This record, I would say, is based on a cautious and sober pragmatism. This pragmatic response relates to the question of the popularity of the President, to reaction to wars and foreign involvement, domestic problems and domestic reforms. For the sake of understanding the American public's reaction to a withdrawal from Vietnam and its desire to engage or not engage in military intervention in foreign countries or to assist foreign countries with arms and aid, whatever the reason for it, I should like to examine the record in light of our common assumptions today. To do this, I have used public opinion polls stretching back over three and a half decades--mainly Gallup polls--together with summary material from the massive body of literature on surveys of American political opinion and attitudes and a record which I made of actual events that occurred throughout these years. Although predictions cannot be made from this material, trends and recurring attitudes may be observed and some light may be shed on how the American people may react to the involvement of the United States abroad.

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY, ISOLATIONISM AND WARS

There is a great body of literature on the subject of isolationism, its causes, aspects and effects, both publicly and individually; on Presidential choice, preference, approval, voting behavior and attitudes; and a significant amount of data on public reaction to wars. Yet little has been done to utilize the data on how people have felt about U.S. engagement in wars. Since I started my research on the subject of Presidential popularity and the public's feelings about wars, an excellent article appeared in The American Political Science Review: "Trends in Popular Support for the

"Wars in Korea and Vietnam," by John E. Mueller.* After having examined the trends in popular support for wars through the use of public opinion polls that had been taken from 1950 to May 1970, Mueller suggests that from the evidence "popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam appears highly similar."** He also suggests that there is a basic percentage of public support throughout these wars, and that although the war in Korea was considerably more unpopular than the Vietnam war over a similar period of time, the Vietnam war may appear to us now to have been more unpopular since its beginning because the vocal opposition to it has been greater.*** Mueller observes that the two main factors determining popular support for a war are the number of casualties and the duration of the war, and that these two factors have a close effect.

Two other, lesser factors that I have found to be determinants in cutting down public support for the war and the country's leaders are "loss of battle" or "a sense of loss of battle" and "stalemated war." Despite the fact that Winston Churchill was esteemed as a wartime leader by the British, the British defeat at Tobruk in WW II caused British public displeasure

*Volume LXV, No. 2, June 1971, pp. 358-375.

**Ibid, p. 371.

***Some of the vocal opposition may have had an inverse effect. Concerning the public reaction to anti-Vietnam war protests, there is evidence that the public--even "doves"--reacts very negatively to them. See John P. Robinson, "Public Reaction to Political Protest: Chicago 1968," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, Spring 1970 and Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," The American Political Science Review, 63, December 1969, pp. 1087-1088, as reported in Mueller, op. cit., p. 373, footnote 42. Mueller suggests that this negative reaction may have hurt the anti-war cause.

with Churchill. The Tet offensive by the Viet Cong forces in the Vietnamese War in early 1968 gave the appearance of being a successful offensive for various reasons, although it was quickly crushed. (It appeared as if the Viet Cong were ubiquitous and could turn up when and where they wanted to; it was felt thereby that they had control of the cities.) In a Gallup poll, the Tet offensive caused a 13% rise in the American public's disapproval of President Johnson,* a rise which reversed itself almost immediately when President Johnson announced he would not run for President.

As for the "stalemated war," this factor causes great public discontent with the war and with the country's leader, as was seen as a result of the lengthy negotiations of both the Korean and Vietnamese wars. This factor may directly relate to the "duration of the war" and, in a lesser way, also to "casualties." The war does not end during these negotiations but drags on seemingly endlessly with no chance of "victory," for victory is to be achieved by reasonable terms arising from the negotiations. In the Korean war, the U.S. forces had a majority of the war's casualties during the negotiations, when the war remained stalemated at the 38th parallel. The American public's hopes had risen in anticipation of these negotiations--even public approval of President Truman, which had been at a deep low, rose perceptibly at this point, only to drop again after the truce talks were broken off and American soldiers were engaged in the terrible battles of the "ridges"--and then sank as the truce talks stalemated, within a lengthy

*As measured by the Gallup poll question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Johnson is handling his job as President?"

stagnation of the war.* I shall go into the subject of Presidential popularity in relation to wars in detail later in this paper; but I am using these examples at present as illustrations of public reaction to "the failure of war."**

Below is a graph comparing public support for the wars in Korea, Vietnam, World Wars I and II, as measured by Gallup surveys. The Gallup polls of the Korean and Vietnam wars were taken while the wars were in progress; of those of World War II, one was taken during the war and two in the years immediately following the war; the ones of World War I were taken towards the end of the 1930's and in the early 1940's, as the storms of the Second World War gathered and broke out in Europe. One poll on World War I was taken on December 10, 1941, just after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and we entered the war. I have chosen the Gallup polls that asked the same or nearly similar questions, and this is indicated below in connection with the graph.

In addition to the Gallup poll questions, I have utilized a differently worded question that was asked about the Korean War by the National Opinion Research Center in a series of polls extending from 1952 to 1956. The responses to this question are also indicated on the graph below.

*"Prior to the final peace settlement, the public was equally confused as to which side would come out best if the war in Korea ended at the 38th Parallel.

"Thirty percent said the U.N. forces would be better off, 33 percent said the Communists, 23 percent said 'neither' and 14 percent couldn't decide." (Gallup Political Index, No. 3, August 1965, p. 27.)

**There is some evidence to show that the successful events of the war did not affect Presidential popularity as might be supposed: that the "negativity" of the war, i.e., its duration, casualties, being stalemated, loss of battle, etc., affected Presidential popularity negatively, but positive events in themselves, except for the announcement of truce negotiations, did not raise Presidential popularity much. They do have an effect, however, on the approval of the war. I shall go into this in some detail later in this paper.

A


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SUPPORT FOR KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS

National Gallup polls

Korean War - Began June 25, 1950; negotiations began July 1953

Vietnam War - May-June 1965, first U.S. combat troop bu



Korean War - 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954

Vietnam War - 1965^a 1966^b 1967^b 1968^b 1969^b

Korean War

Vietnam War

Korean War

X---X--

(NORC polls)

●

World War I

X

World War II

X

Korean War: "Do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Korea?"

Vietnam War: a. "Some people think we should not have been involved in Vietnam while others think we should have. What do you think?"

b. "In view of the developments since we entered Vietnam, do you think it was a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"

c. "Some people feel that the U.S. did the right thing in getting involved in Vietnam to stop communist expansion. Others feel that the U.S. got involved because of other nations. With which group do you agree more?"

NORC polls: "As things stand now, do you feel that the U.S. is doing the right thing or the wrong thing in Vietnam?"

B

SUPPORT FOR KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS

National Gallup polls

5, 1950; negotiations began July 1951; final armistice signed July 27, 1953

65, first U.S. combat troop buildup; preliminary peace talks April 1968

April 10, 1946



Feb. 2 1944
 think you, yourself,
 it was a mistake for
 we entered this war?"
 Mar 11)

April 10, 1946 & Oct. 11, 1947

"Do you think it was a mistake for
 the U.S. to enter World War II?"

October 11, 1947

12/41



the United States made a mistake going into the war in Korea, or not?"
 le think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia,
 ers think we should have. What is your opinion?"
 f the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made
 sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"
 le feel that the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to Vietnam to try to prevent
 expansion. Others feel that the U.S. should not become involved in the external affairs
 nations. With which group do you agree?"

stand now, do you feel that the war in Korea has been (was) worth fighting, or not?"

It can be seen in the above chart that the immediate public reaction to the entrance into the Korean and Vietnam wars was strong support. This must have surely also been the case with World War II, even though the public opposed involvement almost to the time we were attacked; and we entered World War I with a great verve to fight in "the war to end all wars." World War II maintained strong public support once we were in it; in the United States the public favored stronger war measures and was far ahead of its political leaders in supporting total manpower mobilization (the counterpart of this may perhaps be seen right up to this present day when, in the matter of price and wage controls during the present economic crisis, the public is more willing to enforce stricter controls than its leaders).^{*} Public support for wars in Korea and Vietnam, however, declined soon after the wars began (by the length of time between poll questions, a matter of months)--for Korea, precipitously; for Vietnam, slowly. Over the same time period--that is, the length of time the war in Korea lasted--

* The Gallup organization polled Americans throughout World War II on their feelings toward the war effort. In a release issued by Gallup on July 19, 1950, reporting the leaning of the American public in June 1950, just before we entered the Korean War, toward having Congress adopt "stand-by legislation for 'total mobilization' in case of war" in Korea, a comparison was made to public opinion in the early days of World War II. During early World War II,

"These opinion studies [showed] beyond doubt that a majority of the people are willing to accept almost any measure involving compulsion or sacrifice when the need is clearly and unequivocally explained and the urgency of the situation fully understood."

These measures included the favoring of price and wage control, wartime rationing and the willingness to pay higher taxes to support the war effort, long before Congress passed legislation on them; and the conscription of single women for nonfighting jobs in the armed forces, which never went into effect.

It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the Korean War, according to the Gallup polls, the American public was also ahead of Congress on many of these issues. At that time, before Congress did, it favored re-service legislation for total mobilization in case of war (46% approve, 41% disapprove, 13% undecided); long-term extension of the draft (by nearly 2 to 1);

the Korean War had considerably less public support than the war in Vietnam: the Vietnam war did not reach the unpopularity of the Korean War until it had gone on approximately one year longer than the Korean War. Also, President Truman's popularity suffered drastically because of the Korean War--not even the U.N. counteroffensive affected this, although it did affect people's feelings toward whether we had made a mistake in entering the war or not: like a barometer, public approval of our having entered the war rose after the U.N. offensive in January 1951, fell when MacArthur was relieved of his command and the Communist forces mounted a counteroffensive in April 1951, and rose again in June 1951 when the U.N. forces reached the 38th parallel and Jacob Malik proposed a truce in the U.N.

On the other hand, President Johnson's popularity made a gradual decline, broken by spurts of approval, suggesting that either his support declined

and, by a heavy majority, increasing the strength of the army and navy. (Gallup poll news release, July 19, 1950).

Some indication that this attitude may have changed somewhat in the late 1960's, has been given in a recent article by Bruce M. Russet, "The Revolt of the Masses: Public Opinion on Military Expenditures," which will appear in a book edited by Mr. Russet, Peace, War, and Numbers (Los Angeles: Sage Publishers, 1972). By following public response to the AIPO (Gallup poll), NORC (National Opinion Research Center) and Roper poll questions on whether the government should increase, keep the same, or reduce military spending, Mr. Russet found that,

...until the 1960's, popular attitudes toward military spending in the United States were very permissive. Only a small minority ever favored reducing the armed forces. A somewhat larger minority rather consistently advocated expanding the military, but at most times a majority of the population either expressed satisfaction with the existing defense effort or was indifferent to the question. By the late 1960's, however, this situation had changed markedly. In recent soundings, a near-majority of the entire populace has regularly advocated a reduction in military spending.

in a gradual slope along with the gradual loss in support for the Vietnam war, or his popularity would have declined in any event. The substantial decline in Presidential popularity after his election as President is a natural phenomenon of his being in office.*

I would hazard a guess that, at the present time (mid-April 1972), if the South Vietnamese armies hold against the fresh invasion of North Vietnamese forces and mount a successful counteroffensive against them, the percentage of Americans who did not feel that the U.S. had made a mistake in going into Vietnam would increase. I doubt, however, that it would influence Presidential popularity much one way or the other. If, on the other hand, the North Vietnamese were to be successful in their invasion, then I would suggest that not only would support for the war continue to decline, but support for the President might be affected. However, since the war, as far as the interest of the people is concerned, had been winding down, a successful North Vietnamese invasion might not affect Presidential popularity as much as might otherwise be the case.

* For a fascinating and informative discussion of Presidential popularity, see John E. Mueller, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, No. 1, March 1970, pp. 18-34. I shall cover this in more detail later in the section of this paper on Presidential popularity and its relationship to wars. According to Mueller, although President Johnson himself attributed 20% of his popularity drop to the Vietnam war, the war was probably considered by the public to be 'Johnson's War' to a far lesser extent than the Korean war was felt to be 'Truman's War' and may not have affected his popularity as much as thought.

It might be of interest to examine the support for World Wars I and II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War comparatively. In the table below, for the closest comparison possible, I have limited myself to the responses to the question asked by the Gallup organization, "Do you think it was a mistake for the U.S. to have sent troops to fight in [place or war]," or the nearest equivalent to it asked by Gallup. I therefore eliminated questions asked by other organizations or those asked by Gallup that were similar in content to the one above, but worded differently.*

<u>War</u>	<u>Years Polled</u>		<u>Per Cent Considering</u>	
	<u>From:</u>	<u>To:</u>	<u>Each War a Mistake</u>	
			<u>Highest</u>	<u>Lowest</u>
World War I ^a	1937	1941	64*	21
World War II ^b	1944	1947	24	14
Korean War ^c	1950	1953	51	20
Vietnam War ^d	1965	1971	61	24

x - Adjusted from 70% to include no opinion

*Basic idea and format of table and poll questions and responses from Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Is War a Mistake?" Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Spring 1970, p. 135 and passim; poll questions and percentage responses from Mueller, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, No. 2, pp. 360 and 363; and from Gallup polls appearing in the Gallup Opinion Index. For interested readers, the questions that were eliminated may be found in the same sources cited in this footnote.

^aWorld War I--Gallup poll question: "Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter the last war (World War I)?" (Erskine, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, p. 136.)

^bWorld War II--February 2, 1944--Gallup poll question: "Do you think you, yourself, will feel it was a mistake for us to have entered this war?"; April 10, 1946 and October 11, 1947--Gallup poll question: "Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter World War II?" (Erskine, op. cit., p. 137).

^cKorean War--August, 1950--Gallup poll question: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the U.S. made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea, or not?" (Erskine, op. cit., p. 138). All other Korean war polls--Gallup question: "Do you think the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or not?" (Erskine, op. cit., p. 138 and Mueller, op. cit., p. 360.)

^dVietnam War--Gallup poll question: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" (Erskine, op. cit., pp. 141-142; Mueller, op. cit., p. 363; and Gallup Opinion Indexes, 1970 and 1971.)

It is, of course, very well known that the wording of questions can cause varying responses among those polled. Also, some words are highly charged in the mind of the public. When the National Opinion Research Center, throughout the first two years of the Korean War, asked the survey question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to send American troops to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea?" the approval response was consistently 15 to 20 percentage points higher and the "no opinion" generally lower than questions asked during the same period of time which did not include the words "communist invasion" or "communist."*

It can be seen from the table above that, in retrospect, more Americans considered it to have been a mistake for us to have entered World War I than any other war in this century. This comparison must be qualified by the fact that, when they were asked the question about World War I, Americans were looking back twenty years, prior to the beginning of another World War. World War II was clearly the most favored war; here again, although one of the questions about World War II was asked in the latter part of the war, two were asked after the war, one in 1946, the other in 1947. The Vietnam war surpassed the Korean war in being considered a mistake by the middle of 1968. All the questions about the Korean and Vietnam wars in this table were asked while these wars were in progress.

If we look back to the graph shown earlier, we can make some interesting observations in combination with the above table. Beginning with World War I: the graph shows that, although World War I was the most unpopular war, except for a sharp drop in support just after Hitler invaded Poland in September, 1939, support for World War I increased significantly

*For discussion of this, see Mueller, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, No. 2, pp. 359 and 361.

as we got closer to being drawn into World War II; and, as we entered World War II, support for the first World War approximated the level of support given to both the Korean and Vietnam wars at their incipience.

World War II had by far the greatest approval of the American public, an approval which was apparently maintained throughout the war. When one considers that support for wars declines as they draw on, the 77% support for World War II in February 1944 was remarkable. However, since this question was not asked earlier, there are no means of following the trend of World War II. It is interesting to note that two years after the end of World War II, there was a 10% decrease in the number of persons approving of our having entered the war, perhaps a reflection of the critical times that followed the war.

The Korean and Vietnam wars had their highest level of support right at the start. As mentioned earlier, support for the Korean War fell precipitously within a few months (China had entered the war), and, except for the perturbations noted earlier, generally maintained this level of support. Public support for the Vietnam war, however, dropped slowly; not until the middle of 1968 had it surpassed the level of those who had considered the Korean War a mistake. From that time until the end of 1970, support for Vietnam continued between 30 and 40 per cent; as we entered the middle of 1971, support dropped below 30 per cent.*

* Mueller suggests that, viewing the Korean and Vietnam Wars, there is a basic number of people who will always support these wars. Whether this new drop in 1971 will counteract this argument or will be a perturbation in this basic support, remains to be seen as the war goes on. One must now begin to consider what percentage is a deviation from basic support. As of May 1970, which was Mueller's last data, support for the Vietnam War had dropped only 3 per cent below the lowest point reached in August 1968--comparable to the pattern of the Korean War which never went more than 3 percentage points below its low point in December 1950. Moreover, at the juncture of May 1970, the low point of support for both wars maintained the 30 to 40 percent level. The latest poll of May 1971 changed both these pictures. (See Mueller, op. cit.)


One more point should be noted before we leave this discussion. The series of NORC polls on the Korean War, which were taken towards the end of the war and after it was over, are also shown on the above graph. The responses to the NORC question, "As things stand now, do you feel that the war in Korea has been (was) worth fighting, or not?" reveal even less public support for the Korean War than the Gallup surveys showed, and, at one point, less support than was given to the Vietnam war in the latest Gallup survey in 1971. The NORC polls show something else of some interest to this discussion: that when the Korean War was over, public support of the war rose, and after three years, support for the ended war had risen by another 7 per cent. To take the pragmatic reason for this rise--a reason which I find works well indeed in comprehending much of public reaction: South Korea had begun to do well as a sovereign country and its people were making an excellent economic recovery. This would seem to have made it more worthwhile to have sent troops to fight there than it had appeared to be during and in the aftermath of the deadly stalemate of the war. There may be other reasons: on the one hand, from the time the Chinese entered the war, the American public disliked the Korean War; moreover, never did they have the feeling that the "endless, endless hordes" of Chinese could ever really be beaten--an impression that one still has of the Korean War, despite the U.N. victories there. On the other hand, many of the men who were sent to fight in the Korean War were veterans of World War II and their morale consequently might have been low. In 1956, when the question was asked again, both these factors were no longer relevant.

If time allowed, I believe it could have been of some value to have examined and compared circumstances and opinions surrounding the advent of the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this present study.

Support of the Vietnam War By Age and Education

Contrary to the general belief, Americans over 50 years of age have, at all times during the Vietnam War, given less support to the war than the 21-29 year olds.* Moreover, the 21-29 year old age group has, throughout the entire war, except for three periods of time, been more in favor of the war than any other age group. However, when the 18-20 year olds were asked this question by Gallup for the first time in 1971, they registered 5 percentage points below the 21-29 year olds, just below the 30-49 year old opinion, but still 6 per cent higher than the 50 and over opinion. The figure on page 14 shows the support for the Vietnam war by age groups from the middle of 1965 to the latest poll on this question in the middle of 1971.

* See also Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority: The Dove's Guide (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), pp. 53-79.

SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM WAR BY AGE GROUP - GALLUP POLLS

WAR - Should; No, did not make a mistake:

Age
21-29
30-49
50 and over

*18-20 year olds


- "Some people think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia, while others think we should have. What is your opinion?" (1965)
- "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"
- "Some people feel that the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to Vietnam to try to prevent communist expansion. Others felt that the U.S. should not become involved in the internal affairs of other nations. With which group do you agree?" (March 1967)

Equally unexpected are the results of support for the Vietnam war by education of the respondent. For the first three years of the war, college-educated Americans were clearly most in support of the war; throughout the entire war, grade school-educated persons were the least.* As of the middle of 1969, the support of the college-educated dropped below that of the high school-educated segment of the population, seemingly a trend. However, as of the beginning of 1971, this trend reversed itself. The graph on page 17 shows support for the Vietnam war by education.

*"Subsequent data analyses...have indicated that 'differences by social status and age...seem more visible, with those of higher status and middle age most in favor of war policies.' In addition, two other national studies found that lower-class persons were more likely than middle- or upper-status respondents to support 'moderate' or 'conciliatory' policies in both the Vietnam and Korean conflicts as well as to favor a de-escalation of the Vietnam war.

"Despite the latter evidence, many observers adopted the conventional belief that working-class segments of the population have failed to express strong opposition to the Vietnam War....In fact, participation in mass demonstrations may have provided a less accurate measure of popular sources of support or opposition concerning the war than survey responses or voting behavior." (Harlan Hahn, "Correlates of Public Sentiments About War: Local Referenda on the Vietnam Issue," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, December 1970, p. 1187.)

See footnote 3, p. 3, of this study for references to inverse public reaction to anti-war demonstrations.



- a. "Some people think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia, while others think we should have. What is your opinion? (1965)"
- b. "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"
- c. "Some people feel that the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to Vietnam to try to prevent communist expansion. Others felt that the U.S. should not become involved in the internal affairs of other nations. With which group do you agree?" (March 1967)

Support for the war by these groups does not coincide with their approval of the President and the way he is handling his job as President. In the section on Presidential popularity, I shall note approval of the President by age and education and compare it with support for the war in Vietnam.

Presidential Popularity and Its Relationship to Wars

The basic observation that one can make about Presidential popularity is, of course, that the popularity moves in a general trend downwards from the high point after the President's election to office.* There are numerous reasons for this, which the scope of this paper does not allow us to explore in depth; but some of them have been handily and intelligently categorized by John E. Mueller in his article, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson."** Since the observations which Mueller makes from this simple categorization of causes do not do violence to what I have observed in individual cases, I should like to touch on some of these categories here as a handy reference.

Briefly, Mueller introduced three independent variables made up of three categories of events which he found either the presence or absence of caused a basic decline and loss in Presidential popularity. These were "coalitions of minorities," "rally round the flag" and "economic slump." To these, the fourth variable of "war" was added.

Mueller found from the calculations he made based on his categories, that the "coalitions of minorities"--that is, the solidifying of minority

*"Gallup survey evidence going back to F.D.R. in the thirties has shown that, in general, a President's popularity tends to trend downward with the lowest point in popularity registered within a year of the end of his term." (Gallup Opinion Index, No. 78, December 1971, p. 1.)

**The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 1, March 1970, pp. 18-34.

opposition--accounts for a basically linear, normal drop in popularity from election time to each successive year. He also found that infrequency of what he termed "rally round the flag" occasions--occasions which cause Americans to unify in support of the President--and these, Mueller feels, must have the characteristics of being an event which is international, directly involves the United States and the President and is dramatic and sharply focused--also causes a drop in Presidential popularity. As for "economic slump," Mueller suggests from his evidence that while an economic slump harms the approval of a President, a rising economy does not seem to raise his popularity.

In regard to wars, Mueller found that, except perhaps for World War II, wars do not benefit Presidential popularity. This is, of course, borne out by the conclusions of this study. Mueller suggests, however, that wars--even similar kinds of wars--have a significantly varying effect on the approval rating of a President, depending mainly, he feels, on whether the war is seen as the President's war, or not. Thus Mueller feels that since the Korean war was regarded by the public as Truman's war--"he got us in"--he was very seriously harmed by it; he suggests on the other hand, that since the Vietnam war was considered by the public to have been inherited by Johnson, Johnson was not substantially adversely affected by it, although President Johnson himself thought the war had accounted for a 20 per cent drop in his popularity.*

One could extend this thesis to President Nixon and, on the basis of it, presume that his popularity is also being largely unaffected by the war


* Ibid., p. 23.

itself. This might be true, especially in view of the fact that he is winding down American troop participation in the war; and, until the North Vietnamese invaded South Vietnam early this year, public interest in the war had waned considerably.

The figures below combine the trends of Presidential popularity and public support for the Korean and Vietnam wars under Presidents Truman, Johnson and Nixon. They are based on the Gallup poll questions, "Do you approve of the way the President is handling his job?" and "Did the U.S. make a mistake sending in troops to fight?" with some variations of the latter question, indicated on the figures.

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SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND THE WAR
"DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY TRUMAN IS
AND
"DID THE U.S. MAKE A MISTAKE SENDING TROOPS
National - Gallup poll



"Do you think the United States made a mistake
in going into the war in Korea, or not?"

b "In view
in Korea,
deciding

B

PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND THE WAR IN KOREA


"APPROVE OF THE WAY TRUMAN IS HANDLING HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT?"

AND

3. MAKE A MISTAKE SENDING TROOPS TO FIGHT IN KOREA?"

National - Gallup polls

TRUMAN



a mistake
t?"

b "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the United States made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea (South Korea), or not?"


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SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND NIXON AND THE WAR

"DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY [PRESIDENT] IS HANDLING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM?"

"DID THE U.S. MAKE A MISTAKE SENDING TROOPS TO FIGURE IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT?"

National - Gallup polls



a. "Some people think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia, while others think we should have. What is your opinion? (1965)"

b. "In view of the fighting in Southeast Asia, do you think the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops there?"


c. "Some people feel that the U.S. should not become involved in Vietnam to try to prevent communism. Others feel the U.S. should not become involved. With which group do you agree?"

ITS JOHNSON AND NIXON AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

1-22

"DO YOU THINK HE IS DOING A GOOD JOB AS PRESIDENT?"

National - Gallup Polls



involved
while others
(1965)

b. "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"

"people feel that the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to Vietnam to try to prevent communist expansion. Others feel that the U.S. should not become involved in the external affairs of other nations. Which group do you agree?" (March 1967)

As mentioned earlier, the initial public reaction to both these wars was support for sending in troops and a rise in Presidential popularity. Truman's popularity went up 9 percentage points after the Korean invasion of June 1950; it slowly fell again, with perturbations throughout the next months (during which time Congress supported Truman's policy in Korea, selective service was extended and the military budget almost doubled); when the Chinese entered the war and drove into South Korea, Truman's popularity sank deeply.

Johnson "slid" into the Vietnam war. When the first poll on the war was taken in January 1965, the Tonkin Bay Crisis had already taken place and U.S. aircraft were bombing North Vietnamese bases. Most Americans knew very little about the situation in Vietnam at the time. When U.S. combat troops were deployed in South Vietnam for the first time in June of 1965, support for the war rose to 62 per cent, and approval of Johnson rose 6 per cent. From then on, both approval of the Vietnam War and Johnson's popularity went into a downward trend. Johnson's popularity hit a mean between 35 and 50 per cent toward the end of 1966, and from 1967 on, his popularity fluctuated wildly between these percentages, while approval of the war continued its downward descent.

It must be remembered that before the U.S. entered the Korean War, Truman's popularity was already at the point Johnson's was when Johnson left office and the Vietnam War had been going on for three years. Truman had

had to cope with overwhelming domestic strife in the post-war era when the country was beset by strike after strike among the major industries. Since both Johnson and Truman suffered a 20 percentage point drop in popularity in approximately one year after each of the wars began, it might be assumed that the major harm to Truman's popularity came originally from the intense domestic disturbances. Truman's record of disapproval is broken only by the high points of popularity in the wake of U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey and the upset Presidential election of 1948.

Wars do not benefit Presidential popularity and the American people do not wish to get into a war. Throughout the last three decades, the college-educated have tended to be more clearly internationalist and interventionist than the less-educated; and this is once again brought out in the figure above showing support for the Vietnam war being substantially the least among the less-educated.* The correlations, however, among group attitudes towards domestic and international affairs are complex and yield some descriptions of the American public that are generally little known.^{**}

* "With some exceptions, education has been more closely related in the post-war era to support for international cooperation than to opinions on most liberal domestic programs other than civil rights and civil liberties. Prior to the war [World War II], when relatively isolationist thinking was the norm, college-educated citizens were for the most part only a dozen or fewer percentage points more favorable to actual or proposed international involvements among those expressing any opinions than were people whose education went no further than grade school. But since Pearl Harbor the few remaining patent isolationists have been highly concentrated among the latter." (Alfred Hero in Robinson, *et al.*, Measures of Political Attitudes, p. 40.)

** For an excellent summary of the correlations of public opinion, nationally and by groups, on domestic and foreign policy issues, defense and social programs, see the chapter by Alfred Hero, "Public Reaction to Government Policy," in Robinson *et al.*, Measures of Political Attitudes, pp. 23-78. See also Chapter 13 of the same book, "Individual Questions from Survey Research"

From 1936 until the present year, "war," "the threat of war," "fear of war" and "keeping peace" were overwhelmingly the most important problems in the mind of the American public. The table below, based on the Gallup poll question, "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" gives the top problem year by year.

Center Election Studies," pp. 483-671 which gives correlations from sets of election surveys taken by the Survey Research Center.

Another article by Alfred Hero will be of further general interest: Alfred O. Hero, Jr., "Liberalism-Conservatism Revisited: Foreign vs. Domestic Federal Policies, 1937-1967," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, Fall 1969, pp. 399-408. See also Herbert McClosky, Political Inquiry, The Nature and Uses of Survey Research (The MacMillan Company, 1969) chapters 1 and 2, for an overview into the study of survey research in this area and his own work on isolationism.

The liberal-conservative dichotomy is of special interest as the concepts are not readily definable in all policy areas and they are not strictly dichotomous. Correlations between foreign policy and domestic policy attitudes that would be assumed to be held by a conservative or a liberal are weak. Thus,

...though there may be this tendency among the five percent of the most intellectually aware people, for liberals on domestic economic welfare policy to be liberals on foreign policy and for conservatives on domestic policy to be conservatives on foreign policy, such a correlation has hardly been apparent in the majority of the citizenry. New Dealers were at most only 10 percentage points more sympathetic to liberalized trade, U.S. cooperation with the League of Nations, or assistance to the opponents of the Axis before December 1941, than were opponents of the New Deal. The relationship between international and domestic economic and welfare policies rose only slightly under President Truman and declined to virtually zero by the end of the first Eisenhower administration. Consistency between liberal or conservative views in the two respective fields rose again gradually during John F. Kennedy's term in the White House; but as late as the 1964 election, relative liberals on a group of domestic issues other than race and civil liberties were at the very most only 20 percentage points more inclined than relative conservatives on these questions to favor non-military multilateral involvements in world affairs. (Hero in Robinson et al., p. 37.)

Moreover, one's subjective view of being a liberal or conservative depends on numerous factors and varies in comparison with the subjective liberal or conservative feelings of others. One researcher found evidence that there is

"no well-defined ideology widely shared by the public to relate issues to each other. He finds a weak cleavage that resembles the Populism of the 1890's and is a more distinct dimension than either liberalism-conservatism or internationalism-isolationism."

(Robert Axelrod, "The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, Spring 1967, p. 51.)

TOP PROBLEM, YEAR-BY-YEAR*

1971: Economy, Vietnam	1958: Unemployment,
1970: Vietnam	Keeping Peace
1969: Vietnam	1957: Segregation
1968: Vietnam	1956: Keeping Peace
1967: Vietnam	1955: Keeping Peace
1966: Vietnam	1954: Keeping Peace
1965: Vietnam	1953: Keeping Peace
1964: Vietnam, Race Relations	1951: Korean War
1963: Keeping Peace, Race Relations	1950: Strikes
1962: Keeping Peace	1949: Strikes
1961: Keeping Peace	1948: Keeping Peace
1960: Keeping Peace	1947: Strikes
1959: Keeping Peace	1943: Winning the War
	1939: Keeping Out of War
	1937: Unemployment
	1936: Unemployment

When categories within the two variables of age and education are compared in the Gallup polls used previously, support for the Vietnam War does not coincide with approval of the President. The two figures below show the support for the Vietnam War and Presidential approval

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 76, October 1971, p. 4.

This does not preclude, however, the favoring by the American public of compulsory military service in peacetime. Before 1940, in an isolationist era, the public reacted negatively to a draft and to sending American soldiers overseas. (See Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946 [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951] for extensive listings of public opinion sampling during this time.)

Since 1940, however, most Americans have favored peacetime draft. A basic reason, of course, has been the security of the country. However, another aspect of favoring an increase in our forces has been advanced by Alfred Hero. He states that

"a majority of people have believed that large armed forces are more likely to be a deterrent to war than a motivating force for war. The support of a large military establishment has led, as a consequence, to the public favoring the principle of military conscription....but it has had isolationist tinges. Support for aid in arming our allies has never been as high as that for expending much larger resources on our own defenses." (Hero, in Robinson, et al., Measures of Political Attitudes, pp. 29-30.)


under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, first by age and then by education. The only conclusion that can be drawn at this stage, without an elaborate analysis of the correlations, is that when the categories within each variable are compared to each other, the relationship between support for the war and approval of the President varies from category to category. Under education, for example, the popularity of President Johnson was basically similar among all levels of education, but the support for the war varied with each level, indicating that approval of one did not necessarily mean support for the other. Johnson was, therefore, in comparison to other levels of educational background, given greater support by those with a grade-school education than the war in Vietnam; given approximately the same support as the Vietnam war by the high school-educated; and given less support than the war in Vietnam by the college-educated. From this it might be assumed that the grade-school-educated supported President Johnson for reasons other than the war, whereas, among the college-educated, a greater support for the war did not lead this group to give greater approval to Johnson's handling of his job as President. This finding might show that support for the President is based mainly on the domestic attitudes of the groups.

As can be seen in the two figures, however, the trend lines of Presidential popularity and support for the Vietnam war are remarkably similar at their various levels among the categories.

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21-29 YEAR OLDS




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SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM AND APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT BY AGE GROUP - Gallup Polls

"Do you approve or disapprove of the way [President] is handling his job as president?"
and "Did the U.S. make a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"

30-49-YEAR OLDS



WAR - Should; No, did not make a mistake: —

*18-20 year olds (war)

PRESIDENT (Approval): -----

**18-20 year olds (president)

- a. "Some people think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia, while others think we should have. What is your opinion?" (1965)
- b. "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"
- c. "Some people feel that the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to Vietnam to try to prevent communist expansion. Others felt that the U.S. should not become involved in the internal affairs of other nations. With which group do you agree?" (March 1967)


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Polls
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50 YEARS AND OVER

JOHNSON

NIXON



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
I-30

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GRADE SCHOOL EDUCATION

JOHNSON



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SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM WAR AND APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT - BY EDUCATION

"Do you approve or disapprove of the way [President] is handling his job as President?"
 and "Did the U.S. make a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"
 (Gallup polls)

HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

WAR - Should, No, did not make a mistake: _____
President (Approval): -----

- a. "Some people think we should not have become involved with our military forces in Southeast Asia, while others think we should have. What is your opinion?" (1965)
- b. "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?"
- c. "Some people feel that the U.S. did the right thing in sending troops to Vietnam to try to prevent communist expansion. Others felt that the U.S. should not become involved in the internal affairs of other nations. With which group do you agree?" (March 1967)

B


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COLLEGE EDUCATION

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TWO CASE HISTORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCTRINES

The post-World War II period was one of a distinctly international orientation in foreign policy among the American public. Up to 1940, Americans were strongly isolationist in sentiment, reluctant to become in any way involved in assisting Britain and France in the war in Europe.* During the years the U.S. was at war, the pendulum swung to an internationalist attitude, to willingness to work with other countries, to become involved in mutual security pacts and to supply economic and military aid. Thus, toward the end of World War II, Americans were, for example, sanguine about the concept and formation of the United Nations; and they have consistently supported it since that time.**

As of 1970, public responses to questions about strengthening the U.N. were highly favorable:***

"Would you like to see the United Nations become a stronger organization?"

<u>Early October, 1970</u>			
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
National	84	8	8

"It has been suggested that the United Nations establish a peace keeping army of about 100,000 men. Do you favor or oppose such a plan?"

<u>Early October, 1970</u>			
	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
National	64	22	14

*For the series of surveys on this issue see Cantril, op.cit.

**"The U.N., and active U.S. participation in it, have been more widely popular than virtually any other international institution or aspect of American policy." (Hero in Robinson et.al., p. 27)

***Gallup Opinion Index, No. 65, November 1970, p. 11.

And in July and August 1967, national opinion overwhelmingly favored the role of the United Nations and, by a small majority, thought the U.N. was doing a good job:^{*}

"In general, do you think the United Nations organization is doing a good job, or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?"

<u>August 1967</u>	<u>Good Job</u>	<u>Poor Job</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	49	35	16

"How important do you think it is that we try to make the United Nations a success--very important, fairly important, or not so important?"

<u>July 1967</u>	<u>Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Not So</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	79	10	6	5

"Do you think the United States should give up its membership in the United Nations, or not?"

<u>July 1967</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	10	85	5

But the most recent polls taken by the Gallup organization--in late 1971 and early 1972--reveal a frustration with what the U.N. is accomplishing. (The failure of the U.N. to act in the India-Pakistan crisis over Bangla Desh had a strong negative impact on the American public.)

"In general, do you think the United Nations organization is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?"^{**}

	<u>October 29 - November 1, 1971</u>		
	<u>Good</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	35	43	22

^{*}Gallup Opinion Index, No. 27, September 1967, pp. 14, 15 and 16.

^{**}Gallup Opinion Index, No. 77, November 1971, p. 16.

"Is your respect for the U.N. (United Nations' Organization) increasing or decreasing as the years go by?" *

	February 4-7, 1972			
	<u>Increasing</u>	<u>Decreasing</u>	<u>No Change</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	18	50	21	11

From the end of World War II until early 1969, the American public also felt, by overwhelming majorities, that the United States should work closely with other nations. However, the Gallup polls below reveal that this sentiment has grown weaker over the past decade.

"Would it be better for the United States to keep independent in world affairs--or would it be better for the United States to work closely with other nations?"**

	<u>Keep Independent</u>	<u>Work Closely</u>	<u>No Opnion</u>
1969	22	72	6
1967	16	79	5
1963	10	82	8
1953	15	78	7

Clear majorities of Americans since the end of World War II have also favored collective security pacts, such as NATO and have consistently supported the idea of aid to needy nations. Majorities have favored relief aid and technical assistance over military aid:***

"Except for a year or two, during the initial stages of the rearmament of Western Europe in 1949-51, military aid has been second in importance in the public mind to economic assistance, this being the very reverse of priorities usually assigned to the two forms of aid by Congress."

This is consistent with the American public's fear of war and its desire not to get involved in a war.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 81, March 1972, p. 21.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 45, March 1969, p. 21.

***Hero in Robinson et. al., pp. 30, 31 and 32.

As of October 1968, Americans were still in favor of keeping our troops in West Germany as a result of the NATO treaty agreement.

"The United States has troops in West Germany as a result of the NATO treaty agreement with our Western Allies. In general, do you approve or disapprove of keeping our troops in West Germany?" *

	Mid-October, 1968		
	Approve	Disapprove	No Opinion
	%	%	%
National	63	23	14

However, it was a different matter when a military move was suggested after the Czechoslovakian crisis. This poll was taken earlier in the same month as the question above.

"It has been suggested that the U.S. send 100,000 troops to West Germany to remain there until the Russians remove their troops from Czechoslovakia. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?" **

	Early October, 1968		
	Favor	Oppose	No Opinion
	%	%	%
National	29	55	16

The still prevalent internationalism, the basic fear of Americans of becoming involved in military engagements, the growing lack of support for the Vietnam War for the many reasons discussed earlier in the study, some evidence of a new tendency toward not wanting to get involved abroad, which is complicated by generally increasing public dissatisfaction with governmental institutions and the state of the nation, worries about the present economic recession, all may serve to shed some light on why Americans today respond as they do to our role in the world, seemingly paradoxically at times.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 41, November 1968, p. 8.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 40, October 1968, p. 29.

A Louis Harris survey taken in mid-July 1971,* showed that only if the U.S. itself, Canada, Western Europe and Australia were invaded would Americans think it worthwhile going to war.

"Do you feel that if the following happened, it would be worth going to war again, or not?"

	<u>Worth It</u> %	<u>Not Worth It</u> %	<u>Not Sure</u> %
The U.S. were invaded	95	2	3
Canada were invaded	77	12	11
Western Europe were invaded by the Communists	47	31	22
Communists invaded Australia	40	38	22

Harris found that when queried about military intervention in specific countries--among them Yugoslavia, in case it were invaded by Soviet armed forces as in Czechoslovakia, and a Latin American country in case Castro took over--the American public by strong to overwhelming majorities felt it would not be worth going to war. The evidence given above and in the section "Four Case Histories of Small Interventions," however, shows that even at the time of the armed invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces in the summer of 1968 and of the intense crisis generated after Castro took over in Cuba and the Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs in early 1961, the American people also strongly did not favor U.S. military action or intervention.

*Survey reported in the Washington Post, August 23, 1971, p. A-9.

A question comparable to the ones asked by Louis Harris was asked by Gallup in January 1969 when he queried the public about another situation like Vietnam--and a comparably strong majority of Americans were against sending in U.S. troops.* Gallup found a 5 percentage point rise (57% to 62%) from early 1968 to early 1969 in the number of people who thought the U.S. should not send in troops "if a situation like Vietnam were to develop in another part of the world." Harris noted a 7-point increase (54% to 61%) in six months, from January to July, 1971, in the number of Americans who agreed with the statement that "the U.S. has achieved little by going to war to save other countries, and in the future we should let other countries defend themselves."

Gallup warned, however, that his findings should not be taken to mean that "Americans are ready to return to the isolationism of pre-World War II days" and Harris felt that "it might be a mistake to assume that an ostrich-like isolationism, a kind of 'fortress America' mentality has overtaken the American public."

With this as a background, I should like to go into the public reaction to the use of the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 45, March 1969, p. 23.

The Truman Doctrine

In the late 1940's, the Cold War was characterized among the American people by intense distrust of Russian intentions and by fear of the possibility of another war within the not-too-distant future. In a move to stop a Communist takeover in Greece, President Truman in early March 1947 proposed sending 400 million dollars in economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Mr. Truman outlined his proposals in a message to Congress on March 12, 1947 that marked a switch in American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Besides asking for aid for Greece and Turkey, the President declared his belief "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The policy became known as the Truman Doctrine.

The speech received wide recognition among Americans: more than three out of four said they had heard or read about his speech.*

The Gallup organization (AIPD) at the time took, in their own words, "an intensive survey of public reaction to the 'Truman Doctrine,' using a whole series of questions to bring out attitudes on various different aspects of the issue."** These questions were specifically on the aid program to Greece and Turkey. The responses showed that public reaction was of substantial backing for the program.***

"Do you approve or disapprove of the bill asking for 250 million dollars to aid Greece?"

Yes	56%
No	32%
No Opinion	12%

*Gallup poll press release, March 28, 1947.

**Gallup poll press release, April 2, 1947.

***Gallup poll press release, March 28, 1947.

On the proposed 150 million dollars to Turkey the response was:

Yes	49%
No	36%
No Opinion	15%

By an overwhelming majority, the people favored sending American civilian experts to Greece and Turkey to help supervise the uses to which the money would be put (Greece: 83%; Turkey: 77%), but by substantial majorities were against sending American military advisors to train the Greek and Turkish armies. (Greece: For--37%, Against--54%; Turkey: For--33%, Against--55%). Thus though they clearly supported the aid, they were against military involvements of any kind.

Moreover, the majority of the people felt that the U.N. should have been brought into the matter--although they recognized the reasons why it wasn't. Fifty-six per cent disapproved of the U.N. having been by-passed completely, while 25% approved and 19% had no opinion. The main reasons given by the voters why it was not turned over to the United Nations to handle were: 1) "The U.N. is too slow, speed is needed here;" 2) "the U.N. is not equipped to handle the problem;" and 3) "Russia would use her veto to prevent any action on Greece."

The public did not have a clear idea about the political situation within Greece and Turkey. Over 40% had no opinion as to whether the present Greek government had the backing of more than half of the Greek people and over 50% similarly had no opinion about the Turkish government.

*ibid

Those who gave opinions, however, tended to feel that these governments had the support of the majority of their people.

The significant majority of Americans felt that if other countries had crises similar to the one in Greece, the United States would have to do something about it. They furthermore registered sentiments for a strong stand as regards United States' participation in European affairs.*

"Suppose other nations find themselves in the same fix as Greece. Do you think the United States will have to do something about it?"

Yes	68%
No	20%
No Opinion	12%

"Generally speaking, should the United States take a strong stand in European affairs, or should we try to get out of European affairs?"

Take Strong Stand	58%
Get Out	32%
No Opinion	10%

President Truman's popularity rose 12 percentage points after he made the proposals for aid to Greece and Turkey.** His popularity in the months prior to the aid program had already made a substantial upswing: from a low point of 32% in October 1946, to 35% in January 1947 and to 48% in February just prior to his "Truman Doctrine" speech in Congress. The reasons for

* Ibid.

**Gallup poll press release, March 30 and 31, 1947.

this rise in popularity were not clear, but it was suggested by Gallup that Truman's strong handling of labor leader John L. Lewis had contributed to a large part of it. After the proposals of aid to Greece and Turkey, Truman's approval rose to 60%; in the months following, it descended below 40%, while strikes in the coal, railroad and steel industries were stopped by government action.*

A Gallup poll released on April 4, 1947 showed a rare agreement in opinion by political party differences. When the three out of four Americans who had heard or read about the aid proposals were asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of the bill asking for 250 million dollars to aid Greece?", they replied along party lines as follows:**

	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Republicans</u>
Approve	56%	56%
Disapprove	32%	31%
No Opinion	12%	13%

By educational background, those who had had some college education gave greater support to the Truman Doctrine than the less-educated:***

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
College	65%	26%	9%
High School	57%	30%	13%
Grade School or No School	48%	36%	16%

* It might be useful to point out here some of the reasons why Truman's popularity went from 87% three months after he took office after Roosevelt's death in early 1945, to 32% in October 1946. These were, "a meat shortage, the future of O.P.A. was in confusion, the administration's foreign policy was also subject to confusion owing to Henry A. Wallace's speech which seemingly contradicted the policies of Secretary of State Byrnes. Republicans were campaigning effectively on the 'had enough?' slogan." (*ibid.*)

** Gallup Public Opinion News Service release, April 4, 1947.

*** *Ibid.*

As mentioned earlier, the American public had desired that the United Nations be brought into the program of aid to Greece and Turkey. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg made a proposal in early April, 1947, to give the U.N. power to review our actions in Greece and Turkey; the Gallup organization once again polled the public on its attitude toward involving the U.N.*

"Do you think the problem of aid to Greece and Turkey should be turned over to the United Nations organization?"

	<u>March 28, 1947</u>	<u>April 14, 1947</u>
Yes	56%	63%
No	25%	23%
No Opinion	19%	14%

Again, in September of 1947, a few days before Secretary of State Marshall had spoken before the U.N. assembly, calling for U.N. action on Greece, the American public had been surveyed by Gallup as to its feelings toward opposing Russian influence in the Balkans. The survey showed that the majority favored firm action in containing the Russians in that area and that this attitude did not change substantially when the possibility of Russian development of an atomic bomb entered the discussion.**

"As you know the United States is now sending military supplies and other aid to Greece to keep her and neighboring countries from coming under Russia's control. If we find within the next few weeks that this help is not enough, which one of these steps do you think we should take?"

*Gallup Public Opinion News Service release, April 14, 1947.

**Gallup Public Opinion News Service release, September 24, 1947.

1. Let Russia control Greece and any other countries she wants to.....	4%
2. Let Russia control Greece but plan to stop Russia from getting control of any other countries later on.....	6
3. In cooperation with the United Nations organization, send U.S. troops to patrol the Greek border to stop armed men from coming into the country to make trouble.....	28
4. In cooperation with the United Nations tell Russia that any further move into Greece will be considered a declaration of war against the rest of the world	40
Other miscellaneous answers.....	5
No opinion.....	17

By educational background, the poll results were as follows:

	<u>College</u>	<u>High School</u>	<u>Grade or No School</u>
Alternative 1	3%	3%	5%
Alternative 2	3	6	7
Alternative 3	32	31	26
Alternative 4	44	42	37
Miscellaneous	11	4	4
No Opinion	7	14	21

In order to learn what effect the possibility of Russian possession of the atomic bomb would have on opinion about Greece, the Gallup organization asked a second question:

"Some experts say that Russia will have atomic bombs in about a year. If she does, our advantage of being the only country that makes atomic bombs would end one year from now. In view of this, which of the four steps do you think we should take NOW concerning the present situation in Greece?

Alternative 1.....	3%
Alternative 2.....	4
Alternative 3.....	24
Alternative 4.....	46
Miscellaneous.....	4
No opinion.....	19

As can be seen, there were only slight changes in opinion, with, interestingly enough, the firmest Alternative (4) gaining more votes in this eventuality than any other.

In short, Americans had clearly favored military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, did not want to send U.S. military men to these countries, and strongly supported the U.N. becoming involved in the aid program.

The period 1946-1947 was beset by domestic economic problems and labor crises. From the middle of 1946 to mid-1947, these were the most important problems to the public:

August 3, 1946	Inflation, food shortages, strikes, keeping world peace.
January 31, 1947	Strikes and labor troubles.
May 3, 1947	High cost of living, housing.
May 31, 1947	High cost of living, housing.

A few months after the proposals of aid to Greece and Turkey, the so-called Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe was put forward by Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Gallup surveys of the time showed that a majority of the voters approved the plan for an extension of five billion dollars annually to European nations provided that no new taxes were required at home.* Knowledge of the Marshall Plan made a substantial difference in its support; and as the public became more familiar with the general idea of the Plan, support for it increased.** By October 1947, only about half the voters said they had heard or read of the Marshall Plan; a month later this had increased to 61%. By December, 64% had become familiar with it; and there was simultaneously a sharp gain in public support.***

* Gallup Public Opinion News Service release, July 23, 1947.

** See Gallup Public Opinion News Service releases of July 23, September 24, October 8, October 15, November 2, and December 7, 1947.

*** Gallup Public Opinion News Service release, December 8, 1947.

That the public generally approved of a firmer attitude toward Russia at the time could perhaps be seen in the responses to two questions asked by Gallup.* The first question was about "what sort of policy they wanted to see the new Secretary adopt--a policy similar to that of his predecessor James F. Byrnes, a firmer policy, or a softer one toward Russia":

Marshall should follow Byrnes policy.....	19%
Should be firmer.....	51
Should be softer.....	5
No opinion.....	25

The second question was as follows:

"Do you think that in dealing with Russia and other countries the United States is insisting too much on having its own way?"

Yes.....	12%
No.....	78
No opinion...	10

Thus, in specific instances, as well as in general attitude, the Truman policy of containment of Russian influence in Europe was favored by the American public--at a time when the economic situation at home was critical.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

The Eisenhower Doctrine was proposed by President Eisenhower to a joint session of Congress on January 5, 1957 in the midst of political upheaval in the Middle East. Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956 provoked retaliation by an invasion of Egypt by French, British and Israeli forces at the end of October and beginning of November 1956. Soon after the arrival of a U.N. emergency force in Egypt, on November 15, 1956, the British and French forces withdrew. It was at this juncture that President

*Gallup Public Opinion News Service release, October 15, 1947.

Eisenhower asked Congress for power to give economic, political and military aid where necessary in the Middle East to oppose Soviet aggression. A joint Congressional resolution passed on March 9, 1957, empowered the President to use up to 200 million dollars in military and economic aid to the Middle East. The resolution asserted that the integrity and independence of the Middle East was vital to United States interests, and it became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

At the end of 1956, the majority of the American people strongly disapproved the British, French and Israeli actions in Egypt; felt that the Suez crisis would not lead to a major war; and, by 7-to-1, approved of setting up a U.N. police force to patrol the borders between Israel and Egypt.*

In a Gallup survey, completed just prior to Eisenhower's announcement of the aid plan for the Middle East, 58% of the American public questioned felt that Congress should continue the foreign aid program to help prevent countries from going Communist.**

"During recent years Congress has appropriated about 4 billion dollars each year for countries in other parts of the world to help prevent their going Communistic. Should Congress appropriate the same amount this year, or not?"

	<u>January, 1957</u>	<u>February, 1956</u>
Yes, should	58%	57%
No, should not	28%	25%
No opinion	14%	18%

There was hardly any difference of opinion on this issue between Democrats and Republicans. Age and educational background had the greatest influence on the reaction to this question. Sixty-five per cent of the

*Gallup Public Opinion News Service release, November 23, 1956 and November 25, 1956.

21-to-29 year olds favored the proposal compared to 51 per cent of those age 50 and over. And those with some college education approved of continuing the foreign aid by 64 per cent, compared to a 50 per cent approval among those with grade school education.

While the Eisenhower Doctrine was being debated in Congress, the public gave a favorable response to the doctrine in a Gallup poll taken in early February 1957. The following three questions were asked of the public across the country:*

"Congress is now debating what should be done to keep Russia from getting control of the countries in the Middle East--those in the general area of the Suez Canal. Here are three ideas which have been proposed:

- 1) "Would you approve or disapprove if the United States gave economic--that is, financial--aid to the countries in the Middle East area that are friendly to the United States?"

GIVE ECONOMIC AID?

Approve	70%
Disapprove	19%
Neither, don't know	11%

- 2) "Would you approve or disapprove if the United States sent arms and war material to help build up the armies of the countries in that area that are friendly to us?"

SEND ARMS, WAR MATERIAL?

Approve	53%
Disapprove	34%
Neither, don't know	13%

- 3) "Would you approve or disapprove if the United States were to promise to send our armed forces if Russian troops attack these countries?"

Approve	50%
Disapprove	34%
Neither, don't know	16%

*Gallup Public Opinion News Service Release, February 3 or 4, 1957.

When looked at by party affiliation, it could be noted that more members of the Republican party, which had often been regarded as isolationist, favored sending economic aid and using armed forces than the Democrats. But a slightly higher percentage of Democrats than Republicans approved of sending arms and war material to the Middle East.

At the end of February 1957, President Eisenhower appealed to the Israelis to remove their forces from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba. Just prior to this appeal, Gallup had once again queried the American public on its feelings towards a U.N. police force patrolling the disputed areas between Israel and Egypt.*

"It has been suggested that the United Nations ask its member countries to supply soldiers for a police force to patrol the Israel borders. Do you think this is a good idea or a poor idea?"

The results among all adults:

UN POLICE FORCE?

Good Idea	58%
Poor Idea	24%
No Opinion	18%

The second question was asked of those who favored the establishment of such a police force:

"If this is done, should the U.S. send troops as part of this police force, or not?"

The results among those who approve of an international police force:

U.S. SEND TROOPS?

Yes, should	60%
No, should not	11%
No opinion	29%

Nearly 3 out of 4 (73%) of those with a college background approved of a U.N. police force compared to those with a grade school education who approved of the idea by more than 2-to-1.

Thus, as ten years earlier, during the proposal of the Truman Doctrine, the public favored the Eisenhower Doctrine, but wished the U.N. to become involved.

President Eisenhower's popularity went up 4 percentage points (75% to 79%) from December 1956 to February 1957. This might have been due, however, not only to the Eisenhower Doctrine proposal, but also to the inauguration of Eisenhower into his second term in office, which took place in the same month. A landslide victory by Eisenhower in the Presidential election of 1956 had already raised his popularity from 67% in August 1956 to 75% in December 1956. By March 1957, however, a Gallup poll report showed that Eisenhower's popularity had already dropped from the 79% of February, to 72%.*

The most important problems to the American people around the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine, as polled by the Gallup organization, were: October 26, 1956--"Threat of war, foreign policy and high cost of living"; September 15, 1957--"Keeping out of war, high cost of living, racial troubles."

*See the section of this report, "Four Case Histories of Small Interventions" for the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine in Lebanon one year later and public reaction to it.

FOUR CASE HISTORIES OF SMALL INTERVENTIONS

How has the public reacted since World War II to instances of small, quick uses of American forces? In two cases, in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, and in the Dominican Republic on April 28, 1965, large majorities approved of the actions of sending in troops. In the case of the Dominican Republic, an overwhelming majority favored American troop intervention, despite the fact that a substantial majority thought that American troops were likely to stay for the next year or two, and, among the media, the influential newspapers were strongly against the intervention.

"How do you feel about President Johnson's sending troops into the Dominican Republic?"*

Favorable	76%
Unfavorable	17%
No Opinion	7%

"Do you think our troops are likely to stay in the Dominican Republic for the next year or two or do you think Johnson will be able to take our troops out soon?"*

Likely to stay	41%
Take out soon	24%
Other replies	3%
No Opinion	32%

To place it in the context of other political, social and international events: the American troop landing in the Dominican Republic almost coincided with the deployment of the first U.S. combat units in South Vietnam and the rapid extension of that war. Vietnam was in the forefront of the news; a few days prior to the Dominican Republic military intervention, students had demonstrated in Washington against the United States' bombing of North Vietnam. On the domestic scene, the entire first three months of the year had

*Gallup poll press release, June 2, 1965.

been a turmoil of racial demonstrations and, in some cases, fearful violence: the demonstrations in Selma, Alabama, the killing of Malcolm X in New York City and of civil rights workers in the South had taken place. However, President Johnson had just gone into his first elected term in office with an overwhelming victory at the polls, so his popularity remained high at the beginning of 1965. Normally, such domestic unrest would strongly reduce Presidential popularity. On the other hand, the U.S. was just "officially" entering the Vietnam war, and the initial surge of support for the war effort, which accompanied the beginning of each war might have temporarily helped Johnson's popularity at that time.

President Johnson's popularity dropped 3 percentage points after the Santo Domingo Crisis, but it is difficult to know whether this was caused by the crisis or not; after all, the public was strongly in favor of the action. (Eisenhower's, on the other hand, went up 6 percentage points after U.S. troops went into Lebanon in 1958.) As the crisis did not draw on, the Dominican Republic issue had no lasting effect one way or another on President Johnson's approval (which increased 6 percentage points in the next month). In the world of issues in June 1965, two months after the intervention, the Dominican Republic crisis seemed to have had little impact on the fears and worries of the American public.

Most Important Problem*

"What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?"

June, 1965

International Problems	53%
Vietnam Crisis	23%
Threat of War	16
Prestige abroad	9
Spread of World Communism	9
Dominican Republic Crisis	4
Other replies	2
Domestic Problems	48%
Civil rights	23%
High cost of living	4
Lack of religion, immorality	4
Unemployment	3
Internal Communism	3
Juvenile delinquency	2
Poverty	2
Other replies	11
No Opinion	5%

The crisis in Lebanon in July 1958 came in the midst of rapid and intense changes in the political balance of the Middle East. The Suez crisis of 1956, when Nasser of Egypt had seized control of the Suez Canal, British and French forces had gone into Egypt and Israeli troops had invaded the Sinai peninsula, had been quieted by the positioning of a U.N. emergency force in Egypt. President Eisenhower had asked Congress at the beginning of 1957 to give him power to give military and economic aid to the Middle East. Congress had passed a resolution authorizing this aid and asserting that the integrity and independence of the Middle East was vital to U.S. interests--

*Gallup Political Index, No. 2, July 1965, p. 5. Sub-totals within categories add to more than the total for the category since some persons gave more than one answer in the same category. Totals for categories add to more than 100 per cent since some persons named both a domestic and an international problem.

the Eisenhower Doctrine. In February, 1958, Egypt and Syria had merged into the United Arab Republic with Nasser at its head. On July 14, 1958, there was a coup d'etat in Baghdad, Iraq. The next day, on July 15, 1958, 8,000 U.S. troops landed in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese President Chamoun.

In nationwide interviewing done by the Gallup poll organization during the week-end of the crisis, six out of ten among the American public said that they did not know why Lebanon was in the news in the days immediately prior to the difficulties brought on by the army coup in Iraq.

To the four in ten who had paid some attention to the Lebanese situation: "It's a country with a revolt or civil war."*

In an international poll of the major cities of the world, taken by Gallup during this time, Americans in three cities in the U.S. were asked whether they approved of the U.S. action and whether they would favor sending a U.N. emergency force into Lebanon.** In the questions below, the percentage responses of the three American cities are combined.

"Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. action of sending troops into Lebanon?"

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
New York, Chicago and San Francisco	59%	27%	14%

"Do you favor or oppose the U.N. sending an emergency force into Lebanon?"

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
New York, Chicago and San Francisco	79%	10%	11%

The most important problem to the nationwide public on February 2, 1958 was "keeping out of war." This was edged out by "unemployment" on

* Gallup poll press release July 20, 1958.

** Gallup poll press release July 23, 1958.

March 23, 1958. Again, on November 16, 1958, "keeping out of war" was considered to be the most important problem. The beginning of 1958 had seen an economic recession in the U.S. with a high rate of unemployment and falling farm prices. A peak of five million unemployed had been reached in March of that year. In June, the bribery hearings on Sherman Adams, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant, came to a head and Eisenhower admitted that Adams had been imprudent. (This did not affect President Eisenhower's popularity.) The previous year, Eisenhower's popularity had fallen over 20% from the high after his second-term inauguration in January to the end of the year after the racial turmoil in Little Rock, Arkansas had taken place. From the beginning of 1958 to July, Eisenhower's popularity dropped still another 8 percentage points. After the troop dispatch to Lebanon, Eisenhower's approval rose 6%, but dropped that amount by the end of the year after the Congressional election, which the Democrats won.

Two other forms of intervention were the Bay of Pigs landing on April 17, 1961 of a small number of Cuban exiles, supported by the U.S., and the sending of American troops into Cambodia in early 1970 to clear out North Vietnamese sanctuaries while we were already at war. Although the American public approved of the President's handling of both these crises, it was not in favor of sending in U.S. troops. This made for a seemingly paradoxical response in the case of Cambodia, where, of course, President Nixon had already sent in American troops. In both Cuba and Cambodia, however, the public approved of doing something about the crises, but by means short of committing U.S. troops. Both President Kennedy's and President Nixon's popularity rose in the aftermath of the crises.

The abortive attempt of 1,200 anti-Castro exiles, aided by the U.S., to invade Cuba and start an uprising, apparently contributed to a substantial rise in the public's approval of the way President Kennedy was handling his job as President. His public approval had already risen 5 percentage points in the month prior to the Bay of Pigs landing; after the Bay of Pigs it went up another 5 per cent to a high of 83 per cent. Moreover, there was a strong approval of Kennedy's handling of the situation, combined with an understandably very high percentage of no opinion--high, despite the fact that Cuba had evoked considerable interest among the public.*

"Do you approve or disapprove of the way Kennedy is handling the situation in Cuba?"

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	61%	15%	24%

"How much interest would you say you have in the news of the situation in Cuba--a great deal, a fair amount, or hardly any or none?"

	<u>A great deal</u>	<u>A fair amount</u>	<u>Hardly any or none</u>
National	44%	40%	16%

Yet the people did not want to get into a war and they barely agreed that the U.S. should get involved to the point of giving economic and military aid to anti-Castro forces. They did feel, however, that the U.S. should do "something" about Castro Cuba and strongly favored a trade embargo.**

*Gallup poll special release, May 5, 1961.

**Gallup poll news releases, May 7, 1961 and May 10, 1961.

"Some people say that the U.S. should refuse to buy or sell products to Cuba so long as Castro is in power. Do you agree or disagree?"

END ALL TRADE WITH CUBA?

Agree	63%
Disagree	23
No Opinion	14

"Some people say that the U.S. should aid the anti-Castro forces with money and war materials. Do you agree or disagree?"

AID ANTI-CASTRO FORCES?

Agree	44%
Disagree	41
No Opinion	15

"Some people say that the U.S. should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree?"

SEND U.S. TROOPS INTO CUBA?

Agree	24%
Disagree	65
No Opinion	11

The Cuban crisis had, of course, been building up under the Eisenhower administration over the entire previous year with the expropriation of American property in Cuba by the new Cuban government of Fidel Castro, Cuban recognition of Communist China while denouncing the 1952 U.S. military aid treaty and by the American economic and diplomatic countermeasures. The U-2 incident of the previous year and the intense Russian reaction to it, the crisis in the Belgian Congo, the anti-American riots in Japan, the partial blockade of West Berlin by East Germany, had contributed to the public fear of war, and once again, on March 15, 1961, one month before the Bay of Pigs landing, the public had considered "keeping out of war" the most important problem.

The Cambodian intervention of May 1, 1970 is of particular interest, as it came as an extension of a war that the great majority of the public already felt we had made a mistake getting into. It also was deeply related to the domestic tragedy of the shooting at Kent State University on May 4th, and was the target of nationwide student demonstrations and intense opposition from the U. S. Senate. The public's awareness of the Cambodian situation was extraordinarily high.* Its reaction to the intervention seemed paradoxical. From May 1-4, shortly after the entry of U.S. troops into Cambodia, the Gallup poll organization asked five questions of Americans across the country:**

"Have you heard or read about the fighting in Cambodia between the Cambodians and the North Vietnamese and Vietcong?"

May 1-4, 1970

	<u>Yes</u> %	<u>No</u> %
National	92	8

"Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Nixon is handling the Cambodian situation?"

May 1-4, 1970

	<u>Approve</u> %	<u>Disapprove</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
National	50	35	15

*President Nixon had brought the Cambodian situation to the public in a televised address on the evening of April 30th.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 60, June 1970, pp. 3-7.

"Do you think we should send U.S. troops to help Cambodia, or not?"

May 1-4, 1970

	<u>Should</u> %	<u>Should Not</u> %	<u>Qualified</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
National	25	59	7	9

"As you see the situation at this time, do you think the U.S. will be able to avoid a major involvement of our troops in the Cambodian situation, or not?"

May 1-4, 1970

	<u>Yes</u> %	<u>No</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
National	30	53	17

"Do you think the U.S. should send arms and material to help Cambodia, or not?"

May 1-4, 1970

	<u>Should</u> %	<u>Should Not</u> %	<u>Qualified</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
National	48	35	6	11

While a majority of the public approved of the way Nixon had handled the Cambodian situation, an even greater majority thought we should not send troops to help Cambodia. Once again it would appear that although the public did not want to get involved in a war, it supported action taken by the President--even in this case, when the action was, or appeared to be, an extension of a war which was growing increasingly insupportable to the public. As usual, the people favored giving aid short of sending in our own troops.

There was a 2 percentage point increase between April and May 22-24, after the first U.S. troops went into Cambodia, in the numbers of those who

thought the U.S. did not make a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam.* Although this is a very small increase and could be attributed to statistical error, it did indicate that the public did not react unfavorably to the Cambodian intervention. Among the age groups, the 21-29 year olds reacted most favorably and increased their support for the Vietnam war 5 percentage points between April and the end of May; all other age groups increased support by 1 per cent. By education, those who were college-educated were the only group to decrease their support of the Vietnam war between April and the end of May--this, by 2 per cent. The high school-educated and the grade school-educated increased their support 2 to 3 per cent.**

Similarly, approval of the President's handling of his job as President went up 3 percentage points nationwide after the beginning of the Cambodian action.*** Not all age groups increased their support, however. By age, the greatest increase in approval of the President came from the 30-49 year olds (8%). On the other hand, the approval by the 21-29 year olds went down by 3%.

By education, a similar pattern could be seen as with support for the war. Both the high school- and grade school-educated increased their approval of the President between April and the end of May: the grade school-educated by 7%, the high school-educated by 5%. The college-educated group, however, dropped their support for the President by 5% during this time.****

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 61, July 1970, p. 4.

**For the approval and disapproval of the U.S. having sent troops into Vietnam from the beginning of the war until the middle of 1971, by age and education, please see pp. 15-17.

***Gallup Opinion Index, No. 61, July 1970, p. 2.

****For support for the President by age and education throughout the Vietnam war, see pp. 29-31.

Similar to the time of the other troop interventions mentioned above, "war" was very high in the public's mind as the most important problem of the day. As a result of the strife on college campuses, however, in late May 1970, the public for the first time named campus unrest as the most important problem.*

	%
1. Campus unrest	27
2. Vietnam War (including Cambodia)	22
3. Other international problems	14
4. Racial strife	13
5. High cost of living	10
6. Polarization of American people	5
7. Teenage problems/juvenile delinquency	4
8. Crime and lawlessness	4
9. Drug addiction	3
 Others	 16
No Opinion	2
	<hr/> 120%**

In a previous poll, conducted in January of the same year, Vietnam had been considered the top problem, followed by the high cost of living and racial strife.***

Conclusions

The basic conclusion that can be derived from this study is that Americans have a strong and persistent fear and dislike of war and their wishes are for peaceful solutions as long as they are possible. However, when the President has taken action, the initial public response has been support for the President. If, however, the engagement was extended and casualties began to mount, public support dropped. Wars as a rule do not benefit Presidential popularity.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 61, July 1970, p. 3.

**Table adds to more than 100% because of multiple answers.

***Gallup Opinion Index, No. 61, July 1970, p. 3.

Desire not to become involved in military engagements is not a new phase of public opinion. Throughout the last three decades, in every instance that the question was asked, Americans preferred economic and technical aid over military involvement of any sort. They maintained this attitude throughout this period of strong internationalism, during which time they favored foreign involvements, collective security pacts, the strengthening of the U.N. and the containment of communist influence. We can see examples of this desire not to become involved militarily from the time of aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 to the Cuban Bay of Pigs crisis in early 1961, and during the Cambodian intervention in 1970. However, in each of these instances, whatever the action of the President, it was supported by the public.

Public support for the Vietnam war, as of May 1971, had hit a new low. The study showed briefly that until recently, the greatest support for the war had come from college-educated people and from the 21-29 year old group; the support of the grade-school educated and those 50 and over was consistently about ten percentage points lower than any other groups. This was, however, consistent with the greater support of the college-educated and the young, throughout the past three decades, for internationalism and interventionism.

The question as to whether Americans would again favor such an intervention in the foreseeable future cannot be easily answered. The Korean War was more unpopular with the public than the Vietnam war for the same period of time, that is, the length of time the Korean War lasted. Yet, a decade later, the public supported a new military move in Vietnam, and within the decade, a series of minor military interventions had taken place in such

diverse places as Lebanon, Cuba (by proxy) and the Dominican Republic, that were supported by the American public. However, these moves were taken in the decades in which the threat of first Russian and then Chinese communist expansionism was feared by Americans, a fear which appears to have diminished in the last few years.

Also, it has been suggested by some analysts that the disillusioning experience of Vietnam, unlike that of Korea, might have so affected the public as to make it a turning point for a new attitude toward foreign involvement (as World War II was when Americans changed from dislike of any foreign involvement to an internationalist attitude). So far, however, it is too early to know whether the little survey evidence we have showing a change in attitude is a parallel reaction to the dislike of the Vietnam war itself or indicates a new long-term trend such as that, mentioned above, which occurred after World War II.

Clearly, Americans prefer any action short of a military one and have always done so, within the last three decades. But they have also supported Presidential action abroad, apparently in the belief that with his greater knowledge of the situation, he was making a move that he deemed necessary--unless time and events seemed to show that the action was unsuccessful, in which case the public withdrew its support. There are no indications that these feelings, which are pragmatically oriented, have changed among the public at large.

II. MARTIAL LAW, REVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Imposition of martial law in a small Asian country is a commonplace event. Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Korea have recently sought order through domestic use of military power, and even the People's Republic of China needed to impose military authority on most domestic institutions in 1967 and has subsequently experienced difficulty in reimposing civilian authority. But in the Philippines declaration of martial law is an extraordinary event. Suddenly the most stable country in Southeast Asia (except Australia and New Zealand) faces political upheaval. Suddenly the only developing country in Southeast Asia which has consistently maintained a democratic system in which opposing parties regularly defeat one another in elections and peacefully replace each other in power encounters doubts about whether the 1973 election will be held. Suddenly the country where political opposition and freedom of the press have been more vigorous than anywhere else in the developing world, and indeed more vigorous than in the United States, arrests opposition politicians and imprisons its most distinguished editors.

At this time nobody--including in all probability Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, who declared martial law--can accurately foretell whether Filipino democracy will survive its current crisis. If it does not survive, the case for democracy in developing nations will be much harder to make in the future because the Philippines have until now constituted the most

*By William H. Overholt. Substantial parts of this article are drawn from the author's "Peasant Organizational Capabilities and the Possibility of Revolution in the Philippines", presented at the 1972 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. This paper was not originally written for the Nixon Doctrine Contract, but is included for relevance. It was published in Southeast Asia Quarterly 11, 2 (Spring 1973).

vigorous, stable and successful example of democracy in the third world. Informed opinion on the possibility of democracy in developing nations fluctuates violently with intellectual fads in the west, but as long as there are examples of democracy hope remains that the ideal of political equality can coexist with the ideals of prosperity and economic justice. Euphoria in the 1950s that the new nations would succeed in their almost unanimous aspirations to liberal democracy changed in the 1960s to pessimism about the possibility for democracy anywhere in the third world, because rule passed from elected leaders to military officers in most new nations and because American misadventures in Southeast Asia exacerbated an ideological climate predisposed to denigration of non-military as well as military influences of the west on the third world. The early seventies have brought with them the recognition that developing countries which allowed more political freedom have outperformed those with harsher (communist or non-communist) regimes in terms of economic growth and that the most democratic countries have also been among the most stable. But full democracy was nurtured carefully in only a few of the third world countries, and it is a delicate system until it becomes institutionalized, so threats to the survival of a few democracies like the Philippines and Chile threaten to render third world democracies extinct.

II

The flaws in Philippine society and politics have long been obvious and have been well reported. The society distributes its wealth in a grossly unequal fashion. Linguistic and religious groups divide popular loyalties. The governmental process is suffused with corruption. Ingrown elites dominate politics at the upper levels. Poverty is omnipresent. These problems are as serious as their counterparts in any other Southeast Asian country.

At the same time the Philippines defeated in the 1950s a communist insurgency which once seemed overwhelmingly powerful and have gone on to become the only developing nation in Southeast Asia to remain stable since World War II. They have maintained the most democratic electoral process in the third world, and they have maintained freedom of the press as carefully as has the United States. And they have done this while performing quite respectably, although not spectacularly, in economic growth. What is hard to explain is the successes, not the failures. The present threat of failure, and the ominous depth of that failure should it occur, can be understood only against the background of careful analysis of previous success. The roots of prior success have been the strength of the central government, the broad base of the political party system, and the organizational and strategic difficulties facing a revolutionary insurgency.

The Philippine government has been strong and effective by Asian standards, although its inefficiency and corruption relative to western standards have always annoyed western tourists. The basic competence of the governmental institutions results from the high literacy and extensive experience gained under American rule. Americans devoted an extremely high proportion of government revenues to education, and Filipinos continued this tradition, so the government draws its personnel from a literate society, indeed from an overeducated society. Because Americans decided at an early date to train Filipinos for self-government, and because insufficient Americans were available to staff the Philippine bureaucracies, Filipino experience in administration dates back to the early years of the century, and virtually total Filipinization of the bureaucracies was achieved well before World War II. Moreover, civil service principles were introduced more rapidly into the colonial Philippine system than was possible (because of politics) in the United States. This system was destroyed by the

Japanese but was in large part reconstituted. As a result the government has been effective in defeating the communist threat posed by the Huks in the early 1950s, effective in constructing public works (schools, roads, stimulation of rice production),¹ effective in overriding strong regional antagonisms which elsewhere would have led to civil war or immobilism,² and effective in controlling its military forces. (The latter remains true even today; martial law was declared by the civilian President, not imposed or forced upon the President by the military. But continued civilian control cannot be predicted in the absence of legitimate, democratic institutions.)

Philippine government corruption might appear to belie this effectiveness, but it does not. Corruption does exist, does reduce bureaucratic effectiveness, and does alienate the middle class, but corruption appears greater in the Philippines than in other developing nations largely because the free Philippine press exposes and even exaggerates the corruption in ways that are impossible elsewhere. (The total corruption "exposed" by the press has on occasion exceeded the total government budget.) Much of the corruption results from the conflict of values which occurs in every developing nation: the villager who does not help his relatives is corrupt beyond redemption in the eyes of his fellow villagers, but when he goes to work in the town and does help his relatives he is called nepotistic by his American-trained superiors.

In addition, corruption is in large part the price paid for more important things. Corruption resulted from rapid assimilation of partly

¹For instance, H.A. Averch, F.H. Denton, and J.E. Koehler, A Crisis of Ambiguity (Santa Monica: RAND, 1970), found the Marcos administration rice, school and road programs effective.

²All available statistical analyses of political activity, democratic and insurgent, point to regional ties as the most significant variable.

trained Filipinos into the bureaucracies after the 1916 Jones Act, from Japanese destruction of relatively competent bureaucracies,³ from postwar economic difficulties, from the great power of political leaders,⁴ from the political patronage system, and from the value conflict between the mutual aid responsibilities of the villager and the achievement norms applied to the villager-turned-bureaucrat. But Filipinization of the bureaucracies provided valuable experience in self-government. The war with Japan consolidated Filipino nationalism.⁵ The great powers of political leaders provide the flexibility and authority necessary to meet the challenges of development. The patronage system maintains popular interest in, and support for, a democratic party system which reaches into every barrio and draws information and political support to the government.⁶ And penetration of the bureaucracies by the ascriptive values of the village makes governmental processes comprehensible to the people and minimizes popular alienation from what would otherwise be cold bureaucrats. A Philippine government free of corruption would be less like Chicago, which is a corrupt system that works, and more like New York, which is a less corrupt system that doesn't work nearly so well.

The party system is relatively even more effective than the central government institutions. Whereas politics in most colonies was highly

³On the history of Philippine bureaucracies, cf. O.D. Corpuz, Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila, 1957).

⁴Cf. John H. Romani, The Philippine Presidency (Manila, 1956); Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines (Boston, 1965), Chapter 5.

⁵On the need for central concentration of power in developing countries, cf. S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), Chapter 3.

⁶Jose V. Abueva, "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft to Political Development," East West Center Review (1966). Cf. also Averch et al., op. cit., on rural political attitudes.

centralized, and spread only gradually from the capital to remote areas, American rulers held village-level elections early in the century and gradually expanded political competition to higher and higher levels. Thus politics, and political party competition, became rooted in the villages. The issues and personalities were important to the villagers. The role of politician became diffuse (like that of village elder), and the political leader became important because he was arbiter of family feuds as well as dispenser of patronage.⁷ Elections are fiercely contested and well-publicized; Marcos sought to visit every barrio in the country. Villages which support a winner can expect to be repaid by feeder roads, irrigation ditches, schools, and other public works vital to their welfare; the existence of only two parties, and a healthy tradition of voting the incumbents out to make room for new faces, assure that these benefits are broadly distributed. Filipino peasants have become what is probably the non-communist world's most politicized peasantry. The party and patronage system gives most people a sense that they understand politics, can obtain their just demands through the political system, and have a representative whom they know personally and who is personally interested in them.

In a paper read at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting last March, I summarized this situation as follows:

⁷Cf. M. Hollnsteiner, Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Village (Diliman: Community Development Research Council, 1963), 95, on the diffuseness of the political role. Also Carl H. Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties (New Haven, 1966), 114-117, on the broad popular base of the parties. Cf. also Averch, op. cit., 64-66; Carl Lande, "Political Attitudes and Behavior in the Philippines," Philippine Journal of Public Administration III, 3 (July 1959), p. 353.

In short, the Philippine government is effective in its slow and inefficient way, and the party system roots the government in the people. This government will not disintegrate for internal reasons unless the President or the Constitutional Convention acts in extremely foolish and unlikely ways.⁸ Revolution will come--if at all--through homicide rather than suicide. Moreover, if the government did disintegrate in the absence of a disciplined revolutionary organization, provincial rivalries would assert themselves and the political parties and the army would dissolve into feuding groups of families. The result would be Burmese musical chairs, not revolution.

President Marcos may--but may not--have embarked on a course of the kind which I then held unlikely. The crucial point is that Philippine democracy has been a strong political structure by the standards of developing nations and particularly by the standards of Southeast Asian developing nations. Other Southeast Asian governments are like Volkswagens--easily crushed by other vehicles set on collision. By Southeast Asian standards the Philippine government has been a heavy limousine--relatively impervious to hostile vehicles but vulnerable to the follies of its own drivers.

III

The government was strong. On the other side of the coin, the potential oppositions were weak.

One obvious potential opposition was the military, which had the organization and weapons necessary to overthrow the government. But the military was small, fragmented, effectively controlled by Congressional budgetary limitations, and limited in its political role by the personal dependence of military officers on politicians (including opposition politicians), by the democratic values of some high-ranking military officers, and by its own lack of revolutionary ideology and political skills. Military takeover was unlikely and would have led to chaos

⁸ E.g., attempts by the President to perpetuate himself or his wife in office. Also, major reforms can be disruptive, as in the French and 1911 Chinese revolutions.

rather than revolution. Since the Philippines faced no strong external threat, this small, loyal and fragmented military was exactly what the country needed. But President Marcos has installed key officers whose highest loyalties were to him personally, has increased the military budget, and has deployed or developed weapons which carry prestige but have no military relevance to the Philippine situation--including a rocket, the Bong-Bong, named after his son. And now he has called in this army to exercise substantial political and administrative responsibility.

Various urban groups have been capable of relatively minor disruption, including demonstrations and more recently some assassinations and bombings, but they lack the organization, weapons and strategic position to overthrow the government or carry through a revolution. Students indulge in revolutionary rhetoric, and more frequently express discontent than their peers in other nations, but even students basically accept democratic processes and therefore seek reform rather than revolution.⁹ The Communist Party has been isolated and corrupt, a group led by intellectuals who once could sit in their limousines and order peasants to their deaths but who have squandered their legitimacy and their funds. Financial support from foreigners was often spent on luxuries. Peasants abhorred the cold ruthlessness of urban intellectual Jesus Lava and others like him. And the rural Huks stopped subsidizing the urban Party after a 1965 dispute over the election of Macapagal to the presidency. (Characteristically, the Huks supported Macapagal because he came from Pampanga province, the home province of most of the Huks, and because they thought Macapagal would alleviate rural

⁹ Robert O. Tilman, "Student Unrest in the Philippines," Asian Survey (Sept. 1970).

suffering; the Communist Party supported Macapagal's opponent in hopes of aggravating rural misery to the point of uprising.)¹⁰ Because of these inadequacies of urban groups, and because of the example of peasant revolution in China, Filipino revolutionaries have generally depended on the rural areas.

Creation of an effective revolutionary organization and military machine in the rural Philippines would be difficult even with popular support and with guerrilla tactics. Creation of the Red Army in China was possible only because, as Mao Tse-tung pointed out,¹¹ the central government was divided and large areas between provinces were not under unified control. Even under these favorable conditions the Red Army was in continual danger of extinction until the Japanese destroyed the Kuomintang's urban base and provided a screen behind which the Red Army could operate without fear of Chiang Kai-shek's troops. But in the Philippines, because of the small size and island character of the country, and because of the relative effectiveness of the government, prospective revolutionaries have hitherto found no sanctuaries and few power vacuums. The principal exception to this generalization was, of course, the period immediately after World War II when the previous Japanese destruction of the government and party system, and the exit of the Japanese, turned the whole country into a power vacuum. Peace returned as soon as minimally effective government was restored. Power vacuums remain only in isolated, non-strategic areas and in a few more significant places like Isabela Province.

¹⁰ These comments are based on interviews conducted by the author.

¹¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist," Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 65.

Supposing that these strategic difficulties were overcome, revolution would require creation of a highly disciplined organization based on the rural poor.¹² Creation and maintenance of a highly disciplined organization, and destruction of the opponent's organizations, constitute the central theme of revolution and the central preoccupation of revolutionaries. Discontent without organization is a school of guppies in an Establishment sea, and military strategy not implemented by disciplined organization is just so many squirts of strategic ink. Where the government's organization falls apart essentially by itself, as in the French and Cuban revolutions, the organizational requirements of the revolutionaries are reduced. But where the government will not fall apart by itself, as in the Philippines and as in China during the period of the Long March, survival depends upon superior organization.

The army and professional party members represent only the visible peak of a revolutionary organization. Below them are organized mass groups. Control over such organized mass groups constitutes the goal of revolution and the principal means of waging revolution. Mass organizations serve as reservoirs of personnel and funds and as an intelligence net. The Chinese Communists relied upon an extraordinary network of local organizations, including Young Communists, Young Vanguards, Children's Brigades, Young Communist Leagues (for women), anti-Japanese societies, nursing schools, weaving schools, tilling brigades, Poor People's Societies, Peasant Guards,

¹²For a detailed discussion of the theoretical issues involved in analysis of the importance of organization in a revolution, and of the ability of a particular group to organize, see William H. Overholt, Organization, Revolution and Democracy: Toward a Sociology of Politics (New Haven: unpublished Yale University dissertation, 1972), chapter on "Revolution." For organizational approaches to revolution, cf. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, 1966); Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (New York: 1952). Huntington, op. cit.; Barrington Moore, Political Power and Social Theory (New York, 1965).

and committees for education, cooperatives, military training, political training, land, public health, partisan training, revolutionary defense, enlargement of the Red Army, agrarian mutual aid, and Red Army land tilling, as well as the Communist Party itself and even the older Elder Brothers Society.¹³

As Philip Selznick has argued, the central "party cannot be related to an amorphous mass. Its articulation must be to something definite so that clear lines of access and command may be established."¹⁴ More organized groups are more useful to the party than less organized, and more formally and hierarchically organized groups are more useful than less formally hierarchically organized ones. But not all social groups are equally organizable and therefore all groups are not equally useful as a mass base. The insurgency which rests itself on a base of lumpenproletarians or scattered and leaderless peasants or anarchistic students will merely expend resources and weaken its central party without corresponding advantages. The crucial question thus becomes: What groups are capable of organization, or susceptible to it? Marx believed that French peasants were incapable of organization, and many Marxists have long decried reliance on the peasants because they extended their mentor's argument to all peasantries. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung's success has inclined observers ranging from Lin Piao to high American officials to believe in the possibility of peasant revolutions throughout the developing world. Can Filipino peasants organize adequately for revolution?

¹³This list is taken, much of it verbatim, from Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1941), pp. 234ff.

¹⁴Selznick, op. cit., 81, 97.

First, one must discover whether they want to organize for revolution, and then one must ask how effective they would be if they did want to organize.

Frustration resulting from poverty and inequality is the cliche diagnosis of any rural revolt, and this explanation has been considered adequate by most studies of Philippine problems. Ignoring for the moment that the current troubles have been largely urban, one must note that history's most stable societies have been extremely poor and unequal. In the Philippines, the rural insurgency has for decades remained confined to the relatively well-to-do plains of Central Luzon, and intense agitation in poorer areas has met with indifference. So poverty or rising expectations cannot explain revolutionary rural discontent.

Land inequality is a terribly serious problem in the Philippines, a worse problem than its counterpart in pre-revolutionary China. Failure to deal with this problem is a serious debit on the ledger of Philippine society and polity, as serious a debit as political democracy is a credit. But land inequality has proved to be a much more complicated and much less direct stimulant of revolutionary discontent than is generally believed. Popular opinion among American conservatives, American radicals, and the American middle ascribes rural revolt almost exclusively to such inequality. Statistical analyses of individual countries more often show contradictory or negative relationships between land inequality and support for revolution.¹⁵ On the other hand, global studies indicate a weak positive relation-

¹⁵ Roy Hofheinz, Jr. "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success," in A.D. Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle, 1969); Averch et al., op. cit.; Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency," World Politics (April 1968) and his "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion," American Political Science Review (Dec. 1969); Mitchell's work is challenged in Averch et al., 207n., and in J.M. Paige, "Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Reanalysis," World Politics (Oct. 1970). Cf. also Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City, 1955).

ship between land inequality and violence.¹⁶ Both the public and the professors are wrong: inequality does cause discontent, but the statistics fail to disclose this because scholars ignore the fact that other things besides discontent are necessary for revolutionary organization:¹⁷ on the other side, the public usually does not understand how completely frustration due to land inequality can be mitigated by other social ties.

In the Philippines, land inequality is a source of discontent--despite statistical analyses purporting to demonstrate the opposite--as one can learn by talking with enough peasants and by observing the support peasants give to politicians and revolutionaries who promise to alleviate inequality. But the effects of inequality are also greatly muted by a complex set of mutual obligations and exchanges of favors between rich and poor, and by an extraordinary network of familial ties between rich and poor.¹⁸ The landlord is usually an uncle who lives nearby, and who can be trusted to find a job for one's son and to open his doors in a typhoon.

Frustrated nationalism has enjoyed a major role in virtually every revolution,¹⁹ and nationalism frustrated by the Japanese legitimated the formation of a Huk organization and army during World War II. Had Americans in the Philippines behaved like the French in Vietnam after the war,

¹⁶ Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Insurgency: the Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics (April 1964).

¹⁷ A more technical discussion is available in the chapter on revolution in my Organization, Revolution and Democracy, op. cit. The previous chapter discusses some of the mathematical nuances of the problem.

¹⁸ Frank Lynch, "Social Class in a Bikol Town," in S.C. Espiritu & C.L. Hunt, eds., Social Foundations of Community Development (Manila: Garcia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 164-169; Mary B. Hollnsteiner, "Reciprocity in the Lowland Philippines," Frank Lynch ed., Four Readings on Philippine Values (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1964).

¹⁹ Huntington, op. cit., 300ff.

nationalism might have become the Huks' fuel supply, but rapid independence precluded such a possibility. Nationalist anti-Americanism is a strong force among urban students and other middle class groups, but peasant attitudes are better represented by the reported 5.2 million people who seek American statehood for the Philippines. In the 1950's the Huks had to abandon anti-American slogans because such slogans proved anathema to the peasantry.

Other social tensions can also provide frustration to motivate political organization. In China the unjustly lauded Confucian family system oppressed women and children, and Mao exploited family tensions to develop organizations of youth and women that became dependable supporters of the revolution.²⁰ But Filipino families are permissive toward children and more than generous in allotting power to women.²¹ Women's Lib. has no future in the Philippines and offers no significant support to revolutionaries.

Anomie visits peasant villages as frequently as frustration. Characteristically, economic modernization breaks up extended peasant families, education erodes peasant beliefs, and mobility erodes traditional social

²⁰ Cf. deed number seven of the fourteen great deeds listed in Mao's report on Hunan, Selected Works, op. cit., cf. also the description of mass organization in David and Isabel Crook, Revolution in a Chinese Village (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).

²¹ George M. Guthrie and Pepita Jimenez Jacobs, Child Rearing and Personality in the Philippines (University Park, Pa., 1966), 115-116 point out that children must obey but are given time to obey. It is clear from their study that Filipino children are not bound by rigid rule systems. With regard to women: the relatives of husband and wife are regarded as of equal significance; village women often manage businesses; urban women are often treasurers and men presidents, with real power often in the hands of the women. Bulatao calls this pattern "achievement through gentleness" in his Symposium on the Filipino Personality (Manila: Psychological Association of the Philippines, 1965), 16. "Traditionally there are few societies in the world which display as much equalitarianism as Philippine societies, either pagan or Christian," according to Robert Fox, "Social Organization," Human Relations Area Files, Area Handbook for the Philippines (New Haven, 1955), 1, 420.

controls and subjects the peasant to banditry. But Filipino families are informal and flexible, and therefore are not shattered like their Chinese counterparts. Philippine Catholicism has provided a belief system which adapts passably well to both the modern world and the Filipino peasant's understanding of the world. Whereas declining Confucianism undermined the morale of the old order in China, Catholicism legitimates the Philippine social order, explaining problems and assuring man of salvation if he will just believe and behave.²² Likewise, the Filipino politician provides the peasant with a link to government through an endless series of favors ranging from a piece of road to mediation of family spats.²³ By contrast, the gentry in China were discredited by the abolition of the examination system, and the political jobs which were supposed to replace the gentry as links between government and village were regarded as disgraceful positions.²⁴ The Filipino peasant is tied to his society, and these ties reduce both his desire and his ability to organize for revolution.

Exceptions to this broad picture arise from the social disruption of World War II, which was particularly intense in Central Luzon. During the war landlords were the most visible of rural groups and they tended to flee to the greater anonymity of Manila or to collaborate rather than die. In their absence, new social patterns coalesced, and the Huks exploited the collaboration issue; inequality reinforced by collaboration and general social dislocation proved politically potent. Fearful landlords returned with hired thugs and further aggravated class strife.

²² Grossholtz, op. cit., 91-95. Jaime Bulatao, ed., Split Level Christianity (Manila: Ateneo, 1966). An excellent example of the way Filipino religion confounds class analysis is the labor union in Cebu which used its funds to build a large, lovely church while its members continued to live in huts.

²³ Cf. note 7 above.

²⁴ Martin Yang, A Chinese Village (New York, 1965), 117.

Another consequence of wartime social dislocation was banditry, a relatively negligible prewar problem²⁵ which has become intense in Manila and Central Luzon since the war. Filipino peasants, like most peasants, see law and order as the primary responsibility of government and regard as evil any government which cannot cope with bandits and guerrillas.²⁶ The government usually cannot catch bandits and guerrillas, and when it does catch them justice is obtained only after a democratic court procedure which peasants find incomprehensible. Complex American-style court procedures work well except for people who are poor and ignorant--at least ignorant of law. The Huks have successfully exploited these breakdowns in Central Luzon social structure, just as Marcos is now exploiting the intense desire of Manila residents for law and order.

In sum, the rural Philippines are in some ways a model of social injustice, and some discontent does arise from economic injustice and disorder, but most peasants are tied into the system and acknowledge the system's legitimacy--except in certain areas of Central Luzon. Rural people who have sufficient education to understand the difference dislike the connotations of the term "peasant" and use the word "farmer," a word which applies to landlord and tenant alike. The farmers want roads, irrigation ditches, and schools, and these they can obtain by campaigning for a winner in the election. The "Tweedle-dum, Tweedle-dee" character of the political parties, often denounced by visiting Americans as exclusively the product of elite collaboration, derives more from the universality of these unrevolutionary demands and from the overwhelming electoral strength of the farmers, who

²⁵ Lacking data, I base this remark entirely on interviews in Manila and Central Luzon.

²⁶ Grossholtz, op. cit., 14. Note also in Averch et al., op. cit., that Panipanguenos rate crime as their second most important problem, unlike other areas.

form a single interest group constituting far more than a majority of the population.

Even if the rural poor²⁷ were extremely discontented, and even if they faced a weak government, and even if they faced no decisive strategic disadvantages, the Filipino peasants would have a hard time putting together a revolutionary organization as tough and disciplined as their Chinese counterpart. The Chinese peasant was familiar with the demands of tight, formal organization, whereas his Filipino counterpart is not. Chinese villagers lived within a maze of recreation clubs, Brothers' Societies, self-defense organizations, crop protection organizations, landlords' associations, temple associations, secret societies, rainmaking groups, and the like.²⁸ They came from clans which taught the Five Relationships and sometimes had written constitutions. They learned a religion which stressed careful observance of rules of correct form.²⁹ By contrast, the Filipino village has virtually no formal organizations within the village.³⁰ Filipino family structure is informal and flexible.³¹ Relationships with landlords and

²⁷ It is customary, and for many purposes important, to stratify rural poor. But rural revolution does not rest on any single group. "Poor peasants" may (or may not) be most motivated to revolt, but "rich peasants" usually supply crucial leadership skills. The revolutionary sees the village as a reservoir of resources, with different groups supplying different resources. Excessive concern for stratification results from some social scientists' emphasis on motivation to the exclusion of leadership, communications, and so forth.

²⁸ Cf. descriptions of village organizations in Martin Yang, op. cit., 161, 157ff.; A Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover (New York 1963), 126ff.; also Crook, *passim*.

²⁹ C. K. Yang, The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution, in his Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village (Cambridge, 1959). For a discussion of filial piety and identity issues, cf. R. J. Lifton, The Psychology of Totalism (New York, 1960), Chapter 19.

³⁰ Cf. C. K. Yang, Op. cit., 161; "Communication Channels and Functional Literacy in the Philippines," in Hunt and Fugita, op. cit., 263ff.

³² politicians consist of informal exchanges of favors. And even Catholic ritual is interpreted as doing a favor for a saint, who in turn does a favor for someone higher up, in the expectation that favors will be reciprocated. Rural Philippine organizations are typically informal, personalized, and extremely ephemeral, and the rural Filipino lacks experience in roles other than exchange of favors. As a direct consequence, rural revolutionary organizations have been informal, dependent on individual personalities, and faction-ridden.

The experience of the Huks confirms this argument.³³ Like the Chinese Communists, the Huks created mass organizations of peasants, workers, women, youth, and professionals and intellectuals. But the Huk organizations, unlike their Chinese counterparts, proved ephemeral. Supposed to meet once a week, they often met only once a month when an officer from outside the barrio showed up to supervise. Meetings often degenerated into moderately formalized gossip sessions in which the familiar problems of the village were discussed. Real problems were discussed, and real solutions were sometimes found, but the effect on village life was often that of a New England Town Meeting, not a social revolution.

When the Chinese held such meetings, group consciousness developed. Peasants participated in "woe pouring" sessions and at least some became fervent in their hatred of landlords. Women and youth became conscious of

³²On relations with landlords, cf. Frank Lynch, "Social Class in a Bikol Town," in S.E. Espiritu and C. L. Hunt, eds., Social Foundations of Community Development (Manila, 1964), 164ff. On politicians, cf. Lande, op. cit., which makes this "dyadic relationship" a major theme.

³³The following discussion of Huk organizations is based on this writer's interviews with Luis Taruc and others in 1967. This section has also benefitted from Eduardo Lachica's The Huks (New York, 1971); R.L. Hoeksema, (Harvard University dissertation, 1956); and others. My conversations with Taruc were more detailed than his two books, but much of my argument can be confirmed by reading He who Rides the Tiger (New York: Praeger, 1967) and Born of the People (New York: International Publishers, 1953).

the injustices of the traditional family system, and learned to link these injustices with tenancy and imperialism. But in discussion of the analogous Philippine meetings, not a single informant reported any major changes in attitudes resulting from the meetings, and all informants said that the meetings were typically rather relaxed. Women and youth did not express grievances against husbands and fathers. Luis Taruc told me that the professionals and intellectuals were "too individualistic" to form effective organizations. Systematic struggle between peasants and landlords occurred only rarely, in a few barrios in Pampanga. The talents and money of landlords were considered more useful to the Huks than struggle sessions. Landlords were made to understand that they had to cooperate, but official policy was usually to "pamper them." (Taruc's phrase.) In the absence of developing group consciousness, and use of that consciousness in building tough, revolutionary organizations, the creation of mass groups along these lines was a sterile imitation of Chinese practices without practical revolutionary rationale. The mass organizations apparently provided an effective intelligence net, and they did influence elections (because elections turn on numbers rather than discipline), but did not contribute to a permanent transformation of social structure or political power.

Huk judicial practices were similarly relaxed and unrevolutionary providing another example of the influence of Filipino rural culture on insurgent organizations. No formal laws were employed and Taruc said he could think of no case which was so complicated that formal laws were necessary. Such a statement suggests that revolutionary ideals deviated very little from traditional ideals. Barrio courts encouraged opponents to sit together and seek mutual agreement. Lacking mutual agreement, a decision by a court to impose the death penalty was supposed to be unanimous. Landlords were forced to improve the conditions of their tenants, but mainly

were forced to stop the common practice of stealing the landlord's grain. A point was made of never humiliating landlords in public--quite a contrast to Chinese "Speak Bitterness" meetings.

Above the village level the Huks were constantly plagued by factionalism. Horizontal factionalism interfered with coordination among regional leaders. In the 1950s Taruc, although officially Supremo, appears never to have had effective control over many units. In the late 1960s, three major Huk factions contended violently for supremacy. Vertical factionalism divided Taruc and the rural insurgents from the urban leaders of the Communist Party. But this vertical factionalism was based on important issues as well as personal factions. Urban leaders called for militarization of the villages along Chinese lines, and Taruc resisted, knowing that this would alienate his peasant support. By evasion, appearing to acquiesce in Party orders and then not carrying them out, Taruc maintained his position for years but eventually was relieved. Increasing use of terror, in accordance with the wishes of central Party leaders, corresponded with the decline of the Huks. The cold, intellectual, struggle-oriented Maoism of Taruc's successor, Jesus Lava, alienated rural groups and the Huks declined rapidly under his leadership. (They would have declined somewhat regardless of their leader--given their military straits--but all close observers credited Lava with accelerating the decline.) The Huks have subsequently split into several competing factions.

An important consequence of the Huks' organizational inadequacies has been their inability to expand outside regions inhabited by Pampanguenos. Effective confinement to one linguistic group spells death for aspirants to national power, and the Huks have tried to expand but have failed. Their failure cannot be ascribed purely to the admittedly strong regional-linguistic tensions of the Philippines. China confronted tensions which were at least

as strong. But the Chinese genius for formal organization enabled them to surmount local sentiments and create a national organization. The Huks' necessary reliance on personal ties confines them to members who can trust one another on the basis of exchange-of-favors rather than a formal relationship to an institution. Thus Philippine society exercises an effective containment policy, a policy broken principally when the army chases the Huks into other regions or clears regions in order to isolate guerrillas, and thereby creates the same kind of social disruption which nurtured the Huks--a strategy which the army has regrettably followed in recent times. In addition, as noted below, some successors of the Huks (the NPA or New People's Army) have occasionally found ways of employing local ties to spread their movement.

Finally, the informality of Philippine social structure inhibits permanent transformation by revolutionary force. Formal village structures are visible to an outsider and easily dismantled. The Chinese Communists could simply prevent the landlords' associations and other organizations from meeting, and they could then create mass organizations which could institutionalize a new power balance. But informal lines of power are less visible, and it is difficult to cut the vertical Philippine social ties. Permanent social transformation of Philippine villages requires either: (a) redistribution of wealth, including land reform; or (b) change imposed through elections--which require little formal organization of peasants but which engage the organizational power of the government; or (c) application of more force, over a greater period of time, than was necessary in China--a policy the Huks have never been willing or able to implement. These alternatives are not of course mutually exclusive.

The Huks have been too woven into the social structure to revolutionize that structure and too woven into it to be excised. They have even performed more or less useful functions for Central Luzon society: catching bandits, maintaining reformist pressure on the government, transporting American soldiers from their homes to Clark Air Base, providing bars and brothels for the U.S. Air Force, running the best American-brand gas station in Angeles, and maintaining monopolies for large American corporations which pay them for this service.³⁴ A wag has suggested that the Americans are the best supporters of the Huks and that the Huks are the best capitalists in the Philippines.

The Huks were defeated, and the remnants of the Huks have, since their defeat, split this way and that into factions which have often resembled the Mafia more than the Chinese Communist Party. The real political action has been in the cities, and current difficulties in the countryside reflect urban trends.

IV

American reports on the Philippines, both by scholars and by journalists, originate primarily from Manila. But, like other Asian capital cities, Manila does not reflect the country, and unlike other Asian capital cities Manila does not ultimately dominate Philippine politics. The highly politicized rural areas make or break Presidential candidates in elections, and they will eventually wear down any non-electoral government which replaces democracy without replacing democracy's legitimacy and benefits. On the

³⁴This is based on 1967 interviews. The demise of Commander Sumulong undoubtedly changed at least the details of such revolutionary activities.

other hand, Manila seethes with discontent. Inequality and land reform are far larger issues in Manila than in the countryside--because Manila's vast student, intellectual and middle class population responds to the intellectual attitudes of the west rather than to Filipino society. Corruption is a big issue in Manila, but not in the countryside. (A partial exception to this, and one which is very important under present circumstances, is resentment of Philippine constabulary and army exactions. For instance exactions from those manning checkpoints in Central Luzon have in the past generated great resentment.) Law and order is important to Manila, but only in Central Luzon and the Moslem areas do the rural poor worry greatly about it. Politics in the Philippines is a mirror image of the standard western picture of a revolutionary peasantry and a complacent middle class: In the Philippines the peasantry demands gradual reform whereas much of the middle class leans toward revolution.

The revolutionary leanings of parts of the middle class reflect an enormous student and intellectual population. They also reflect the reflex opposition to the government of every capital city in every developing nation. (Hanoi could conceivably be an exception to this generalization--which I believe was originally made by Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard--but even Peking is no exception.) In addition the legitimacy of the political system has been undermined by real social concern and by the false middle class belief, inherited from the west that land inequality automatically creates the conditions for a rural revolution.

Ethnocentric western beliefs have also undermined the legitimacy of Philippine democracy through the opinions of American intellectuals whose theories of democracy got stuck with a peculiar interpretation of James Madison. The Philippine President has far more power than his American

counterpart, and for good reason. The Philippines face far more divisive social issues (e.g., land reform) than America faces. They are a country with far more intense regional and ethnic tensions than the U.S. And they possess far fewer resources to cope with these problems.³⁵ But a peculiar Madisonianism, instilled by Americans, argues not only that a strong President will inevitably become a dictator but also that a strong President is inherently a dictator and therefore that a Filipino President who can declare martial law (even if he does not) and who has an item veto over legislation is not a democratic president. To be sure, increasing the powers of a president increases the risks if he misuses his powers, but increased risk is very different from inevitable disaster. A quarter century of executive restraint had made the Philippines a model of political freedom and free elections in a developing nation.³⁶ Moreover, prior to the Marcos administration the trends were in the direction of greater executive restraint rather than less. The juxtaposition of President Marcos and the situation of the last few years no more testifies to the inevitable evolution of a strong President into a dictator than the untimely death of Magsaysay before his reforms became institutionalized testifies to the impossibility of reform in a democracy.

³⁵For an analysis of the implication of high decision loads and low resources for organizational structure, cf. Overholt, Organization, Revolution and Democracy, op. cit., Chapter Two.

³⁶The frequent American emphasis on electoral corruption and political killings is overdone. If elections were determined by corruption and killings, then the incumbents should have been sure winners since they had more money, power and guns. A high proportion of election-period killings seem to result from local personal disputes and from the liquor, rather than the political passion, that so often accompanies Filipino elections. Violence and corruption certainly occur, but in the perspective of earlier American history and by comparison with the methods of political power transfer employed by neighboring countries, the Philippines have fared relatively well.

What is the situation that precipitated the declaration of martial law? Crime remained high in Manila and generated intense concern for law and order. Violent student protests were frequent. Talk of revolution had increased among intellectuals--but there has always been plenty of talk of revolution among intellectuals. Overspending in the last presidential campaign had to be followed by two years of drastic cutbacks in even the most basic infrastructure projects, and discontent therefore soared. The reelection of Marcos short-circuited the usual renewal of hope that came each election as the old "scoundrels" were fired by the electorate. The Constitutional Convention faced a credible charge of corruption among some members. In the south, Christian-Moslem conflict intensified.

A number of particularly ruthless young communists and others from the Manila social elite managed to join forces with, and seize control of, the most dynamic of the old Huk factions. The combination of urban intellectual ruthlessness, canny leadership from Indonesian-trained communist leader Jose Maria Sison, military knowledge from a Philippine Military Academy defector (Victor Corpuz), and a relatively dynamic rural insurgent group, together with a military strategy that chased guerrillas into new territories instead of confining them in old areas, allowed rural guerrilla activity to spread.³⁷ The New People's Army managed to secure control of the center of Panay Island and to succeed in extending at least a few tenacles into regions of Luzon previously completely beyond reach of communist insurgents. For instance, in one case two Igorots who had migrated to central Luzon were indoctrinated and made leaders of a 40-man NPA detachment.

³⁷ A policy of uprooting peasants to isolate guerrillas may greatly exacerbate rural unrest where it is employed.

Because of family and tribal ties that precluded fellow Igorots from betraying these leaders to the government, the unit gained considerable freedom of action in the Mountain Province until outfoxed by a Constabulary unit also led by an Igorot.³⁸

Given time, this renewed combination of urban elite intellectuals and peasants probably would have proved unstable; as in the 1950s the interests of the two groups are just too far apart. Just as in the 1950s communist guerrilla leaders regularly tripped themselves up by mechanical use of inappropriate Chinese tactics.³⁹ Marcos could consolidate and expand the alliance if he moves too harshly against his urban opposition. The alliance has so far held, with disquieting consequences that include some government loss of control over territory, the first attack on an American military post, assassinations of government officials, communist establishment and infiltration of a wide variety of organizations, a dramatic battle over a ship which the government alleges to have been delivering weapons from foreign communists,⁴⁰ a wave of bombing in Manila, and an alleged

³⁸ Conversation with LTC Achmor, Philippine Constabulary, 19 December 1972

³⁹ In the 1950s such inappropriate tactics included excessive militarization and terrorization of the villages, as well as attempts to mobilize inappropriate groups (e.g., rural women and youth). In the 1970s tunnel warfare--a preoccupation of Chinese Cultural Revolution propagandists--joined the list.

⁴⁰ In an interview with this writer Marcos' Executive Secretary, Alejandro Menchor, asserted that wooden gunstocks from the ship originated in North Vietnam and that ship markings remembered by the crew (who were unaware of the ship course and destination) indicated that the cargo had been loaded in North Vietnam. Further details of the government's findings regarding the ship can be found in a 30-page undated document by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Palanan Incident. Opposition critics have expressed considerable skepticism about the connections with foreign communist countries. These critics assert either (1) that the incident, and others like it, were staged by the Armed Forces, a possibility which cannot be completely discounted but which if true would imply skills at acting, coordination and secrecy not usually attributed to the AFP, or (2) that the ship was one of Congressman Ablan's illegal gunrunning expeditions and that the apparent tie-up with the NPA was fictitious or purely

attempted ambush of the Secretary of National Defense.⁴¹ Perhaps most important of all, the ponderous bureaucracies of Manila seemed to be strangling themselves in red tape and becoming more corrupt--heading downward toward the Southeast Asian norm despite continued impressive results in public works.

President Marcos has found himself under considerable pressure. He has been denounced ever since he was a Senator as an excessively ambitious politician who might become a dictator. Middle class Filipino observers have attributed corruption of historic dimensions to Marcos personally, and this image of Marcos is widely accepted. He is viewed by peasants as "one of those rich ones," but he has pushed just enough reforms to antagonize much of the illustrado elite of Manila. He won the last election, becoming the first President to be reelected, not because of extraordinary charisma and not because of corruption, but because his opponent was so weak. Marcos has regularly overreacted to events. He reacted to an astrologer's prediction of assassination by sequestering himself. (Such a reaction would be typical in other Southeast Asian countries, but not in the Philippines.) He reacted to the bombing of an opposition party rally by suspending habeas corpus. And now he has reacted to the overall situation by declaring martial law and imprisoning many of his opponents. It is difficult to know how much of this to ascribe to jumpy nerves, to personal ambition, and to the feeling

monetary. Ablan, a close associate of President Marcos, frequently engages in such activities, and clearly possesses the logistics and communications to mount an operation of this size. Until further evidence becomes available, one of these theories can be decisively discounted. But regardless of which theory is correct, it is clear that the incident helped justify, and perhaps precipitate, the martial law declaration.

⁴¹ For more details of the government's case for martial law, see Ferdinand E. Marcos, Proclamation No. 1081, "Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines" (Manila, September 22, 1972).

that the country was sinking into anarchy or being led by opponents into a trap whose significance would become clear only when it was too late. At any rate contingency plans for martial law date back at least one year, careful attention to the loyalty and expansion of the armed forces has marked the past year, and consideration of fundamental political and social change clearly predate the publication of Marcos' 1970 book.⁴²

Although events required action, they clearly did not force Marcos into such drastic action. Far more serious threats were defeated in the 1950s without recourse to such measures. Imprisonment of newspapermen like Max Soliven and Joaquin P. Roces, and censorship of the press, necessarily strike foreign observers as out of proportion to the threat--despite the true charge that many of the most prominent reporters and publishers were simply employees of opposition and incumbent, domestic and foreign, politicians. Charges that opposition Senators have been in contact with the insurgents might be true, but given many of the individuals involved the implication of revolutionary conspiracy seems dubious.⁴³ Such contacts are not unusual, and they have sometimes been useful; Marcos himself has on occasion corresponded with guerrilla leaders. Benigno Aquino, who has been the target of the most drastic accusations, is so popular that one could hardly imagine his failing to become President of the Philippines eventually if democratic political processes proceeded normally.

⁴² Ferdinand E. Marcos, Today's Revolution: Democracy (Philippines, no publisher listed, 1971). Reportedly most of the research and writing of the book were done by Adrian Cristobal.

⁴³ In an interview Alejandro Melchor asserted that the New People's Army planned an alliance with the opposition Liberal Party and cited as evidence a letter to that effect which he alleges was given to the government by Benigno Aquino, one of the alleged LP conspirators, after Aquino allegedly discovered that the government knew of the conspiracy. It is worth noting that, supposing the allegation to be true, the LP and NPA would have little to gain from one another as parties, and the LP could not deliver to the NP more than a few of its members, so the conspiracy could at most involve a few leaders.

The Philippine polity was thus strong by Southeast Asian standards, but weak by western standards and becoming weaker and more venal at a time when greater strength and foresight were required to meet renewed revolutionary challenges and legitimate (even if primarily urban) demands for rapid progress toward social justice. The system needed a shock, a shock which would awaken a complacent elite as the Huk threat did twenty years ago. But the omens would have been far more auspicious if the most dramatic shock had come from the insurgents rather than from the President, if the President were a new face with broad popular support, and if it were not so easy to trace so many of the problems which precipitated martial law to the previous actions of the President. Marcos aspires to the role of Magsaysay facing the Huks, or of Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor, but could find himself in the role of Lyndon Johnson after the Vietnam escalation of 1965.

V

The implementation of martial law has been relatively benign.⁴⁴ Although imprisonments have far outrun the publicly available justification, and although freedom of organization has been drastically curtailed, imprisonments have been relatively few in number and by all accounts the conditions of imprisonment have been humane. One report, in a governmentally censored newspaper, indicated that 8,281 people were taken into custody after martial law was declared, and that 2,123 of these had been released by Christmas.⁴⁵ Some of these were notorious criminals, some were men with private armies

⁴⁴ This section is based on extensive travel and interviews, December 1972.

⁴⁵ Bulletin Today, 25 December, 1972.

and weapons whom the government wanted out of action until they could be disarmed, and some were simply men or women whose normal and often legal activities appeared to the government to pose some threat to the success of martial law policies. There is widespread knowledge of the conditions of imprisonment, from prison visitors and from those who have been released, and there are no reports whatsoever of torture or intense interrogation. Informants who have been jailed report minimal inconvenience; indeed they frequently report being able to send out for Blue Seal (smuggled American) cigarettes. A Davao official who was jailed spent much of his time playing golf with his captors. Having been in the stockade is something of a status symbol in Manila. There are stories of Manilans who deliberately violated curfew, taking with them their own grass cutters for the standard punishment of a half day cutting grass. Whether such stories as the latter are true is less important than the lighthearted spirit to which the stories attest.

None of this is to say that normal or democratic procedures are being followed. The opposition has been defused by jailing top leaders. Men "invited" to the stockade are not given benefit of legal counsel. Legal decisions are rendered by untrained military officials. An American in Cebu was held without charges for thirty days, despite a treaty limiting such incarceration to four days, but he was released without being questioned and returned to an ovation and a place at the head table of the Rotary Club. Martial law is very real, but at least for the time being it is martial law in a form that is perhaps the least harsh imaginable.

Law and order, in the sense of absence of criminal activity, have improved since martial law was declared. Many large scale criminal activities have been suppressed, and many have been transformed from direct attacks to more subtle and less frightening forms of swindling. Reports

that petty crime has been eliminated are probably exaggerated, but such reports have been good for the tourist industry. One of the great achievements of martial law has been the collection of a vast quantity of firearms. It is probably impossible to disarm the Philippine population in any thorough manner, and Moslems whose firearms represent an enormous investment and source of personal pride have resisted surrender of their guns, but the most important aspect of firearms collection is disarmament of the so-called "private armies" of the elite and this task has been accomplished to a substantial extent. Such "private armies" (or, more precisely, squads or platoons) represented a tremendous threat to democratic procedures and were almost impossible to eliminate under normal conditions. Military campaigns against insurgencies appear to have achieved mixed results. Against the New People's Army the government has captured or killed a number of leaders and men, and has reportedly uncovered a variety of arms caches. It has terminated some of the activities of groups supporting the NPA. In at least a few cases martial law has been an essential element of military success. For example, a Constabulary team in Mountain Province reported chasing NPA men fruitlessly for lack of intelligence because two of the NPA were relatives of local villagers. After martial law the Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the squad imprisoned all the local barrio captains until they agreed to cooperate, and their cooperation led to some military successes. The long run balance between such successes and the political costs associated with them is not yet discernible. Those costs may be very high given the policy of clearing areas in order to isolate guerrillas which have uprooted up to 100,000 people in Isabela.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Daily Express, 26 December 1972. This report may be greatly exaggerated despite governmental censorship.

Against Moslem dissidents reports are more clearly negative. Newspaper reports⁴⁷ indicate that up to half a million people have been displaced by the military's policy of clearing areas to ensure free use of artillery. (Military men confirm the policy, but are vague on numbers.) Other reports indicate terrific resistance to such policies despite drastic rice rationing and use of artillery. The armed forces have taken substantial casualties and have lost at least one jet to hostile fire and one C-47 to mistakes made during operations. The unfortunate consequences of uprooting rural populations necessarily call to mind the support Huks in Central Luzon gained from the disruption of social structure that followed Japanese campaigns in World War II.

The economic consequences of martial law have so far been painful. Some of the biggest businessmen are enthusiastic over improved law and order and governmental decisiveness, but most businesses report declining volume and profits. Price controls, declining volume, and a government ban on firing of employees without central government permission, put businesses in a squeeze. Exceptions include tourism, barbers, and a fishing industry profiting from prosecution of pirates and dynamite fishers. Most businessmen see one-man rule as inherently a source of uncertainty, because policies can be changed on a whim and because something might happen to the President. Businessmen also wonder about the President's commitment to a free enterprise economy and note the view of many officials that businesses are largely composed of Chinese who are systematically conspiring to defeat administration policies. Some of these fears may, however, be temporary, and some reflect the loss of excessive privileges. In any case the stock market heads inexorably downward.

⁴⁷Ibid.

The long run offers at least some hope for economic improvement. The economy is beginning to recover from the disastrous floods of July and August and from the hangover that followed the last election. Land reform will undoubtedly exacerbate production problems in the always-troubled agricultural sector, but the gains in justice promise to outweigh the costs in production if the President's momentum here is sustained. Reduction of corruption, and improved governmental ability to make decisions and to make those decisions stick, should encourage businesses and particularly foreign businesses. Economic plans which emphasize dispersion of industry and emphasis on export industries and labor intensive industries are sensible and will boost the economy if implemented firmly. Ambitious plans to transfer land titles, provide generous pensions to landlords, and accelerate infrastructure development, will prove costly, but the government plans to finance these by increasing taxes, improving collection of taxes, and obtaining foreign assistance. Many experts think these plans feasible, and officials of international lending institutions praise the implementation of reforms.

Within the government President Marcos has planned a drastic reorganization and has already fired many employees in a campaign against incompetence, disloyalty, and corruption. All observers find the effects dramatic and positive. But the problems of overcentralization, bloated staffing, and corruption run so deep that the reforms could afford to go much further. Personnel cuts have occasionally affected senior people, but they have been disproportionately directed at lower levels. The credibility and permanence of the Marcos reforms will over the long run be determined by the unwillingness of the President to fire senior men who have reputations both for

being corrupt and for being close to the President. In addition they will depend on the sheer size of the cuts, since the bloated bureaucracies cost too much, inhibit local initiative, and are excessively hard to control.

The political mood of the Philippines is lighthearted regarding the relative painlessness of martial law, disrespectful as always, but increasingly sullen regarding the widely perceived prospects for indefinite rule by Marcos. Perhaps the ultimate comment on this situation was a response to the observation that Christmas carols were strikingly absent from the media this year: "Well, Christmas carols are joyous, and the mood of the people is depressed this year."

A crucial variable affecting responses to martial law is the universal assumption that the United States must be behind martial law. The top of the social elite assumes that the imperialistic U.S. must be supporting martial law and that resistance is therefore difficult. Much of the rest of the educated, urban Filipino public assumes that "Mother America" will make sure everything works out not too badly. Senior American officials provide the strongest assurance that the U.S. role is strictly neutral, but opinion counts more than reality and concessions to big American companies together with frequent, large, color photographs of visiting Americans on the front pages of the papers do nothing to dispel the impression of American involvement.

VI

In larger perspective martial law is a revolt of the city against the countryside, a revolt of efficiency against stability, a revolt of foreign training against local customs, a revolt of the bureaucrat against the

politician, a revolt of synoptic planners against incrementalists, a revolt of the modernizer against the democrat.

Under the political system that has predominated since 1946 politicians have utterly dominated bureaucrats--the opposite of the situation that has been attributed to many other Southeast Asian countries. Appointments reflected political needs of elected officials, as did decisions. The military was rigidly subordinated to civilians, because budgets were under tight control of civilian politicians whose reelection depended on doing favors for a rural civilian constituency and who therefore skimped on military expenditures, and also because individual military men depended upon personal relationships with individual politicians for advancement. This system was unprofessional and corrupt, but effective in maintaining civilian control and relatively harmless given the low level of military threats to Philippine security.

The politicians who dominated the bureaucracies were in turn beholden to rural constituencies. Politics at the upper levels was indeed a game played with an elite, but the rules of the game were decisively determined by the character of the rural constituencies which constituted a majority of the electorate. The loose, ephemeral alliances which constituted parties reflected rural social structure. The bargaining and exchange of favors which constituted the political process, and which infected the bureaucracies, reflected the characteristic social processes of the village. The non-ideological character of the political parties reflected the demands of a stable rural society which cared little for ideology but which understood its own need for roads, irrigation ditches, small reforms, and the like, and which by force of numbers used democratic political processes to put the stamp of rural society on parties and hence on government.

The result was a society which was a failure by standards of bureaucratic efficiency, a failure by comparison with a democratic ideal, and a failure at development by comparison with its Siniculture neighbors (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). Intellectuals resented the "stupidity" of rural politicians, from Magsaysay to numerous lowly Representatives, who wielded so much more power than they did. Bureaucrats resented being dominated by politicians. People educated to think of politics in European terms felt that the Tweedle Dum-Tweedle Dee character of the political parties reflected a failure of democratic politics because the issues did not reflect systematic policy differences; in fact the parties were successfully representing the society. (Social scientists criticize both American and Filipino parties for lack of discipline by comparison with European parties, but the lack of discipline derives from the origin of American parties in a highly differentiated society and of Filipino parties in a relatively undifferentiated society; European parties typically reflect a peculiar intermediate stage of differentiation. In this light the criticisms must be dismissed as largely ethnocentric and oriented to the interests of intellectuals in neat distinctions.)

The failures of efficiency embodied in this political system, and the failure to incorporate a set of efficiency-oriented elites, were real and crucial failures of the first Philippine Republic, as were the failures of social justice. On the other hand the first Philippine Republic was a resounding success by comparison with its peers--that is, with other Southeast Asian countries with similar problems and a similar level of development. It was not an ideal democracy, nor even a democracy like the United States, but it gave its people far more influence over the structure and policies of their government and parties than any other Southeast Asian nation and

probably as much as was feasible given the social structure. Literacy and politicization of the society were far more widespread than in other comparable societies; here the Philippines had an advantage from colonial days, but democratic processes ensured pressure on the government to maintain the advantage. Political freedom was superior to any other nation's in the developing world. Economic development at an average rate of five to six percent was not spectacular, but was certainly respectable and well above the Southeast Asian norm.

Martial law represents a reaction to both the very real problems of the First Republic and to the frustration of elite, urban, western aspirations. Efficiency of several kinds will be greatly increased, at least temporarily. Decisions will be made more quickly. Bureaucrats will be more honest. Garbage will be collected regularly. Criminals will be captured. Politicians will not interfere. Military men can be professionals for once. A group of bright, American-educated technocrats in their thirties and forties has been given enormous power. Jeepneys, which are a terrible nuisance to big cars in a hurry, have been restricted--at considerable cost to cheap and quick transportation for the masses of Manila. Squatters, who used to build homes illegally and then vote into office politicians who would allow them to remain, are being removed to areas more convenient to the government. The interminable delays associated with democratic judicial processes have given way to more efficient military decision processes. The ability of Everyman (not just elites) to have a local politician intervene in judicial and bureaucratic proceedings has been short-circuited. Thus real gains in efficiency occur but shade imperceptibly into imposition of elite concepts of efficiency in place of mass concepts. Land reform is in a

fortunate position at the intersection of mass enthusiasm, intellectual self-righteousness, and the political self-interest of the technocrats. In the combination of land reform and improved governmental efficiency are located the brightest prospects of Marcos' New Society.

The dangers of this New Society are that it will not go far enough or that it will go too far. If the reform processes are short-circuited because something happens to President Marcos, chaos might ensue. If the reforms get bogged down, or if resistance to the reformers and their methods become too intense, the justification for martial law might continue indefinitely and the New Society might go round and round a vicious circle in which martial law leads to more dissidence and more dissidence leads to harsher martial law. Excessively harsh martial law could achieve what no guerrilla leader or communist party committee has approached: unification of rural discontent and intellectual revolutionaries into an enduring coalition whose rise coincides with a civil war between Christians and Moslems. This is a country which has for a quarter century been stabilized and unified by the catharsis of regularly throwing out the incumbents, by the knowledge of Everyman that he had a friend, or a friend of a friend, in Congress, by the careful aggregation of conflicting interests that occurred through the "inefficient" bargaining of the national parties, and by Everyman's feeling that he understood and could manipulate (in a small way and through powerful friends) the machinery of the bureaucracies. The defects of this process threatened to put the country into a skid; Marcos and his technocrats now face both the dangers of undercorrecting and oversteering. And the irony is that they will find themselves doing both if they are not careful: they could so negate normal political processes and expectations that they create

a united front against themselves and yet not succeed in creating the social discipline and governmental efficiency that they seek. Such an outcome is by no means inevitable, but the dangers must not be underestimated either.

Time is the central variable in this process. The cement which binds the Philippines together despite apparently overwhelming regional tensions is the political parties. To the extent that they are not employed their binding power is lost. To the extent that they are allowed to wither they will be difficult to regenerate. And paradoxically the more they wither as democratic political parties the more will the network of ties and mutual obligations which once constituted the parties be transformed into narrower but stronger conspiracies against the government.

Likewise the longer martial law lasts the weaker will become the political cement binding the government together. On NBC's "Meet the Press" (8 October) Marcos said,

It is my hope that I will be able to lift martial law within the period of my term as the President. That is, before the end of 1973. However, I cannot guarantee this.

It is well to put the last sentence in the context of the difficulty of the reforms, the likelihood of continuing military challenges especially in the south, and rising public opposition. Likewise, it is worth noting that, if the new proposed Constitution is approved Marcos will be operating under an interim clause which provides him with both the powers of the old President and the powers of the new Prime Minister for an indefinite period. The Constitutional Convention seriously considered limiting the interim period to the time between ratification and 1976. They were dissuaded from writing such a limit into law.

Over such a period of time the Philippine Army and Constabulary will gradually prove themselves an inadequate substitute for democratic processes. The Armed Forces of the Philippines are small and politically divided. They contain officers strongly dedicated to democratic ideals. They are not free from corruption. As is appropriate to professionals proud of their professionalism they generally understand the requirements of capturing a few guerrillas better than the requirements of maintaining the loyalty of a broad population. The professionals of the army and the other bureaucracies are not an appropriate instrument for ruling one of the world's most politicized societies.

VII

Martial law has obtained its moral justification as a rejuvenation of decadent democracy and its legal justification first as a constitutional response to insurgent threats and subsequently as a constitutionally approved transition between one constitution and another. Space does not allow thorough consideration of the constitutional issues, but an article on "Martial Law, Revolution and Democracy" can hardly escape brief comment on some of the major issues.

The first constitution of the Philippines was by any reasonable standards a success. Under it the Philippines enjoyed a quarter century of stability and freedom which her neighbors could not match. The strong presidency and unitary form of government proved wise choices given the strains of Philippine society. All of the major institutions proved congruent with the main themes of Filipino social structure. The large House of Representatives provided sufficient locally elected representatives to keep the center of government in touch with the periphery of

society. The small, nationally elected Senate developed a group of nationally oriented leaders with national reputations in a country which desperately needed such leaders. (The U.S. is far less successful in casting up leaders of national stature.)

But this constitution had serious defects. Too many checks and balances imposed vetoes on the decisive changes that a rapidly modernizing society required. The constitution provided inadequate legal grounds for decisive action to promote social equality. An emphasis on rights to the exclusion of responsibilities reflected an alien model developed for a Puritan society in which duty and responsibility could be taken for granted. The great powers of the President, and the absence of close ties between Presidential operations and Congressional operations, inclined the Congress to irresponsibility, and the personal obligations of Senators through family and party aggravated this irresponsibility. The first constitution, moreover, was developed under American tutelage, subject to an American veto, and contained rights for Americans that infringed Filipino sovereignty.

To remedy these, and many other, perceived defects, a Constitutional Convention was called, and this Convention finished its work in 1972. The resulting proposed new Constitution, which will probably be the subject of a plebiscite before this article is published, would change from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government. The Prime Minister would retain the extraordinary powers of the existing President, including an item veto over legislation and the right to suspend habeas corpus and declare martial law when disorder is threatened. In addition there will be a symbolic President, who will not counterbalance the powers of the Prime Minister although proponents of the Proposed Constitution assert

that he will. The parliamentary form solves the disjunction between executive and legislature, but fails to replace the leadership development function of the old Senate; this is a major loss. (A previous version of this paper, written before approval of the Proposed Constitution by the Convention, suggested a parliamentary system with one house, but containing locally elected Representatives with one vote and nationally elected Senators with five votes. Such a system would have possessed all the virtues of the Proposed Constitution, but would have retained the functions of the old Senate.)

The Proposed Constitution gives the government sweeping welfare functions, great powers for restructuring society (including a responsibility for maintaining an optimum level of population), emphasizes the duties of citizens, attempts to force responsible behavior upon public servants and governmental institutions by prohibiting many of the abuses that accompanied the old system, and establishes a number of independent commissions and offices that collectively are supposed to operate as a cross between the U.S. General Accounting Office and the old Chinese Censorate.

In these regular provisions the Proposed Constitution is a sensible, balanced document. It runs a verbose sixty pages, and frequently reflects the tremendous influence of lawyers in Filipino society and the absence of extensive social science knowledge. Attempts to legislate a disciplined, multi-party system (Article XII. B. Sec. 8, 10) would be disastrous if they succeeded, since such parties would be based on ethnic groups and would tear the society apart rather than hold it together, but here as in other places social processes will almost certainly dominate legal intricacies, and the provisions will prove harmless.

Martial law impinges on the two constitutions in a number of ways. First, under the old Constitution the powers of the President under martial law are not spelled out, and Marcos has employed the martial law power to go far beyond meeting the threat of disorder for which the power was included in the Constitution. He intends to remake Filipino society and politics by decree, with little pretense that all the decrees have any relation to existing military threats. In doing this he has denied that Congress has any power under martial law, and in attempting to buttress this position and to carry out a plebiscite under martial law conditions he has created a crisis for the Supreme Court. The position of the Supreme Court is far stronger than that of Congress, because of the great respect which Filipinos have for the Court and because Marcos appears to retain some of the respect or fear of the Court inculcated in his legal training. But he does not seem ready to allow the Court to constrain his major goals. Thus he has created a crisis over the old Constitution and at best a dangerous precedent for the new Constitution.

Second, considerable doubt has been cast on the honesty of the process by which the Proposed Constitution was developed. It has long been the practice of Filipino politicians to provide financial support to those who voted their way, and it was probably naive for anyone to think that the Constitutional Convention would prove an exception to this practice. It was not an exception, as one of the delegates, Quintero, revealed quite dramatically just before the declaration of martial law.⁴⁸

Third, these problems have been greatly exacerbated by martial law. The Proposed Constitution was approved after martial law was imposed.

⁴⁸ Interviews confirm the Quintero allegations.

Delegates feared imprisonment if they did not vote for the Constitution. Many delegates were typical of Filipinos in having avoided taxes or infringed the law in one way or another at some time in their careers, and it is alleged that some were reminded of this by administration officials prior to their votes. And the transitory provisions of the Constitution included an enormous incentive for a positive vote: those who voted for the Constitution were promised seats in the interim Assembly, which is expected to continue for at least several years, and with those seats came emoluments totaling 216,000 pesos per year, a princely sum by Filipino standards. The transitory provisions (Art. XVII) provide continuation of the current President in power, with the full powers of both the old President and the new Prime Minister, for an indefinite period. As mentioned earlier a time limit of 1976 on such powers was rejected.

Finally, the plebiscite for ratification of the Proposed Constitution is supposed to be held under conditions of martial law. The earlier provisions of martial law have been relaxed somewhat to allow greater public debate, but the principal facets of martial law remain. The principal opponents of martial law are jailed. The controlled press presents the opinions of those opposed to ratification, but invariably follows each objection to the Proposed Constitution with a refutation of that objection. Opponents of ratification are largely silent from fear of imprisonment; whether or not Marcos's intentions are democratic, fear prevents fair debate. The President has announced, in a "Time" magazine interview widely published in the Philippine press, that he will impose harsher martial law if the Proposed Constitution is rejected.

Holding the plebiscite under these conditions has naturally caused severe controversy. Elite pressure, and seven suits before the Supreme

Court, have forced postponement of the plebiscite for a short time. But conditions for a democratic plebiscite can now no longer be created so long as President Marcos is in office--regardless of the possible good will of the President himself. And it is very unlikely that the plebiscite will be postponed indefinitely. So it is almost inevitable that the new Constitution, if it is approved, will exist under conditions of impaired legitimacy at least as severe as the impaired legitimacy which resulted from American influence over the last Constitution.

Such impairments need not be decisive if people support the basic provisions of the Constitutions. The old Constitution was relatively successful for a quarter century under such conditions.

Can people support the new Constitution? Here it is impossible to gather the appropriate data to provide a methodologically sound conclusion, but perhaps it is not illegitimate to draw on extensive travel and interviews, together with ten years of following Philippine politics, to provide a speculation clearly labeled as such. The new Constitution, in its permanent provisions, is not so different from the old as to provide a basis for massive discontent. It was written by Filipinos and draws support from that fact. Most people do not understand the details sufficiently to care a great deal, so long as the major provisions are well within the limits of democratic ideals. Nonetheless, an overwhelming majority of the opinion leaders who are most respected appear--on the basis of a very small and unsystematic survey--to reject the Proposed Constitution because of the transitory provisions. On the other hand, they would overwhelmingly accept the Proposed Constitution in the absence of those provisions. Under the

circumstances of martial law most of the dissenting elite will, from fear, fail to participate in the pre-plebiscite debate and refuse to vote. The election will therefore be determined by the overwhelming administration campaign for ratification, by rural appreciation of improved law and order, and by the promise of land reform--as well as by the methods used to count the votes. A full scale campaign by the opposition might well have counteracted these pressures, but it is unlikely that informal filtration of elite opinions down to the villages could come close to reversing the administration campaign.

One need not believe in great man theories of history to see that the future of democracy, martial law, and revolution in the Philippines rests largely with President Marcos. He cannot ensure that Philippine society will follow his wishes, but he has the initiative. He can provoke civil war with the Moslems or avoid it. He can allow military campaigns to disrupt the society and push his opponents into a united front against him or he can conserve the social ties which maintain stability and lead a broad coalition toward social reforms. He can make martial law a brief transition period between two periods of successful democracy or he can use the reactions of his opponents and the political failings of his efficiency experts as an excuse for prolonging his tenure and leading Philippine society into internecine strife which will render future democracy.

Governing the Philippines democratically is difficult. What is perhaps not so obvious is that governing the Philippines non-democratically would prove even more difficult.

"Recognizing that men always make mistakes, what should be done with those comrades who go astray? Toward these, one should first carry out struggle and thoroughly wash away mistaken thoughts. Secondly, it is necessary to help them. Proceeding from good intentions, help them correct their errors, enable them to have a way out."

Mao Tse-tung, Moscow Communist Party Conference, November 1957.

III. WOULD CHIANG FIND MAO AN UNACCEPTABLY STRANGE BEDFELLOW?¹

Future international relations in Eastern Asia, and future American policy in this region, will depend significantly on relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (GRC). Among the conceivable forms which the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan could take are: one dominated by military conflict; a stable one imposed by other powers; an unpredictable or oscillating one based either on a destabilized international situation or on domestic fluctuations in either country; a hostile but predictable one based on the present military stalemate and attainment of a political stalemate; one based on formal agreements between Taiwan and the mainland; or various combinations of these. This paper focuses primarily on the possibility of formal agreements between the PRC and either the Taiwan government or individuals or groups on Taiwan. Within this possibility, the paper focuses on PRC ability to make convincing commitments to the GRC or to groups or individuals on Taiwan.

The belief by B that A keeps his word depends upon A's objective record and upon B's perception of that record. If B's information is faulty, or if B's way of interpreting the information differs from C's way, then B and C will differ regarding the credibility of A. For this reason we shall look first at the "objective" record of the PRC in honoring agreements and then at the perception of that record by various individuals, groups and countries.

¹Published in Asian Survey (August 1974), with ARPA permission.

I. "OBJECTIVE" CREDIBILITY²

A. International Agreements

In East Asia the PRC has apparently avoided breaking explicit agreements with the North Koreans despite frequent shifts in relationships with that country, and has honored almost all agreements with Japan despite ideological conflict and nationalistic fear. The PRC's usually scrupulous fulfillment of contracts with Japan was marred in the late 1950s when it repeatedly failed to meet agreed standards for exported iron ore for non-political reasons, and when it unilaterally canceled all contracts in 1958 for political reasons. These incidents have not been repeated, but the Chinese have generally bargained very hard on prices and even obtained fertilizer at prices below the manufacturer's cost when Japanese companies became dependent on Chinese markets.

In Southeast Asia, the PRC terminated agreements in Cambodia and Indonesia after coups in those governments, but this termination apparently had at least the tacit consent of recipient governments fearful of Chinese influence. PRC troops are rumored to have crossed their mutually-agreed-upon border with Burma, but evidence on the charges is

²An informal survey of senior academic and diplomatic specialists was used to compile a list of situations in which PRC credibility had been tested. The findings reported here are illustrative rather than comprehensive. For this paper "subjective credibility" is more important and thus the informal survey is more useful than more formal methods. For a more formal survey, cf. Luke T. Lee, China and International Agreements (Durham, North Carolina: Rule of Law Press, 1969). Lee's excellent study was unavailable when this paper was written, because of the publisher's inability to provide a copy, but his conclusions substantiate this paper's. This paper does not compete with such works, but uses their conclusions to illuminate important policy choices.

scanty, the Burmese have not protested (perhaps from fear), and the border is straddled by tribes, families, and smuggling routes. PRC troops' crossing of this border can occur when chasing Kuomintang soldiers or when instigated by local (communist or non-communist) feuding parties.

In Laos, Chinese road-building activities violated the Geneva Conventions, but the Chinese reply that American and Thai violations nullified those conventions, and that Chinese military protection of the construction teams was a justifiable response to the presence of U.S. aircraft. A clearer lapse of compliance was the Chinese failure to pay their share of the expenses of the ICC, even before the Chinese denunciation of U.S. activities in Laos. So far as is known, China has kept all agreements, including annual and supplementary aid agreements, with North Vietnam, although--importantly--Cultural Revolution chaos did delay and divert some shipments from Russia.

In South Asia the record is more complex. China fulfilled commodity agreements with Pakistan and continued to provide diplomatic support against India in 1971-72 even after it became clear that Pakistan would lose. The Chinese stalled on an agreement to build a conference hall in Ceylon when a moderate government came to power, but built when Mrs. Bandaranaike became head of state. During the 1962 conflict with India, Chinese troops did cross boundaries which had been acknowledged very informally by a previous Chinese regime under circumstances which demonstrated that the Chinese were avoiding any firm commitment until their position was stronger. Chinese troops built a road in territory which China claimed (despite the informally acknowledged boundaries) in order

to secure lines of communication from Tibet to Sinkiang. During subsequent military conflict for which India was at least as responsible as China, China attacked here and in the Northeast Frontier Area (NEFA), but withdrew voluntarily in NEFA after securing its road in Ladakh.³

The PRC has not always met its obligations to foreign diplomats. During the brief interlude in the summer of 1967 when Red Guard supporters took over the Foreign Ministry, a British official was beaten. A Laotian consul in Yunnan was attacked by local people who envied his standard of living in a period when there was insufficient food for the local Chinese. Also, Chinese diplomats have sometimes behaved quite undiplomatically. Cultural Revolution incidents occurred in Brussels, Moscow, Rangoon, and London. Such incidents are usually beyond Peking's control; in the British case above, Chou En-lai apologized, and the Foreign Ministry head at the time of the beating was later executed for his various lapses of responsibility.

In commercial dealings not specifically mentioned above, the PRC has acquired an apparently justified reputation for hard bargaining, for honoring its obligations in general but frequently not meeting deadlines, and for reasonable arbitration of disputes.

This brief and incomplete survey of some situations which have tested the PRC's willingness to honor international agreements indicates the basic principles of, and limitations upon, the PRC's credibility in international contracts. The PRC makes few detailed international commitments. Where the PRC has explicitly accepted obligations, it is ordinarily

³These brief remarks are based on Neville Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon, 1971).

scrupulous in honoring them despite occasional, usually minor, lapses resulting from domestic political or economic turbulence. On the other hand, the PRC has followed the Soviet Union's precedent in insisting⁴ that, as a revolutionary government, it is not bound by all of the agreements of its predecessors; thus the PRC has repudiated the 1946 accord on diplomatic and consular property, and certain boundary agreements negotiated by previous regimes. Similarly, China's revolutionary perspective leads to rejection of the view that aid to a foreign insurgency is illegal. Finally, the PRC, like the U.S., usually suspends aid agreements when the recipient state's leadership shifts to unfriendly hands. Despite these qualifications, the PRC's record of keeping international agreements is outstanding among developing nations.

An important caveat to this conclusion results from the absence of situations where such compliance might impose high costs on the PRC. In a sense the absence of such "test situations" attests to PRC good faith; like a cautious bank, the PRC is careful not to make agreements which it will not be able to honor. But no country can forever avoid severe tests of "credibility" against other values such as national welfare and national security. Lacking more test situations, one cannot evaluate the limits on PRC willingness to incur costs in order to maintain credibility. The dispute over the Askai Chin could have provided an important test. There, Chinese security against the U.S.S.R. seemed to require rapid access to Sinkiang from Tibet. Had there been a prior boundary agreement with India that precluded such a road, or precluded military use of such a road, then a formidable test would have arisen.

⁴In the Common Program.

For Taiwan, this international record means that, to the extent that the PRC would accept explicit international obligations with regard to the status of Taiwan, the letter of those obligations would probably be honored. Vagueness in such agreements would of course be fully exploited. More important, the PRC would hesitate to accept international obligations in connection with Taiwan. The PRC has repeatedly acknowledged that unsettled international issues exist regarding Taiwan (e.g., the issue of U.S. troops in Taiwan). But, like the GRC, the PRC has maintained that Taiwan is a domestic Chinese issue. The credibility of domestic promises thus affects the credibility of agreements with Taiwan more than the credibility of international promises.

B. Domestic Agreements with Political Groups

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made agreements with regional groups, with non-Communist parties, and within the CCP itself, which provides some basis for judging whether similar deals with Taiwan would be kept.

Regional/Cultural Groups. Peking has dealt with several groups which are culturally distinct, geographically concentrated, and remote from central control, by initially promising autonomy and later seeking to absorb them as fully as possible. Tibet provides a paradigm for this process.

In 1950 Chinese armies entered Tibet, and in 1951 the Chinese and Tibetan governments signed an agreement⁵ providing for, among other things, "national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central

⁵The complete text of the Tibetan agreement is in Ling Nai-min, Tibetan Sourcebook (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1964), pp. 19-23.

People's Government," assurance that "The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet," commitment that "Officials of various ranks will hold office as usual," and

"In matters relating to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet."

These guarantees sound impressive, but the balance between "regional autonomy" and "unified leadership" is not specified, and the guarantee of non-compulsion is juxtaposed with insistence upon unspecified reforms.

This ambiguity is characteristic of such CCP accords. As its power increased, the CCP increasingly emphasized central leadership and stimulation of "popular" demands for "reforms." The Tibetans became restive under such policies, particularly after forced dismissal of several of the Dalai's more anti-Chinese ministers in 1952, after experimentation with agrarian reform in 1954, and the arrival of a political Preparatory Committee in 1956. Resistance flared into full revolt in 1959; the revolt was brutally crushed and followed by thorough transformation of the political, religious, economic, and social systems of Tibet.

The CCP apparently acted in accord with the most extremely pro-Chinese interpretation of its ambiguous agreements and later could justify actions apparently inconsistent with them by maintaining that dismissal of anti-Chinese ministers was necessary to honor Article 1 of the agreement and that, later, Tibetan revolts nullified the agreements. Although both sides probably understood the ambiguities of the 1951 agreements, subsequent CCP behavior clearly ignored the clauses considered vital by Tibetan officials.

Various aspects of the Tibetan case recur in the other autonomous regions. Agreements are sufficiently vague to be reinterpreted in accord with "changed conditions" (as perceived by the CCP). Full advantage is taken of ambiguities. The eventual goal of full socio-cultural assimilation and total central control is never abandoned. The PRC places an overwhelming priority on establishing the legitimacy and legality of treating the region as an integral part of the nation. Although the CCP generally keeps the letter of agreements, intense pressure for social and political change often stimulates local resistance, giving the CCP a pretext for abrogation of the agreement. This does not mean that the CCP deliberately provokes revolt in order to abrogate its agreements, for the CCP's intense self-criticism frequently demonstrates the opposite.⁶ But the CCP's social and political goals are ambitious and, despite a justified Chinese reputation for a long-term, historical perspective, it is impatient for results. The pressure for change therefore often becomes unbearable for local elites. The CCP would be quite happy if these elites peacefully implemented "reforms" at the demanded rate, but they naturally balk at systematically undermining their own power. Moreover, Peking often finds itself embarrassed by local representatives who become more Catholic than the Pope in exercising centralized control.

Not all of the Tibetan experience can be so readily generalized. For instance, both Tibet and Mongolia declared independence early in the

⁶ Ibid., p. 17, provides one example of such criticism.

century, but largely as a result of varying international conditions,

Tibet was eventually subdued, whereas Mongolia retained its independence.⁷

If the PRC and Taiwan reached agreement for Taiwan to be an autonomous region under Chinese sovereignty, the pressures for ambiguity in written agreements, the CCP's goal of thorough assimilation, and its later insistence on the importance of changed conditions would probably mirror the Tibetan case. But Taiwan's political and military situation is different from Tibet's. The Taiwanese are no more immune to eventual military subjugation than was Koxinga,⁸ but for the moment Taiwan's military strength and PRC air and naval weakness make subjugation more difficult than in Tibet or Sinkiang. The relatively modern political structure of the GRC makes autonomy easier to defend than was true with the traditional tribalism of Sinkiang or the theocracy of Tibet. Extraordinary economic growth increases Taiwan's capabilities rapidly. Japanese, U.S., or possibly even U.S.S.R. support⁹ could keep Taiwan's position strong.

The Han background of the Nationalists creates greater empathy between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) than between, say, the CCP and the Dalai Lama, but the KMT position as pretender to the rule of all China makes subjugation of the KMT more vital. But with the passing of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, and the increasing international acknowledgment of Peking as

⁷John K. Fairbank pointed out this divergent evolution on "Meet the Press" television program, 25 April 1971.

⁸Koxinga maintained Taiwan as a Ming stronghold after the accession of the Ching Dynasty on the mainland. Following a temporary fragmentation of the new mainland regime, Koxinga intervened and thereby provoked assemblage of a vast Ching fleet which successfully attacked Taiwan in 1683.

⁹On the possibility of a Taiwan-Moscow alignment, cf. G.F. Hudson, "Taiwan's Radical Alternative," The New Leader, 20 September 1971, 11-13. The possibility appears rather remote.

the government of China, fear of Taiwan as an alternative source of power and legitimacy will diminish--unless revived by major international support of Taiwan or by Taiwan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The passing of the current PRC leadership will bring to power men who have never committed themselves to retaking Taiwan and who may find it inexpedient to do so. Increasing native Taiwanese influence in the Taiwan government, or increasing blurring of the distinctions between Nationalists and Taiwanese, or both, could reduce the cultural identification between Peking and Taipei--although never to the extent of the cultural impasse between Peking and Lhasa. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that some or all of the Taiwanese could eventually assert themselves as the true bearers of traditional Chinese culture, and thus revive some CCP fears of an alternative source of legitimacy.

Non-Communist Political Parties. A number of non-Communist and non-Kuomintang political parties existed prior to the defeat of the KMT by the CCP on the mainland. The CCP gained the support of most of these groups by giving them larger and more reliable support than did the Kuomintang. By supporting the principle of freedom of organization (opportunistically, to facilitate organization of additional anti-KMT parties and to allow the CCP greater freedom), by giving financial support to these parties, by maintaining personal contacts and joint memberships, and by being less doctrinaire than the KMT in some short-run policies, the CCP gradually gained support from these "bourgeois democratic parties" (BDP) and made agreements with them to form a broad, united anti-KMT front under acknowledged CCP leadership.

After 1949 the CCP gave the BDP a role in the new state and relied upon them as bridges to key elites. Subordination to the CCP, which the BDP had vaguely accepted prior to 1949, was thorough. They were consolidated and assigned sections of the non-Communist population as target groups--for surveillance, mobilization, and communication. Van Slyke, the most careful student of the united front, is convinced that the CCP did not deliberately deceive the BDP regarding their role in a state run by the CCP.¹⁰ Initially, the CCP intended a large role for the BDP, while retaining its own full central authority, but conflicts between the official positions of high non-Communist officials and the influence of lower-ranking but more "trustworthy" CCP members have reduced the BDP role.

Mao's desire to prevent ossification of the CCP, and CCP realization of dependence on the skills of BDP members and BDP target groups, have generated attempts to give the BDP larger roles. In 1956 the BDP were expanded in membership and asked to criticize CCP performance; simultaneously, CCP members were accused from within the party of deviations such as "commandism" and not making adequate use of the BDP. The BDP were slow to begin criticizing, but once they became convinced of Mao's sincerity they vigorously attacked both the CCP's policies and its political role. Such criticism went beyond what Mao had anticipated, and was subsequently crushed in an anti-rightist movement. Some have taken this crushing as evidence that the CCP sought to entrap the BDP, but such a view ignores the intensity of self-criticism within the CCP, the rapid rehabilitation

¹⁰ Lyman P. van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 218.

of BDP members denounced as rightists,¹¹ the subsequent limited revival of the Hundred Flowers campaign,¹² and the repeated evidence (e.g., the Cultural Revolution) of Mao's sincere fear of CCP ossification.

The status of the BDP after the Cultural Revolution is unclear, but previously the CCP has driven very hard bargains while honoring the letter of most agreements. The Hundred Flowers period revealed intense BDP frustration, and most members probably had not expected such thorough isolation from political power; but no straightforward breaking of agreements comes to light.

More generally, united front policies have often confused other political groups. Van Slyke noted with regard to the coalitions of the Japanese war:¹³

To the KMT, Bolshevik cynicism has always been foremost: the united front was simply a trick to deceive people. To many others, at that time, the Menshevism of agrarian reform, coalition government, and broad democracy were most obvious. Because both aspects were parts of a single policy, both analyses were wrong.

Individual Non-Communists. When the CCP was gaining power, it often made deals with individual opponents, even after the collapse of those opponents was inevitable. These figures have fared extraordinarily well. A survey¹⁴ of non-Communist ministers and vice-ministers during and after the Cultural Revolution found that only two out of 38 were criticized

¹¹Ibid., 245-6.

¹²Merle Goldman, "The Unique 'Blooming and Contending' of 1961-62," China Quarterly XXXVII (1969), 54-83.

¹³van Slyke, op. cit., 113.

¹⁴Donald Klein, "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly 35 (1968), 87.

during the Cultural Revolution and one of these was rapidly rehabilitated. Usually such men were offered both amnesty and high-ranking positions in the government in return for acceptance of CCP guidance. In the early days attempts were made to give them power,¹⁵ but their positions are now generally sinecures without authority. Nonetheless, the survival of these men in high positions indicates once again the CCP's intent to honor at least the letter of its promises.

An important case is Li Tsung-jen, who was Vice President of China under Chiang Kai-shek and then became President when Chiang Kai-shek retired briefly in 1949. Second only to Chiang Kai-shek on the CCP's official list of "war criminals,"¹⁶ he subsequently came to the United States and attempted to create a third force. But he became disillusioned, and he wanted to die in his homeland, so he returned on 20 July 1965 to a hero's welcome in Peking. He made anti-American speeches and issued appeals to former KMT members to return to Peking; in return the PRC honored its promises of safety and status.

Within the Communist Party. The CCP has experienced volcanic upheavals which cast doubt upon its ability to sustain commitments. An outstanding arrangement upset by upheaval was the division of labor between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi worked out in the late 1950s. Following his demotion Mao systematically gathered his forces until, beginning in

¹⁵Van Slyke, op. cit., 223.

¹⁶Robert Bedeski, "Li Tsung-jen and the Demise of China's 'Third Force,'" Asian Survey V, 12 (1965). The point is not that the PRC was generous; on the contrary, the quid pro quo was appropriate. The point is that the PRC honored its promises--unlike, say, Stalin's Russia and certain African states.

November of 1965, he felt strong enough to launch a "cultural revolution" striking at the roots of the CCP itself. The split with Lin Piao parallels this one.

One must note such upheavals, but also remember that the CCP has been one of the most cohesive revolutionary parties in history. By comparison with Stalin's Russia or Robespierre's France, the CCP is a block of stone beside piles of sand. Struggles and policy disagreements did occur, but between 1949 and the Cultural Revolution important disgraced or defeated members were quickly rehabilitated with only the two major exceptions of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. The Cultural Revolution severely marred this record,¹⁷ but once again the scope of rehabilitation has been extraordinary. More important for our purposes, intra-party deals affect the credibility of party agreements with outsiders only when denunciation of the former leads to non-compliance with the latter. The Cultural Revolution did affect some agreements marginally (cf. above), and indirectly affected some domestic agreements, but has not led to wholesale abrogation of explicit agreements.

C. Domestic Agreements with Social Groups

The CCP has also made explicit agreements with certain domestic social groups, including businessmen, anti-Communist military officers, and intellectuals.

Businessmen. The CCP early realized the influence of businessmen on the outcome of their pre-1949 political struggle and the importance of

¹⁷Cf. Charles Neuhauser, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party Machine," *Asian Survey* VII, 6 (June 1968), 465-488.

business skills to the success of any regime. An early statement¹⁸ assured that:

...the CCP will neither confiscate other capitalist private property nor forbid the development of capitalist production that 'cannot manipulate the people's livelihood.'

After taking over politically, the CCP gradually clamped down on businessmen by controlling currency, wages and supplies. After briefly encouraging business in order to run the economy during the Korean War, the CCP initiated the Three Anti- and Five Anti-Campaigns. The first sought to reduce political corruption by destroying the political influence of businessmen and others. The second demanded businessmen's confessions of economic exploitation--with exploitation defined primarily as making a profit. The taxes and fines levied through this campaign shunted most of the liquid capital of China's businessmen to the government.¹⁹ Businessmen were often left in nominal control of their businesses, but they operated on capital confiscated and then loaned back by the government, under supervision of their own laborers and often of party members also, and with the government as their primary customer and source of supplies. Often the government became a dominant partner.

Despite all these forms of government control and confiscation, many businessmen retained rights in their businesses and were entitled to a percentage of the income of those businesses. Among the beneficiaries of such rights were a small number of extraordinarily wealthy Shanghai merchants who at least until the Cultural Revolution were regularly

¹⁸Van Slyke, op. cit., 227-8.

¹⁹A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-1955 (New York: Praeger, 1964), 159, 163.

displayed, with limousines, to foreign visitors. These few men of wealth are hardly typical, but behind them stood large numbers of other businessmen or former businessmen who received government subsidies at least into the mid-1960s. How large these subsidies were, and whether they fully met the original terms, we do not know. The current fate of these men is unknown. One should not assume from Chinese press and radio silence on this that the businessmen have been eliminated, although that is a possibility. Possibly also the status of these men is such a touchy issue after the Cultural Revolution that press comment would create undesired political struggle. In any event, this social group has undoubtedly diminished greatly because many who retained their businesses were elderly when the deals were made two decades ago.

The businessmen are subject, like all others, to changes in party line. The CCP and other Chinese groups would feel that the legalisms which dominate American thought about changes in government-business agreements would be both un-Chinese and un-revolutionary. Businessmen have suffered from some changes of line, particularly when changes in educational policy led to exclusion of bourgeois sons previously promised good educations. In addition, businessmen and other capitalists have had to absorb a share of the reduced rations which accompany economic crisis in China--regardless of prior agreements. But the continued government subsidy of businessmen, at least until the Cultural Revolution, testifies to an intent to honor commitments that uninformed Western eyes do not customarily associate with relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the bourgeoisie.

Intellectuals. Intellectuals have suffered more than any other social group from changes in Party line. The CCP needs intellectuals to interpret ideology and to make and implement policies, but also feels threatened by the relative independence of intellectual activity. Inconsistencies in policy have resulted not so much from deliberate non-compliance with agreements as from vacillating efforts to solve an insoluble problem. The Hundred Flowers period, previously described, had its main impact on the intellectuals. Retraction of the promised freedoms occurred out of feelings that the intellectuals had gone beyond their mandate and out of real fear that the legitimacy and control of the CCP would crumble under such severe criticism. And the anti-Rightist campaign which followed was accompanied by warnings from Chou En-lai to party workers that they must not interfere excessively with the work of intellectuals.²⁰

Following the anti-Rightist period and the demotion of Mao, a thaw occurred in which some independent intellectual work was allowed. Many intellectuals took full advantage of available freedom, and criticism of Mao in the official press reached extraordinary heights. The criticism was disguised, to be sure, but not disguised much by Chinese standards--for instance in the column, "Evening Chats at Yenshan." Other intellectuals began reviving suggestive old stories, such as the one in which a virtuous official systematically disobeyed orders from his wicked superior. By Western standards, such material is rather mild, but in the context of Mao's China it is spectacular. Not surprisingly, Mao counterattacked with devastating effect.

²⁰Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," in Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank (eds.), Communist China, 1955-59 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

The Western intellectual's sympathy naturally goes out to his Chinese counterpart, but the appropriate context for judging whether the CCP has kept faith with intellectuals is of course the Chinese Communist context. Within that context the record shows an initial crackdown harsher than was expected by many of the CCP's intellectual supporters, and contrary to certain previous temporary policies, but not in contradiction with any specific, long-term promises. Then it shows pragmatic experimentation with alternative ways of utilizing intellectuals' talents while minimizing risks to the regime's legitimacy. Just as in the case of delayed deliveries of foreign aid, the CCP seems to intend to carry out its promises scrupulously, but domestic political surprises sometimes lead to drastic policy changes.

Military Officers. Data on former non-Communist military officers are scarce, but a few hesitant generalizations seem possible. A number of generals were offered ministerial posts in the new regime. One obvious example is General Fu Tso-yi, who surrendered Peking. Completely surrounded, his eventual defeat was assured, but the CCP offered him a high post in return for surrendering the city without a battle in order to save the historic capital from devastation. He accepted and was given his ministerial position. However, as is typical in such cases, the position turned out not to carry great power. Some former KMT officers who surrendered after being promised freedom from harassment if they confessed, discovered "confessions" as conceived by the CCP to be extremely thorough and humiliating. Here, as in the case of "autonomy" promised to provinces, the CCP did not specifically break promises, but did give many words highly distinctive meanings; the agreements thus turned out to mean

something very different from what the other party expected. (Such words are not defined capriciously, however; their meanings are often stable over decades, and thus are accessible to the observer who sedulously studies them. Lack of time, wishful thinking, and lack of alternatives seem to be the primary reasons for acceptance of such agreements.)

Summary

In both international and domestic matters, the CCP makes few explicit agreements. When it does make agreements, it keeps its own concessions as vague as possible. It emphasizes legitimization of PRC and CCP authority over social groups and regions where that authority is potentially in doubt. The CCP's revolutionary perspective leads to use of unconventional and vague²¹ but internally consistent use of crucial words, to rejection of much conventional law and legal perspective, and to promulgation of temporary "lines" rather than permanent laws. The absence of a strong legal tradition in China, the absence of lawyers among the senior CCP leaders and among the general population,²² and the pragmatic, informal, experimental, revolutionary traditions ("Politics in Command") of the CCP reinforce these tendencies. Legalistic, idealistic, or status quo-oriented people are frequently confused or deceived by such a system. Nonetheless, when the CCP makes explicit, detailed agreements, it usually obeys the letter of the agreements. Agreements for safety and security have usually worked out in roughly the way anticipated by the

²¹David Finkelstein, "The Language of Communist China's Criminal Law," Journal of Asian Studies XXVII (May 1967), 503-521.

²²On such factors, cf. Victor H. Li, "The Role of Law in Communist China, China Quarterly 44, 66-111.

non-Communists, whereas agreements seeming to give political power to non-Communists usually have not.

Perhaps it would not be too irreverent to suggest that American political campaign promises and their Chinese counterparts often reflect similar processes. But Chinese campaign promises have been more consequential because the whole structure of Chinese society has been in question, whereas American campaign promises ordinarily confine themselves to incremental adjustments. The Chinese avoid credibility crises like Skybolt by making fewer international commitments. Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Chinese occasionally find international commitments outrunning domestic capabilities, but the paucity of their commitments and their resources limits the magnitude of such debacles.

II. SUBJECTIVE CREDIBILITY

How is this allegedly objective record perceived by third parties and especially by Taiwan? With qualms one can suggest some hypotheses at a level of simplicity dictated by both lack of information and the process of simplification involved in third parties' formation of an image of Chinese behavior.

The Chinese have made a favorable impression for credibility on some who have been dedicated ideological opponents: American officials. American diplomatic and military personnel who have had responsibilities requiring detailed knowledge of China give the CCP extraordinarily high marks in this regard.²³ "The Chinese are obsessed with the idea of Good

²³No systematic survey was undertaken in support of this statement, but in preparing this paper, the writer discussed the issue with key U.S. officials and scholars in late 1971. It is important to note that these discussions occurred prior to the euphoria attending President Nixon's trip to Peking.

Faith," was one characteristic comment. Distinguished academic China-watchers think the PRC's record excellent, but not perfect; some think the international record better than the domestic one. The highly informed mostly agree that a promise from Peking is worth far more than one from Taipei. Chou En-lai has an excellent personal reputation for credibility.²⁴ Those who are firmly committed to support of Nationalist Taiwan would demur, and the average American citizen would probably express anger at the suggestion that the PRC could be trusted. Most South Asians would agree with the view of this "average American citizen."

When Americans take at face value PRC assertions that its bargaining positions are non-negotiable and supported by ideological fervor, they concede to Chinese credibility and leverage that a more balanced assessment would deny them. John K. Fairbank once predicted in this regard that most Americans could not deal with Chinese without losing their shirts.²⁵

Japanese opinion of Chinese credibility probably varies as much with educational attainment, level of direct experience, and political persuasion as does American opinion. Most Japanese agreements with China have been economic, and among Japanese businessmen the Chinese seem to have recovered from any lack of credibility generated by the disputes of the late 1950s. But, while Japanese businessmen believe China will obey the letter of agreements, they also believe it dangerous to become economically dependent upon China.

²⁴Allen Whiting, "The Word of Chou En-lai," The New York Times, 11 October 1972, p. 35.

²⁵Cf. the transcript of "Meet the Press," 25 April 1971.

Peking's credibility on Taiwan is difficult to assess because of lack of evidence. The present writer hesitates to speculate and does so only with the caveat that the following represents primarily speculation.

In print the Kuomintang insists that the CCP is entirely untrustworthy. Chiang Kai-shek's book, Soviet Russia in China, consists of a historical polemic on this point. Moreover there is some historical basis for such a feeling. Both the CCP and the KMT spent the years of the Japanese war seeking to circumvent the mutual commitment to fight the Japanese--because they wished to conserve strength for fighting one another. Virtually all CCP agreements with the autonomous regions would be interpreted by Taipei as instances of CCP bad faith, although the KMT would concur with the goal of fully integrating such areas into a coherent, unified society and polity.

But there is a Chinese tradition, with which senior KMT officials are familiar, of reintegrating surrendered rebels into society. This tradition has persisted into contemporary times, as evidenced by the release of Chiang Kai-shek with CCP concurrence after he had been kidnapped in the Sian Incident, the CCP treatment of various groups after their defeat, the continued belief of both Mao and Chiang in the efficacy of appeals to those who have been their most dedicated enemies, and Mao's slogan of "treating the illness to save the patient."

Just as important as the tradition of reintegration is the Maoist presumption against the use of unnecessary force.²⁶ The Chinese Civil War

²⁶Franklin W. Houn, "The Principles and Operational Code of Communist China's International Conduct," Journal of Asian Studies XXVII, 1 (1967), 27-29, undertakes to correct misunderstandings that have arisen in this regard because of the fame of Mao's statement that all power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

and the land reform of the early 1950s caused casualties which are impressive because of the huge population within which these conflicts occurred. But compared with other social revolutions the CCP achieved large social changes at a disproportionately small cost in lives.²⁷ Just as the French Terror caused less loss of life but higher political impact of bloodshed than other periods of the French Revolution, so Mao's land reform and other reforms combined high political impact with smaller proportionate loss of life than Stalin's "reforms." Similarly, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly shown impressive restraint and talent for handling domestic conflicts by persuasion rather than force. Time after time in the Cultural Revolution, PLA units stopped armed conflicts using megaphones rather than rifles. None of this means that Mao or the CCP hesitate to use force when it appears necessary--as in the land reforms, Tibet, and Korea. Once again senior KMT officials, but not necessarily young or low-ranking officials, are probably aware of this aspect of the CCP operating code.

Likewise, Chinese leaders, including both Mao and Chiang, emphasize the appearance of superior virtue in a political victory nearly as much as the victory itself. Both follow a tradition of rule through superior virtue, of political victory achieved not merely by force but by possession of a moral mandate. For precisely these reasons, Mao and the CCP would greatly prefer a bloodless "deal" which prolonged KMT power somewhat in

²⁷The reference here is to casualties after 1949, as a proportion of population. In addition to comparing with Stalin, it is useful to compare these casualties with the far larger ones resulting from starvation under the previous social structure. But also it may be worth noting the extraordinary land reform and income equalization which occurred in Taiwan with almost no loss of life--but with much foreign assistance.

return for KMT confession of error and provision of inroads which would give the CCP power eventually, over a costly and bloody slaughter of Nationalist officials. In other words, KMT officials could quite reasonably believe that the KMT could make a deal with the CCP, even a deal which would eventually give elements of the PLA access to Taiwan, and count on their own personal safety as long as they accepted the CCP's hegemony in principle and were able to prevent an uprising like the one in Tibet. They would also know, however, that an uprising would lead to devastation, and that the CCP would exert relentless pressure for political hegemony and social revolution regardless of vague promises of cultural and political autonomy. Moreover, they might well realize their own impotence to prevent uprising once their participation in a deal became known to the Taiwanese.

KMT officials could reasonably feel that all of the above arguments apply with even greater strength to individuals than to the KMT as a whole. Those who are knowledgeable (and this may be a crucial limitation) regarding the fate of officials who have gone over to the CCP could reasonably feel that they have excellent chances of living comfortably as powerless but high-ranking officials of the PRC.

One plausible riposte to such reasoning would hold that the KMT and its officials differ decisively from other political and social groups insofar as (1) the KMT has been a significant threat to the CCP whereas other groups have not; and (2) the CCP has had to honor its previous agreements in order to retain its credibility but a solution to the conflict with the KMT would complete the CCP's domestic conquests and thus leave the CCP free to engage in a "final solution." But in the case of agreements with

individuals the KMT "threat" would remain. In the case of a more general agreement with the KMT any ideological threat and any KMT status as an alternative source of legitimacy would vanish automatically with KMT willingness to accept an overall settlement. Also, the riposte would rest upon erroneous assumptions about the CCP and contemporary Chinese society. Chinese society is not monolithic and totally under control. In order to retain its own discipline the CCP has to remain small and control society by manipulating other groups. And it desperately needs to be able to manipulate key intellectual and technical groups, and to work with social and cultural groups whose compliance it cannot completely control. Moreover, the CCP's need for at least a moderately responsive relationship with non-Party socio-cultural elites and with cultural minorities has increased substantially in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. These demands of expediency are reinforced by the CCP's (and especially Mao's) image of itself as the progressive leader of a unified Chinese society. Harsh political and social repression of KMT policies and organizational structure and Taiwanese social structure would not contradict either the demands of expediency or the morale of the Party. But systematic slaughter of many officials without convincing provocation in the aftermath of an agreement would sharply reduce Party morale and non-Party elite compliance, and might induce a "fight-to-the-end" mentality among other social and cultural minorities. Blatantly ignoring other crucial aspects of such an important agreement would have proportionate counter-productive consequences.

Finally, KMT officials would be quite aware that the CCP would not abandon the eventual goal of complete political and social transformation

of Taiwan, but they might also be confident that, if they could maintain internal unity and prevent penetration of Taiwan by the CCP and PLA, they might be able to survive an arrangement which acknowledged Taiwan as an autonomous region within Chinese sovereignty and provided for very limited intercourse between Taiwan and the mainland. Taiwan's fate would then be different from the fate of Mongolia because Taiwan would not have to allow permanent foreign occupation as the price of autonomy from China, and different from the fate of Tibet and Sinkiang because of the weakness of the PRC navy, the internal cohesion of Taiwan, the strength of the GRC army, and the Han background of KMT officials.

III. THE EFFECTS OF VARYING TAIWAN FUTURES

So far the possibility of agreements between Taiwan and Peking has been treated solely as a function of the CCP's record and of KMT officials' perception of that record. But the internal situation on Taiwan, the international situation, and PRC intentions and capabilities relative to Taiwan, also influence credibility. The credibility of various deals hinges so completely on the internal situation in Taiwan that a cursory survey of a few of the obvious alternatives seems necessary.

An Integrated Taiwan

Contemporary Taiwan is divided between a ruling minority of Nationalist Chinese bureaucrats and a ruled majority of native Taiwanese entrepreneurs and peasants. The Taiwanese are Chinese by descent but centuries of isolation, a half century of Japanese rule, and a history of opposition to the mainland as pirates and as supporters of the remnants of Ming and Nationalist power, have created a distinctive culture. In addition to

cultural differences, the Nationalists consist of vaguely socialist bureaucrats whose lifestyle is generally austere, whereas the Taiwanese have enthusiastically reaped the economic rewards of a booming capitalist economy. The Nationalists share with the CCP an identification with the glory of the Chinese past, and the supremacy of Han culture (despite Mao's denunciations of "Great Han Chauvinism"), which the Taiwanese do not share. The Nationalists exclude the Taiwanese from most politically sensitive positions, and maintain bureaucracies and an army suitable for the rule of the mainland but ungainly on a small island. The army mirrors the society in the sense that all the key officers are Nationalists, but virtually all the men in the lower ranks are Taiwanese. But there has been significant recent movement toward greater use of Taiwanese in high positions. Taiwan's 1971-72 diplomatic setbacks stimulated a heightened sense of unity in Taiwan. Similarly, young Taiwanese and young Mainlanders possess remarkable similarities in political and social attitudes.²⁸

Economic trends have reinforced political and social trends that are auspicious for improved integration. Taiwan's economy has boomed for a decade, and the benefits have been distributed far more equitably than in most countries. The Taiwanese seem to have benefited disproportionately from the economic boom. The conspicuous consumption characteristic of most of Taiwan's neighbors (especially Tokyo and Manila) is not evident in Taipei. Thus long-term economic trends seem conducive to stability.

If these trends continue, then one can imagine the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese slowly dissolving into an integrated culture. Such a future

²⁸Sheldon Appleton, "Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan: A Survey of Student Attitudes," China Quarterly 44, 38-66.

would eventually require constitutional changes to end the treatment of Taiwan as just one province of a larger China, and would also require integration of mainlander bureaucrats into an entrepreneurial economy, partial transformations of the identity of both groups, and substantial intermarriage.

Such a Taiwan would possess the internal cohesion to resist subversion. It could muster conventional defense forces so massive as to deter PRC military actions except under extraordinary circumstances. (For instance, very conservative projections of Taiwan's economy indicate that by 1980 Taiwan will be able to sustain a billion dollar defense budget.) Nuclear threats by the PRC would not be credible, except by the most extreme radical regime, because of inhibitions against the use of such weapons against an allegedly domestic population, and because nuclear attacks would expose the PRC--immediately and over the long term--to attack by such weapons. Taiwan's international trade would be so important to Japan and other countries that PRC attempts to cut Taiwan off economically could not succeed. Rising disparities between Taiwan's and the mainland's per capita incomes would augment the already great Taiwanese resistance to the possible leveling effects of economic integration with the mainland, and would pose terrible political problems for a PRC seeking such integration.

In such a situation, what would be the incentives to Taiwan to negotiate any substantial concessions to the PRC? Taiwan's bargaining position would be weak. The Taiwanese population might react violently to such negotiations. The military, composed mostly of Taiwanese, might revolt. Thus the likely outcome of direct negotiations which envisioned

any kind of legal, economic or political incorporation of Taiwan into the mainland would likely be domestic unrest and international weakness.

Against such a situation the yearning of patriotic Nationalist officials for reunion with the mainland would not prevail. There would be effective deterrence not only against any broad political deal but also against any open negotiations in which Taiwan's status was called into doubt.

A Business-As-Usual Taiwan

Continuation of present trends would not lead to such thorough integration as the "Integrated Taiwan" scenario, but would have substantially the same implications for potential negotiations with the PRC. Straightforward projection of present trends would yield a politically apathetic Taiwanese population enjoying great prosperity, continued strong political leadership, a relatively honest and effective and less impoverished bureaucracy, Nationalist political domination with slightly more influential Taiwanese participation, a diplomatically isolated but economically thriving relationship with the rest of the world, and a large army with high morale and modern equipment. Such a Taiwan would have important political, social, and diplomatic problems, but would be able to manage those problems and defend itself. The disadvantages of negotiating directly with the PRC would be the same as in the "Integrated Taiwan" scenario but magnified somewhat by domestic problems.

A Disintegration Scenario

If one adds together the things that could go wrong for Taiwan, one can write a scenario for political disintegration and more successful PRC assertion of hegemony. This scenario is substantially less probable than

the business-as-usual scenario because it requires the coincidence of a number of misfortunes.

Suppose that Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo were to die in quick succession, and that no other political leader was able to assert firm leadership. Suppose that, around this time, the U.S. decided to cancel its alliance with the GRC, and that Japan adopted a decidedly less sympathetic stance. (This latter could occur because of PRC offers of extraordinary investment and trade opportunities, because of a decisive reversal of Taiwan's economic fortunes at a time when the PRC was growing fast, or because of changes in the Japanese leadership.) Suppose in addition, that, as a result of a prolonged energy crisis, or of Japanese political decisions, or of collapse of world trade, Taiwan suffered serious economic reverses. Then GRC political leaders might become demoralized, the bureaucracy might become fearful and ineffective, and the population might become restless. The constitution based on representation of all of China might come to be perceived as an unacceptable fiction. Taiwanese assertion of a distinct national identity might become more widespread and more open. The army might become internally divided. Under such circumstances Taiwan could become susceptible to military threats and internal subversion.

In such a situation a number of kinds of possible deals between GRC officials and the PRC could become possible. First, discontented individual officials might make purely personal rapprochements with the PRC, on the model of the deals made by Fu Tso-yi and Li Tsung-jen. Second, one can imagine the PRC being sufficiently strong to force formal GRC acceptance of status as an autonomous region under PRC jurisdiction, and of

greatly reduced foreign policy independence, but without CCP or PLA penetration of Taiwan. Third, a Taiwan in extremis could conceivably be forced to allow the CCP or PLA a foothold on Taiwan in return for guarantees of personal safety for government and military officials. The latter could only occur in the most extreme situations, because it would likely provoke an internal uprising on Taiwan, and the PRC would likely retaliate by holding GRC officials responsible for the uprising; thus guarantees of personal safety would amount to very little even if both parties had negotiated sincerely.

Conceivably outcomes of this kind could be precipitated by scenarios less serious, and thus more probable, than the disastrous one outlined here. But one or two crises, even fairly serious ones, would not immediately cast doubt on the GRC's future. If that government, or the society which it heads, were inflexible and unable to cope with adversity, or if the government were too unpopular among the population, then the diplomatic crises of 1971-72 and the economic/energy crisis of 1973-74 should have opened gaping wounds in the polity. But the reaction to the diplomatic crisis was greater national unity and greater emphasis on economic growth, and the reaction to the economic/energy crisis has been skillful maneuvering unhampered by domestic political difficulties.

In addition to the above detailed scenarios, which take into account mainly domestic issues on Taiwan, it may be useful to note some low-probability international events which could greatly affect Taiwan's willingness to negotiate agreements directly with the mainland and which are so momentous that they are important despite their low probability: PRC invasion; Sino-Soviet war; a repeat of the Koxinga story (cf. note 7);

various mutual conflicts with Japan or the U.S.S.R.; possible extreme U.S. policies; and dramatic shifts in Japanese or U.S.S.R. policies.

IV. SOME CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE FORM AND FORMULATION OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS

The foregoing discussion of the credibility of possible agreements suggests some broader hypotheses regarding the specific content of agreements and the modalities by which they could be reached.

The Need for Secrecy, Incrementalism and Proxies

Just as important for diplomatic purposes as the content of agreements is the way in which they are made. Channels of communication between Peking and Taipei do exist. Travelers frequently visit both countries. A grapevine exists through Hong Kong, and Taipei's man in Spain can get in touch with Peking's man in Paris. The personal position of Chiang Kai-shek, the institutionalized hostility between the two governments, the ephemeral nature of agreements to share power, and the intense propaganda directed toward individuals,²⁹ make individual agreements likely to be more frequent than governmental agreements. When and if governmental agreements do occur, the slippery nature of such agreements, together with fear of international repercussions and Taiwanese uprising, will exert pressure for those agreements to be arrived at incrementally, rather than as a package, and secretly rather than openly.

²⁹Taiwan's policy is a mirror image of Peking's in this regard. Cf. the parallel united front-type appeals in Chiang's 1969 National Day Message and the 9 April 1969 Declaration of the Tenth National Congress. I am indebted to Angus Fraser for pointing out these parallel appeals.

Although there is strong pressure to keep any negotiations secret, there are also reasons for Taiwan to involve key foreign powers in any negotiations of consequence. Since Taiwan is inevitably weak compared with the PRC, both because of smaller size and because revelation of negotiations could cause domestic violence, it is most likely that, if Taipei wished to conclude relatively explicit agreements with Peking, it would do so by proxy. In the current environment, the U.S. is the only proxy with appropriate strength, ability to maintain confidentiality (somewhat attenuated), and political relationship to conduct proxy negotiations. In the future the U.S.S.R. or Japan might fill this role.

Possible PRC Strategies to Obtain Taiwan's Agreement to Major Changes

The form potential agreements would take, and the mode in which they were negotiated, would of course depend heavily on Peking's strategy. Peking's strategies have varied between extremes of frowning and smiling. The most extreme frowning strategy occurred in 1958, when massive shelling of Quemoy was employed in an attempt to force Nationalist abandonment of this island. Since March of 1973 the PRC has moved to a smiling policy.

The frowning posture was abandoned, at least temporarily, for a number of reasons. Given U.S. commitments to Taiwan, military threats were ineffective. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Peking lacked the diplomatic leverage to undermine Taiwan, and by the late 1960s Peking's rising diplomatic leverage availed little because of Taiwan's economic and domestic political insecurity. After the rapprochement with the U.S., and the accompanying partial U.S. military withdrawal, Taiwan ceased to appear

as a serious threat to the PRC, and a threatening posture toward Taiwan would have endangered rapprochement.

Had Peking been able to achieve rapprochement with the U.S. and immediately mount a strong campaign against Taiwan, including a major economic opening to Japan in return for a Japanese cutoff of trade and investment in Taiwan, it is conceivable that Taiwan's position could have been shaken to the point where it would have agreed to a stronger statement of its relationship with the mainland. Japan was susceptible to decisions that would have been disastrous for Taiwan, because most Japanese believed, from early 1972 until the summer of 1973, that Taiwan's future must inevitably be one of attachment to the PRC as a province or as an autonomous region and that the U.S. would push Taiwan into such a status.³⁰ But a hostile PRC stance toward Taiwan would have endangered the rapprochement with the U.S., and the U.S. had no intention of pushing Taiwan into the arms of the PRC. In the meantime, Japanese opinion swung into a more balanced view of U.S. policy, and of Japanese trade interests in Taiwan, and may never again return to the willingness expressed in 1972 to abandon Taiwan completely.

³⁰This statement is based on interviews this writer conducted in Japan in February, June and November of 1973, and on reports of conversations conducted by others during 1972. One respected newspaper reporter went so far as to assert the existence of a Tokyo-Peking deal providing Tokyo with commercial access to Taiwan in return for Japanese acknowledgment of Peking's political hegemony over Taiwan. Cf. Selig S. Harrison, "Japan, China Agree on Taiwan Dealings," The Washington Post, 26 February 1973. His evidence of an explicit deal is inadequate, but he accurately reflects the mood in Tokyo at the time. The April 1974 Japan-PRC air-line agreement may represent the limit to which any LDP government can now go in denouncing the GRC's political status, and in trading economic loss for political advantage.

Beginning in March of 1973 the PRC adopted a smiling posture toward Taiwan.³¹ Rapprochement had reduced the threat, and had made hostility untenable for the moment, and conciliation offered possible advantages. Conciliation would help to ease the U.S. further out of its position in Taiwan. Conciliation was necessary to convince Taiwan's political leaders that they could trust Peking, and equally necessary to quiet Taiwanese fears that a closer relationship with the PRC would mean drastic economic leveling. Whatever the PRC hoped to gain could only be obtained by conciliation. Some students went beyond this to speculate that, with the U.S. presence and threat removed, Peking's leadership would not feel that Taiwan was so important; some went even further and noted that soon a generation would come to power in Peking which had never committed itself to taking Taiwan and which might not wish to make such a commitment. Whether or not such speculations are correct, the smiling approach has continued into 1974 and has included relaxation of PRC demands that Japan stop dealing with Taiwan and radio broadcasts promising Taiwan officials that they will retain their status if they accept PRC hegemony.

The smiling approach, by itself, offers little hope of leading toward agreements to change the status of Taiwan, because GRC officials lack motivation to make such agreements. Here a comparison with Korea is useful. North Korea has also pursued a smiling posture and, by tapping a deep South Korean desire for unification, has driven at least a small wedge between government and people. But in Taiwan only the governing

³¹On the initiation of this approach, cf. James Pringle, "China Seeks Unity With Taiwan," The Washington Post, 2 March 1973; Frank Ching, "Peking Steps Up Taiwan Appeals," The New York Times, 4 March 1973.

KMT officials feel a strong pan-Chinese nationalism, and such feelings will hardly overcome fears of persecution and loss of power.

Moreover, most of the obvious potential PRC strategies to create motivation sufficient to overcome such fears seem inadequate. One such possible strategy would be a private agreement with the U.S. for the U.S. to force Taiwan into such a change; however, the U.S. probably would not want to be a party to such an agreement and probably lacks the leverage over Taiwan to implement it except through economic or military sanctions that would be unacceptable to the American public. A second such strategy might have been to induce panic, through the PRC rapprochement with the U.S. and Japan, and then to gain agreement to a change in status through a generous and conciliatory approach that seemed to offer the only alternative to disaster. Had world events been just slightly different such a strategy might have worked: had the energy crisis been more severe and had it coincided with the nadir of Japanese opinion regarding Taiwan's future, then Taiwan might have experienced simultaneous diplomatic and economic disaster and might have panicked. Instead, Taiwan experienced a 12.5 percent growth in GNP during 1973 and an astounding 50.2 percent growth in trade³²--a performance that went a long way toward healing diplomatic wounds. Third, the PRC could be employing the smiling posture to facilitate U.S. disengagement from Taiwan, to reduce Taiwan fears, and possibly to facilitate certain political movements on Taiwan, with the hope of exploiting some future crisis on Taiwan. One cannot rule out some success for such a strategy, because one cannot rule out the possibility

³²William Glenn, "Taiwan's New Status," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 February 1974, p. 40.

of serious future crises, but with only moderate luck Taiwan's future crises need prove no worse than the ones just past.³³

The Likelihood of Tacit Agreements

This paper has largely confined itself to possible explicit and formal agreements. Such agreements continue to be possible and credible for discontented individuals on Taiwan. Larger agreements are increasingly possible through secret or tacit use of proxies; but for most important issues, motivation to make agreements is absent and the domestic risks of negotiation are too high. Therefore the most important agreements may be tacit and informal.

Such tacit agreements have already begun to appear. Antagonism over Quemoy has become ritualized; plane flights from Taipei to Quemoy are not disrupted. Tacit understandings exist regarding use of the Taiwan Straits. Such tacit "agreements" still have much of the character of the "agreements" which keep limited war limited, rather than of firmly established consensus, but one can easily imagine evolution toward the latter status. And one can imagine extensions of such agreements to include drilling rights on the continental shelf and other important issues. One can even imagine the evolution of a tacit agreement on the most important issue of all, namely Taiwan's security: it is quite possible that an unspoken agreement might develop whereby Taiwan's most basic security and economic interests go unthreatened so long as Taiwan does not declare its formal independence.

³³It is probably worth noting that the "smiling approach" can change in response to domestic PRC political changes (e.g., the renewed Cultural Revolution) or to incidents like the fuss over the Japan-PRC air agreement, as well as in response to rational strategic calculations. The air agreement dispute does not, by itself, constitute abandonment of the smiling approach.

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IV. U.S.S.R. INITIATIVES FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA*

Soviet foreign policy in Asia has been the subject of much attention recently yet no comprehensive study has been undertaken. Most studies are concerned with Soviet relations with a specific region such as the Indian subcontinent, Japan or China and because of their focus on regional aspects have so far failed to consider the wider implications of Soviet moves and motives and their impact on the newly emerging balance of power.

With few exceptions¹ scant attention has been paid to the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia and the response of the Asian governments to this idea.

The presence of the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean has received wide coverage, but no attempt has been made to relate Soviet capabilities and intentions to the position of various Asian countries. An analysis of this relationship is currently desirable in view of the state of parity in the strategic balance between the two superpowers and its relevance to the Asian continent.

This article will then discuss current and future options for Soviet policy-making on the Asian continent, taking into account the points raised above.

*By Alexander O. Ghebhardt. The author would like to express his appreciation to Professor Robert H. Donaidson of Vanderbilt University, Mr. Hugh O'Neill of the Hudson Institute, Dr. Margaret Roff of Colombia University, and Dr. Gaston J. Sigur, Director, Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University for their valuable assistance and comments on this article.

Not written for the Nixon Doctrine Contract, but included here because of relevance.

The Collective Security Proposal

In June 1969 at the Moscow International Meeting of the Communist and Workers Parties, Leonid Brezhnev spoke about the need for a system of collective security in Asia. A few days earlier an article in Izvestiya signed by V.V. Matveyev had described the proposal in somewhat broader terms.² Neither the Brezhnev speech nor the Izvestiya article put forward any specific program. This lack of specificity may have been the result of the multi-faceted answer that the proposal seemed to require at that time.

In the West, Brezhnev's plan for collective security in Asia was greeted with surprise but an immediate explanation was provided: the proposal was believed to be directed against China.³ This interpretation was the obvious one in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet military clashes on the Damansky Island in January 1969.⁴ There is very little doubt that China was the principal target of what appeared to be a Soviet plan to create a political-military alliance with the specific aim of containing its neighbor. Whether this policy of containment was to be accomplished by a system of collective security modeled on the League of Nations concept or on bilateral treaties, the flexibility of the proposal seemed to allow sufficient room for either option.

The reassertion of the Soviet Union's interest in Asia and the stressing of its role not only as a European, but also as an Asian power, may, too, have been prompted by Britain's decision to withdraw from positions East of Suez. Feeling that a vacuum had been created by the British departure, the Soviets may have decided that the expansion of their Navy would allow them to back up their diplomatic activity by a

show of strength at sea. Despite their protestations to the contrary, the Russians did not seem to be inimical to the idea of taking the place of the "former colonial power," particularly since this would contribute to the enhancement of their security and their increased presence in some Asian countries.

Insufficient attention has been paid to the relevance of the collective security plan in the aftermath of Vietnam. It is possible that the Soviet leaders had advance knowledge of the Nixon Doctrine speech, given by the President of the United States only one month after Brezhnev's proposal.⁵ Though this assumption is difficult to prove, the almost coincidental date of the Soviet and American Doctrines does not entirely exclude the possibility that the Soviet leaders might at least have felt that a new approach was being studied in Washington as a prelude to the forthcoming gradual disengagement from Southeast Asia. Thus, the attempt to reduce the influence of both China and the United States would stand a better chance of success if the U.S.S.R. offered what appeared to be a program of security and cooperation for the whole Asian continent.

Should this hypothesis be correct, the implications for U.S. policy-makers appear to be the following:

First, it seems that in formulating the Nixon Doctrine more attention should have been paid to the Soviet proposal for collective security. If the U.S. military disengagement and the growing role played by the Asians themselves, two major provisions of the new American Doctrine, were to be followed by an increasing Soviet presence in the area in the form of military aid, acquisition of naval facilities and (in the case of India) sending of advisers, then some countries, feeling left on their own after a long period of American involvement in the region,

might well prefer an accommodation with the Soviet Union to the danger of aggression on the part of other Asian states.

Second, subsequent attacks by the Russians against the Nixon Doctrine have particularly stressed what the Russians perceived as the "defeat" of the imperialists and a retreat from the previous position of "open aggression" to a doctrine according to which "Asians fight other Asians."⁶

Third, by that time the Russians had apparently become aware of the impending rapprochement between the U.S. and the Chinese People's Republic.⁷ Fear that a possible Washington-Peking-Tokyo triangle might be the final result of closer relations between Peking and Washington, presumably caused apprehension in Moscow.

Fourth, Moscow set about trying to break up such an alliance which, by its very nature, was thought to be directed against the Soviet Union or at least aimed at containing it. The Soviet leadership appeared to consider Japan the weakest link in the triangle and presumably the least dangerous at the present time. Economic advantages in the form of exploitation of natural gas and raw materials in Siberia were offered to the Japanese not only as bait to keep them away from China, but probably also out of a genuine desire to reach a workable agreement between the two countries.

Fifth, the Russians tried to prevent the expansion of Chinese influence in Eastern Europe and simultaneously curtail the impact of the American policy of building bridges which, with its economic offerings in the form of trade and advantageous exchanges of all kinds, constituted a strong temptation for the starved East European Communist economies, burdened as they are with Comecon obligations and hampered by lack of hard currency and advanced technology. Politically, the U.S.S.R. was

concerned over the possible formation of a Bucharest-Belgrade-Tirana "axis" which would have presumably adopted anti-Soviet tones and might have eventually fallen under the influence of Washington or Peking or both.

In the event that the Washington-Peking-Tokyo triangle could not be easily broken because of the outstanding issues between the Soviet Union and Japan, the most pressing of which were the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and the Japanese demand for the return of the northern islands,⁸ the Soviet leadership sought an ally in India to help stabilize the balance of power in Asia. A possible Moscow-New Delhi axis was to be opposed to the Washington-Peking-Tokyo triangle. To achieve such a feat the Russians sought to encourage economic cooperation among India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the ultimate aim of drawing all three countries into the Soviet orbit and creating an anti-Chinese chain of countries on China's western border.

Soviet-Pakistani Relations

The weak link in this chain proved to be Pakistan, not only because of its strained relations with India but also because of its membership in SEATO and close contacts with both Washington and Peking.

Nevertheless, despite Soviet support for India during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Soviet Union immediately tried to patch up its relations with Pakistan following Yahya Khan's replacement by President Bhutto. There was no attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to complicate the situation on the Indian subcontinent, but rather an effort to promote a return to the policy of Tashkent when Premier Kosygin played the role of mediator in the Kashmir conflict. Faced with political and

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economic disaster at home and eager to surmount the difficulties in the wake of defeat, Bhutto decided to accept Moscow's offer of help without having to pay too much in exchange. As one American analyst observed:

"...President Bhutto accepted public chastisement by Soviet leaders during his visit to Moscow in order to mitigate Soviet hostility and secure a resumption of Soviet economic aid."⁹

The Pakistanis did not, however, accept the collective security proposal, despite apparent Soviet pressure on this particular issue.¹⁰ Pakistan has never been receptive to the idea of collective security, presumably because of its close relations with China and the feeling that India was the key to an Asian security system while Moscow represented the linchpin.¹¹

Soviet concern with the fate of SEATO, in the wake of possible peace in Vietnam, was superseded by the apparent desire to prevent the formation of other regional alliances in Asia. The primary target of the collective security plan in this respect seemed to be the two groups of countries known as the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thus, instead of military and political blocs on a regional basis, the Soviet Union was offering the Asian nations its own variant security arrangement based on bilateral treaties whose primary role would be prevention of the use of force and non-interference in internal affairs, according to the Soviet proposal.

The Small and Medium-Size Asian Countries

The Soviet Union found an unexpectedly sympathetic ear in Malaysia where the retirement of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman did much to contribute to the modification of the foreign policy orientation of Kuala

Lumpur. The new Premier, Tun Abdul Razak, immediately put forward a proposal to make Malaysia a neutral country independent of the superpowers' political and military blocs. The Malaysian Prime Minister seemed to believe that his country's plan for neutrality and the Soviet proposal for collective security supplemented one another at least to some degree.

The idea that the Malaysian government was trying to advance was that no neutralization of Southeast Asia was feasible while the Vietnam war was still going on. To this effect Malaysia proposed the convocation of a conference of Southeast Asian nations on Vietnam without "the presence of any outside power."¹² As the Malaysian Prime Minister apparently discovered during his visit to Moscow, his hope of receiving Russia's "sympathetic understanding" of his neutralization plans did not come to fruition. Instead, the Soviet Prime Minister advanced once again the idea of "ensuring collective security in Asia."¹³

Despite what appeared to be a disagreement between Russia and Malaysia over the question of selecting a suitable means of implementing a policy with some common facets, Malaysia came to play a significant role in Soviet foreign policy in Asia if for no other reason than that the neutralist tendencies of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak suited Soviet designs to nullify the Asian countries' regional security organizations. More by Malaysian actions than by Soviet design this policy of neutralization on the part of Kuala Lumpur may turn out to be detrimental to the Asian states' regional security in the long run. On March 12, 1973, the Malaysian government declared its intention to withdraw from ASPAC. Although ASPAC has been all along a cultural and economic organization designed to promote cooperation among its members, Malaysia's action may in the end have a negative effect upon other countries in this area,

particularly in view of the Soviet diplomatic initiatives of which the collective security question is only the most important.

Whether a centrifugal phenomenon will now take place, the end result is not yet clear. Should the collective security proposal fail to gain acceptance among a number of Asian countries, neutrality will still be preferable in the Soviet view to a series of regional security alliances in which the Western powers will play even a marginal role. Furthermore, neutrality may only be the first step toward final acceptance of collective security Soviet style. Alternatively, the Russians may be satisfied with a chain of neutral states economically dependent on Soviet aid and politically attuned to the present arrangement. In this respect Malaysia may be only the first of many outside the Indian subcontinent.

The Soviet attempt to improve relations with small and medium-size Asian states should be viewed in the context of the realignment of the regional balance of power on the Continent. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez contributed to a more flexible policy on the part of countries like Thailand, Singapore and Iran. All three countries have had internal disturbances coupled with less than friendly neighbors, who at one time or another in the past have tried to put political, military or economic pressure on them. The atmosphere of detente following the rapprochement between the United States and China as well as the achievement of strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine have made reliance upon direct American support a risky enterprise for the future, except, perhaps, in the case of Thailand. Attempts to improve relations with the Soviet Union, especially on the part of Thailand, must be seen in the overall context of the newly

emerging balance of power in Asia as well as Sino-Soviet support of indigenous guerilla movements.

Thus, the former foreign minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, has come out in favor of improving relations with both Russia and China following his visit to Washington and acceptance of the Nixon theory of the five-power world. This was followed by the visit to Moscow of General Prapas Charusathiara, Deputy Chairman of the National Executive Council and one of the most powerful men in the Thai government.¹⁴ It is not certain that the collective security issue came up for discussion but it is interesting to note that another Thai official, Prasit Karnchanavat, following his visit to Peking, declared that China was willing to set up diplomatic relations with Thailand.¹⁵ Thailand's relations with the two communist superpowers seem to be influenced by fear of domestic upheaval in the northern part of the country and the sudden realization that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Southeast Asia makes it necessary to come to terms with both Moscow and Peking in order to keep the North Vietnamese at a safe distance by indirect pressure. While U.S. troops have been withdrawn from Vietnam, American involvement in the defense of Thailand cannot be entirely discounted. The maintenance of air bases on Thai soil implies that the United States is prepared to provide the Thai army with air support should this be needed. During his visit to Singapore in February 1973, Vice President Spiro Agnew reportedly reached agreement with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on the necessity for the United States to maintain bases in Thailand and help make that country a buffer against possible Communist expansion to the South.¹⁶ Possible transformation of Thailand into a forward defense

line in Southeast Asia would mean that in the event of insurgency in that part of the world the United States, in conformity with the principles of the Nixon doctrine, would have to render support to the Asian governments that found themselves challenged by external aggression or domestic uprising.

Singapore opened its facilities to the visiting Soviet naval squadrons but has not welcomed the collective security plan. Following Vice President Agnew's visit the position of the Singapore government, beset by growing fears of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, appears to have undergone a substantial change as evidenced recently by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's proposal for the formation of a joint air-naval force made up of the United States, Japan, Australia and Asian nations to counter the Soviet naval power in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.¹⁷ The position of the Prime Minister of Singapore has also been influenced to a large extent by his apparent desire to play an important role in regional Asian affairs possibly with the help of both the United States and Japan.¹⁸ Singapore's deeper involvement in regional affairs and the improvement of relations with Indonesia as well as the creation of a joint fleet and air force would certainly allay Lee Kuan Yew's fears of being "swallowed up" by bigger neighbors or of his country being transformed into a Russian naval outpost or a "third China."

As for Indonesia, President Suharto's government has been utterly opposed to any form of regional cooperation that would involve the creation of a supranational organization.¹⁹ Strained relations with Singapore in the past have been used by the Indonesians as an excuse to attack their neighbor for a series of imaginary evils. One of the most

frequently heard accusations was that Singapore was being transformed by Russia into a maritime base which would then be used as a springboard for expanding its political and military influence in the region.²⁰

As the consequence of the Sino-Soviet conflict both Moscow and Peking appear to have tried to persuade Chiang Kai Shek if not to accept an alliance or their friendship at least to keep away from the other superpower. The collective security design has played an interesting role in Soviet relations with Taiwan, for while the Russians have made no overt attempt to draw Taiwan into their plans for a system of collective security in Asia, the Sino-Soviet conflict has indirectly contributed to at least one instance of an unofficial contact between the two capitals. The rumored visit last year of Victor Louis to Taiwan was probably connected with a Soviet attempt to counter increasing CPR propaganda in favor of closer contacts between Peking and Taipei. Rumors that Chiang's son and probable successor, Prime Minister Chiang Ching Kuo, might regard closer contacts with Russia in a favorable light, may have induced the Soviet Union to send its emissary on a fact-finding mission. It is interesting that no Soviet attacks against Taiwan have been noticed except when the Soviet Union thought Taiwan's diplomatic activity and proposals might result in the undermining of the collective security proposal.²¹

Although Soviet-Taiwanese relations should be seen in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, it appears more likely that Moscow would pursue a double-edged policy in regard to Taiwan: on one hand trying to come closer to prevent a rapprochement between Taiwan and Peking, and on the other attempting to force the other Asian countries to break

off relations with Taiwan in order to undermine any military alliance in which Taiwan might come to play an important role as a result of U.S. and British withdrawal from Asia. As part of this double-edged policy the Russians also may have contemplated using Taiwan as a pawn to prevent closer military and economic cooperation between the CPR and Japan.

While Soviet relations with a number of countries continue to be based on shaky ground, ties with Iran reached a new high following Kosygin's visit to Teheran in March 1973. During the Soviet Prime Minister's stay in Iran, the Iranian foreign minister declared that his country views the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia with sympathy.²² It seems doubtful however that the Iranian government would be willing to accept the Soviet proposal without a serious study of the possible implications of such a move. It is more probable that Iranian authorities tried to do their best not to offend the Soviet Union while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. Iranian interest in improving economic and political ties with Moscow is influenced by the changing balance of power in the Persian Gulf and the growing Soviet presence both on the Indian subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean. As one of the major oil-producing countries of this region Iran is unlikely to want to offend either the United States or the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship and Cooperation Treaty of April 1972, followed by the Iraqi-Kuwait border incidents must have made the Iranian government even more aware of the possible military and economic consequences of the growing Soviet presence in the area. Thus, it is not improbable that Teheran's willingness to listen sympathetically to the Soviet proposal for collective security is a preventive step in a changing relationship in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Soviet relations with Afghanistan have been steadily improving, especially following Prime Minister Kosygin's visit to Kabul where he signed the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty in May 1969. Increased economic and military aid amounting to almost 60 percent of all the arms procured by the Afghanistan armed forces over the past four years have been furnished by the Soviet Union. A series of political gestures among which tacit support for Afghanistan in its policy of backing the rebel tribes in Baluchistan and Pakhtunistan in their conflict with the Pakistani central authorities, have tended to bring the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Musa Shafiq closer to Moscow.

In the past the Afghan government has followed a strict policy of non-alignment being careful not to give any kind of open support to the Soviet collective security proposal. This stand has particularly been taken because of the apparent opposition to the Soviet plan by King Mohammed Zaher Shah.

During his May 1973 visit to Kabul, Nikolay Podgorny tried once again to persuade his hosts of the desirability of collective security in Asia, declaring that it is a pressing problem.²³

Although it is not exactly known what the major topic of the talks was, the speeches made by Podgorny and the King and the final communique seem to indicate that the Soviet Union pledged again support for Afghanistan's border claims in exchange for the acceptance of the collective security idea.²⁴

A new and somewhat unexpected element introduced during the talks was the strong condemnation of Israel made by King Mohammed Zaher Shah:

"The just solution of the Middle East problem caused by Israel's aggression and by Israel's

desire to benefit from the aggression's results should be based on the granting of all rights to our Arab brothers in Palestine and the return of Israeli occupied territories to Egypt, Syria and Jordan."²⁵

The new emphasis on the political situation in the Middle East and the anti-Israel stand taken by both Podgorny and the King of Afghanistan appear to indicate that the Soviet Union may attempt to use the collective security proposal to conclude bilateral treaties with a number of Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region while continuing to use it in its more direct form on the Indian subcontinent and in Southeast Asia. Thus, with the exception of Bangladesh, Afghanistan appears to be the only medium size country where the Soviet leadership has succeeded in having at least some of its views accepted. The cause for this state of affairs should be traced back to 1960 when the Soviet Union began its drive into Afghanistan as well as to what Podgorny called during his dinner speech: "...the border, territorial and other disputes left by colonialism to this day."²⁶

Australia and Collective Security

At the other end of the hemisphere Australian foreign policy has also undergone a substantial change in attitude following the election of the first Labor government in the post-war period. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's decision to withdraw Australian troops from Vietnam and his recognition of the CPR in December 1972 were accompanied by a decision to cease participation in ASPAC in February 1973.²⁷ It must be said, however, that moves were previously made in this direction by the former Australian Prime Minister John Gorton.²⁸ Both Gorton and

the External Affairs Minister Freeth, welcomed Russian participation in some form of economic assistance to the Southeast Asian nations. At the same time against the advice of his Army Minister P. R. Lynch, he seemed to accept the idea, with the possible encouragement of Washington, that his country and the Soviet Union could work together to assist in the conclusion of non-aggression pacts among the Southeast Asian countries.²⁹ Gorton's ideas coincided to a certain degree with the Soviet idea of collective security in Asia for, as the Soviet press has repeatedly emphasized following Brezhnev's speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969, the non-use of force was one of the cardinal principles of the Soviet proposal.³⁰

The establishment of diplomatic relations with China by the new Labor government appeared to have cooled off at least temporarily the Australian overtures to the Soviet Union on this particular issue. On the other hand Gorton's policies may have also been influenced by a desire to appease the Russians and fend off their attacks during the election year especially since his Vietnam policy came up for sharp criticism, not only from the opposition but also from intellectuals and some other circles in his own party. The Russians' main points of attack against Gorton were directed at two levels: against his role in the creation of ASEAN which was directed purportedly to "...suppress national liberation movements in Asian countries located in the vicinity of Vietnam,"³¹ and the establishment of the naval base at Cockburn Sound near Fremantle aimed at checking Russian activity in the Indian Ocean.³² The impression gained from Soviet statements and pronouncements at that time was that both the United States and Britain were trying to arm

Australia in order for it to play an aggressive role in Southeast Asia in the event of American withdrawal.

Recognition of the Chinese People's Republic by the Labor government has not yet drawn any hostile reaction from Moscow as it was followed by Prime Minister Whitlam's attempt to improve relations with the U.S.S.R. as well in the context of the new balance of forces in the Pacific Basin. However, Whitlam's approach to collective security in Asia has so far been more than circumspect in contrast to his enthusiasm for improving relations with China. The Russians may be more content with a government in Canberra which will try to disengage itself almost completely from Southeast Asia and at the same time maintain a neutral attitude in the Sino-Soviet conflict. They may have also arrived at the conclusion that Australian nationalism forged by Whitlam with its potentially anti-British and anti-American tones could eventually lead to closer ties between Canberra and Moscow.³³

Japan and Collective Security

Following Brezhnev's speech in 1969 Japan has become a principal target for Soviet diplomacy. Unlike the case of India, however, Soviet-Japanese relations have been checked by the close association of Tokyo and Washington and the outstanding issues between Tokyo and Moscow. For all these reasons the Soviet Union has been making less headway in Japan despite presenting the collective security plan as a non-aggression pact rather than an alliance dominated by the Soviet Union.³⁴ The Russians seem to look with particular uneasiness at the conclusion of the United States-Japanese security treaty feeling that the treaty tended to uphold territorial claims against the U.S.S.R.³⁵ Another explanation can be

found in what appears to be extreme sensitivity about "possible diversion of Japanese economic growth into military might."³⁶ This fear is nonetheless reduced by a desire to reap maximum benefits from utilizing Japanese capital and technology for the development of Siberia knowing full well that exploitation of American-Japanese rivalry over economic and technical assistance will serve not only Soviet political interests but will also have a dampening effect on whatever suspicions the Japanese may nurse over Soviet naval expansion in the Sea of Japan. The outstanding issue which seems to lie like a roadblock on the way to closer political contacts is the Japanese demand for the return of the Kurile islands occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Without these islands being returned to Japan, chances of rapid progress in the successful negotiations of a peace treaty appear to be slim. As Soviet sources acknowledge, their country is not prepared to tie the territorial question to the collective security proposal particularly since the European security negotiations are predicated on the maintenance of the status quo.³⁷

The paramount fear of the Soviet government in this instance seems to be that acquiescence to the Japanese demand will open the door to a series of territorial questions settled at the end of World War II to the Russians' advantage. Thus, the Soviet strategy in relation to Japan amounts to ignoring completely the Japanese territorial demands while emphasizing economic cooperation in the Siberian development and attempting to persuade the government and public opinion to accept the collective security proposal. During Gronyko's visit to Tokyo the Soviet Foreign Minister was obviously attempting to exploit to Soviet advantage the

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Japanese dissatisfaction with American policy toward China. Gromyko succeeded in extracting a promise from the Japanese to resume the peace treaty talks. It is doubtful however that much headway was made toward favorable consideration by the Japanese of collective security in Asia. The Soviet attitude on the question of the northern islands has so far remained unchanged.

While Soviet diplomacy has demonstrated a high degree of eagerness to improve relations with Tokyo the Japanese have found an unexpected ally on the territorial question in Peking. The Chinese media has loudly lent its support to the revision of the status quo even more so since President Nixon's visit to China followed by that of Prime Minister Tanaka.³⁸

Against this background of Chinese meddling in the Soviet-Japanese territorial question the Russians appear, at least temporarily, to have shifted the emphasis from collective security and other political questions to improving economic relations and "good neighborliness."³⁹

By holding in front of the Japanese the advantages of economic cooperation and a substantial share in the exploitation of Siberian raw materials the Russians presumably hope that political cooperation may follow at a later stage and thus prevent closer cooperation among China, Japan and the Southeast Asian and Pacific countries. The Russians' major fear seems to be the possibility that such cooperation may eventually lead to the formation of a regional security system which will prevent the establishing of Soviet influence in this area.

The Indian Position

India's reaction to the Soviet proposal has been influenced by events and forces outside her own control. In 1969 when the proposal was first made the Indian government received it with cool politeness but no particular enthusiasm.⁴⁰

A major fear of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Indian government at that time seemed to be the Russians' attempt (at Indian expense) to fill the vacuum left by the British. A second reason for discomfort was the attempt of one of the superpowers to impose what appeared as a military and economic supranational organism over and above the heads of the Asian nations. Instead India advocated U.N. guarantees for the countries of the region.⁴¹ A similar statement was made in December 1969 by the then Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh.

However, growing tensions between India and Pakistan were to compel the Indians to pay at least lip service to the Soviet proposal. The conclusion of the Soviet-Indian friendship and cooperation treaty in 1971 was interpreted by the Soviet side as the first and probably most important step in their effort to secure a collective security system in Asia. As William J. Barnds stated:

"...moreover, such a treaty could be seen as the first major success in the U.S.S.R.'s campaign to erect a collective security system in Asia."⁴²

Following the Indo-Pakistani war and the Soviet support for New Delhi the Indian government was compelled by circumstances to react favorably to the renewed Soviet campaign for collective security in Asia. Fear of a possible new clash with either Pakistan or China or both may

have persuaded the Indian leaders that close military cooperation with Moscow was the only alternative to a possible future reversal of the 1971 outcome of the conflict over Bangladesh.

None other than a spokesman for the Indian General Staff drew the attention of the intelligentsia and the political leaders to the possibility of a future war against both Pakistan and China, warning against the feeling of self-satisfaction and complacency with the stern words that:

"...treaties and defense pacts are but poor substitutes for possessing independent armed strength--they may be a good umbrella but a bad roof."⁴³

Thus, the Indian General Staff appeared to believe that undue reliance on both the Soviet-Indian friendship treaty of 1971 and the Simla agreement between India and Pakistan of 1972 were not a substitute for vigilance and military preparedness. Nor is the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia, according to the same sources, much to the liking of the Indian military leaders. Better relations with Pakistan followed by possible improvement in Sino-Indian relations may contribute to the dilution of Soviet influence in India. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi recently indicated, India is interested in improving relations with both China and the United States while maintaining her cooperation with the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ Rapprochement between India and China, possibly facilitated by the decrease in Pakistani military power, would certainly pose serious problems for Moscow and lead to the possible undermining of its collective security plans. As she is now the major Soviet ally in Asia, any Indian attempt to come to terms with China would lead to a series of chain reactions including a new realignment of power in Asia. .

The success of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's effort to continue pursuing a policy of non-alignment appears to depend to a great extent on peaceful relations with Pakistan and closer contact with Peking and Washington. This will allow India to break away gradually from Moscow without feeling threatened by domestic political insecurity or external military aggression. Moscow, for its part, also seems to prefer peaceful relations between India and Pakistan with the hope that Asian collective security, Soviet style, may be the end result of such a policy. Recent Soviet statements leave the impression that Moscow would more than welcome a tripartite agreement among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which would enshrine the principle of the renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, one of the cardinal principles of the Soviet proposal for collective security.⁴⁵ Such a tripartite arrangement on the Indian subcontinent would eventually lead to a considerable cooling off in relations between Pakistan and China which will serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy. A political treaty to follow the recently signed Soviet-Pakistani agreement on economic and technical cooperation would not only be a further step, and as such a very important one, toward the realization of the Soviet collective security plan but also contribute significantly to the isolation of China in a potential conflict with the U.S.S.R.

It appears therefore that the key to the success of the collective security system in Asia lies on one hand in the state of Indian and Chinese relations and on the other in the ability of Pakistan to withstand Soviet political pressure while improving its ties with India. The New Delhi-Peking-Karachi dealings for the next few years may prove to be crucial for Moscow's place on the Asian continent.

The Chinese Position

From the very beginning China has attributed an anti-Chinese flavor to the Soviet collective security plan, declaring right at the outset that the Soviet proposal was picked up from "the garbage heap of the notorious warmonger John Foster Dulles."⁴⁶ The only difference was that the so-called "system of collective security in Asia" was actually a proposal to create an anti-Chinese military alliance. This was in response to Matveyev's article of 29 May which accused China of "creating trouble" in Asia.

The Chinese leadership has sensed from the start the anti-Chinese nature and potentially dangerous implications for China of the Soviet proposal. On the whole the Chinese media have tended to ignore the Soviet campaign after stating in 1969 that India and Japan were the "linchpins" of the envisaged collective security system. The Soviet-Indian treaty followed by the defeat of Pakistan must have increased Peking's fear of Soviet initiatives. To counter that fear the Chinese have apparently decided that the best tactic was to pretend that the proposal was just another machination of Moscow and concentrate instead on other issues. The defeat of Pakistan was greeted in Peking with the accusation that the Soviet Union had pushed India to annex East Pakistan so that the Soviets could in turn gain control over the Indian Ocean and contend with the United States for hegemony in the hemisphere.⁴⁷

This fear on the part of the Chinese was never better expressed than during the visit to Peking of British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home from October 30 to November 3, 1972. The visit may have also marked an important step forward in China's attempt to improve

relations with India with the help of Britain.⁴⁸ What transpired from these meetings was the Chinese concern that the Soviet Union was attempting to play the leading role in Europe with the help of the European security conference, and in Asia through its plan for collective security carried out through bilateral treaties. Improving relations with India would certainly help deal a severe blow to what the Chinese consider Soviet attempts to isolate them with a chain of countries friendly toward and economically subservient to Russia. The other common concern of the British Foreign Secretary and his Chinese hosts seems to have been the growing presence of the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean. Beside its strategic significance, the relevance of the Soviet fleet may lie in the U.S.S.R.'s inability to maintain direct contact with India by land as long as Pakistan refuses to participate in Soviet schemes for linking Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.⁴⁹

After a long silence on the subject, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En Lai declared before a group of Japanese parliamentarians on 20 January 1973 that the U.S.S.R. would like to subordinate the People's Republic of China with the aid of an Asian security plan.⁵⁰ The Chinese public statements on the Russian proposal have alternated with total silence while the Peking diplomacy was busy trying to hurt the Russians in other Asian countries of which Japan and Taiwan appeared to be primary targets. Fear of Soviet encirclement and potential aggression led China to refuse to be contained and therefore reject any Soviet initiative that may lead to a growing Russian role on the Asian continent.

The Current Soviet Position

As Robert H. Donaldson has aptly noted..."it is significant that in the months following the Soviet-Indian treaty the U.S.S.R. had revived the long dormant notion of a 'system of collective security in Asia.'"⁵¹ The revival of the Soviet proposal happened to coincide and not accidentally, with efforts made by the Nixon Administration to reach a settlement in Vietnam. For while the war in Southeast Asia was still going on there was little prospect for preserving peace with the help of treaties; nor could the Soviet Union play a significant role in that part of the world or attempt to attract the Southeast Asian nations to her side against China.

The close connection attached by the Russians to the ending of the Vietnam war and the successful implementation of their proposal became evident in January 1973 when the Hungarian newspaper Nepszava published the most comprehensive article to appear on this subject in an East European country. It said among other things:

"The reaction to the Soviet proposal was more or less mixed, a fact which could be explained by the situation prevailing at that time (i.e. 1969), since there was then not even a chance of ending the Vietnamese war, and without this, not even the greatest optimists could believe in any real peace in Asia."⁵²

A few paragraphs later the author acknowledges that while the war in Vietnam is coming to an end and relations with the United States might possibly be improved, "the attitude of China in the Asian region, as well as in international politics as a whole, gives cause for alarm."⁵³

Almost a year before at the Trade Union congress in March 1972 General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev explained the aims of the collective security proposal in the following words:

"Collective security in Asia, as we see it, should be built on such principles as the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, broad development of economic and other kinds of co-operation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit."⁵⁴

Following Brezhnev's speech a new emphasis could be detected in the articles of Soviet commentators. The first and one of the most interesting was immediately published in New Times under V. Kuznetsov's signature.⁵⁵ In it the author outlines the common approach on the part of the Soviet Union to collective security in both Asia and Europe. The principles enunciated by Leonid Brezhnev only a few days before were equally applicable to the two continents. The most important (or only) difference is the Russian desire to come to the conference table in Europe as opposed to the attempt to tackle the issue through bilateral treaties in Asia. It should be noted here that both proposals have evolved from what appeared at first to be pure security aspects to a broader framework which includes economic cooperation, trade and bilateral or multilateral relations.

Of particular interest is the Soviet Union's attempt to drum up support for the collective security idea with the help of pro-Soviet Asian communist parties and other groups dissatisfied with the existing governments. The "conference of collective security and cooperation" in Dacca in May 1973⁵⁶, composed of communist delegations representing 26 countries ranging from the Middle East to Japan signalled the dilemma in which the

Soviet leadership finds itself. This is a result of improving relations with the United States, Japan and the other Asian countries at governmental level. For while trade and political ties with the Third World countries have witnessed a marked improvement as a result of the detente process, simultaneously Moscow finds itself in the awkward position of being asked to support anti-establishment and guerilla movements in a number of Arab and Asian countries. Once again the national interests of the Soviet Union and her ideological interests seem to conflict. And the success of the collective security proposal or the lack of it may depend in the end on the Soviet Union's ability to resolve this dilemma. For it is doubtful that with one or two possible exceptions the Asian nations will take seriously the Soviet collective security proposal while simultaneously Moscow continues to support national liberation movements as the organization of the World Congress of "peace loving" forces in the fall in the Soviet Union appears to indicate.

The Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia is the major diplomatic initiative on the continent in the 1970s. Its success, or lack of it, depends on the acceptance of this idea by China and Japan. As long as Peking continues to see the collective security proposal as mainly anti-Chinese, chances of holding a conference on security and cooperation similar to the European security conference are indeed slight. A conference would have both advantages and disadvantages for the Soviet Union. Among the potential benefits accruing to the Russians the most important will be acceptance of the idea itself by China and Japan since this fact alone will signify a dampening of the Sino-Soviet conflict and implicit recognition of the status quo enshrined at the end of World War II.

In the face of Chinese and Japanese opposition to an international conference the Russians have the option of attempting the conclusion of bilateral treaties with small and medium size countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Basin, using the Soviet-Indian and Soviet-Iraqi treaties as models.

Changes of governments or leading personalities like those in Malaysia may lead to either an improvement in relations with Moscow or a further step toward nonalignment or neutrality.

The success of the collective security design will be influenced even more by economic relations among the three major protagonists in the Pacific Basin: China, Japan and the Soviet Union. Both the Russians and the Japanese have a direct interest in the development of trade and co-operation on a scale far exceeding the present, but economic considerations may be negatively influenced by continued expansion of Soviet military and naval power which eventually might lead to a clash between the Soviet Union on one side and China and Japan on the other.

To some extent, the role played by the United States and Britain will also affect the security considerations in Asia and the Pacific Basin despite both countries desire to disengage militarily. To help secure acceptance of their proposal the Russians will presumably compromise and accept the participation of both Britain and the United States as they acquiesced in the participation of United States and Canada in the European security conference. Despite their desire not to conduct the conference on a bloc basis, an Asian security conference might eventually be held. If it ever is held, it will become extremely difficult to satisfy each and every interest because of the great number of participants and the multitude of interests involved.

Withdrawal of the United States and Britain from Asia but continuation of close economic contacts with Japan may improve the Soviet position but at the same time create further strains between Moscow and Tokyo. Should Japan, however, decide to develop nuclear weapons, a regional alliance of Asian countries, with Japanese and Australian input with a Japanese nuclear umbrella would probably make the Soviet Union feel even more insecure regardless of China's attitude. In that case Moscow can be expected to double its efforts to achieve collective security in Asia through bilateral or multilateral agreements and commitments. Either way, the next decade may well witness a growing role for the Soviet Union in Asia and the Pacific Basin. Both the economic and political activities of the Russians will make substantial progress but this progress is likely to be balanced by the new power arrangements, with the two Asian superpowers, China and Japan, playing counterweight roles and a non-Asian power holding the balance.

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V. REGIONAL SECURITY IN EAST ASIA*

The problems with regional security arrangements are generally well known but there are some possible aspects of problems in regional security in East Asia under the Nixon Doctrine which are different enough to warrant detailed discussion. These aspects are not only in the conventional military area (this paper does not stress the nuclear problem which brings in new and in many cases entirely different aspects of security, deterrence, etc.), but in the political/ideological and morale areas.

The dominant communist power in the area is Red China and, particularly after recent events, this ideological, political, military and morale force affects every aspect of regional security in East Asia, even in zones which are not directly contiguous to the Peoples' Republic. In this paper therefore the political/psychological and military threats of this power are outlined in total where they are first encountered in the study (e.g., the total air threat is outlined in Section IV, A, 3, "The Air Threat of Red China and its Impact on Southeast Asia," but the more detailed analysis of the threat applies only to Southeast Asia). The immediate threat to many of these areas is not Red China itself and security arrangements are directed at these lesser but more imminent threats first.

I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL/IDEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT

One of the difficulties in developing regional security arrangements in the environment of the Nixon Doctrine is that, unlike the Monroe Doctrine or the Truman Doctrine (to which it has been incorrectly compared), it is basically a withdrawal doctrine. In other words, the Monroe Doctrine, the Truman

*By Frank Armbruster. This paper was completed in March 1972 and has not been updated. It has been included for reasons of relevance.

Doctrine, and several other "doctrines" of the United States reflected our staking out areas of primary or even exclusive interest of either the United States or the Free World. The United States, or for that matter the Free World, has not put forward such a policy in a decade. It is the communist powers who have proclaimed and vastly and even violently supported such "doctrines." The Brezhnev Doctrine is a super Monroe Doctrine for East Europe. It says, in effect, that the satellite powers in Europe are the exclusive domain of the Soviet Union as far as their international relations, and even their domestic politics, are concerned. This is a strong, dynamic doctrine voiced by a self-confident government.

Like all these doctrines which have to do with spheres of influence and are promulgated by high morale, dynamic nations, the implications are that things within the Soviets' sphere of influence are theirs while the rest of the world is negotiable. Furthermore, at the time of formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine the Soviets reminded Bonn of their rights, as a result of the arrangements at the end of World War II, to send troops into West Germany at any sign of a resurgence of Nazism. This was taken by some as a warning by the Soviets to Bonn not to enforce the law against the new Communist party which had arisen in West Germany since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.* In fact, Bonn hurried to Moscow to try to "buy" from the Soviets a promise not to bring up the Soviet right to intervene in West Germany again. (The Western allies, of course, have a similar right to intervene in East Germany, which they, of course, never threaten to do, primarily because we accept the Soviet criteria for who is a German National Socialist. With less contortions than

*Communist parties are illegal in West Germany on the grounds they are associated with a foreign power--the new party has close ties with East Germany, including reportedly personnel from there; yet it is unmolested by the law.

are sometimes evident in Soviet political logic, one could say, for example, that since the leaders of the East German selfproclaimed "socialist" state are admitted nationalists, that they are German National, as well as international socialist. And in many ways they act like the old types too.) Bonn has gone along completely with agreeing to only work through Moscow in any of its relations with the satellites on a political level, with no quid pro quo from Moscow about working through any nation in formal Soviet relations with another Western power, or even with informal but close Soviet relations with the Communist parties in West Germany and other Western European nations, some of which are quite strong, as for example, in Italy and France. We are in a poor position to criticize, however; the United States had acquiesced in the premise of the doctrine years before its "formal" announcement in the case of Cuba where we guarantee that Communist government from interference by any groups based in the United States without any quid pro quo guarantees from Cuba or the Soviet Union against interference in the internal affairs of other nations by Cuba or the U.S.S.R.

Hanoi has an expansionist "sphere of influence" doctrine which embraces all of Indochina (most of which was, until recently, non-Communist territory) and she adamantly refuses to reject this doctrine regardless of the costs.

Even Cuba has such a dynamic, expansive, ideologically based doctrine, and feeble though she is economically and militarily, and despite the failures in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic of Communist movements, supported, and apparently to some extent sponsored by Cuba, she refuses to abandon that doctrine. Now Chile hails Cuba as the leader of the ideological movement in the Americas and fetes Fidel Castro.

We can probably expect the same kind of doctrine to come out of Peking one of these days. As a matter of fact, like the Brezhnev Doctrine prior to its "formal" declaration at the time of the 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, it is probably there already. When announced the Peking Doctrine will again probably be a strong doctrine by a dynamic nation staking out its spheres of influence and areas of interest. It is very clear that China wants "friendly" nations around her. It is also clear that not only does she consider Taiwan to be a part of China but that there is no restraint within her idea of her own doctrines which would prevent her from making other countries, nearby and distant, more "friendly" when she had the opportunity (particularly if it can be done at low risk).

Communist China's new doctrine (perhaps we could call it a Chou En-lai doctrine since part of it may be made up of his four or five points, mostly dealing with Taiwan) will probably be like the Brezhnev Doctrine in other respects. The Communist Chinese have ties with Communist organizations in the non-Communist world. Furthermore, they are definitely not philosophically a "status quo" power, they are quite willing to state publicly that they are interested in "wars of national liberation" and quite readily give advice, equipment, and money to these organizations outside of their sphere of influence (e.g., the Palestinian guerrillas); and one has the distinct impression that they are not likely to shy away from opportunities of increasing the "buffer zone" of "friendly" powers around them. A friendly power does not necessarily mean that they dominate it completely but that it does not have a foreign policy hostile to theirs and perhaps preferably that it also does not have an ideology alien to theirs. As mentioned above Hanoi's Communist central committee of Vietnam had its

own sphere of influence which they consider to be Indochina. But nevertheless, they identify strongly with Peking as they do with Moscow. Furthermore, Hanoi would be unlikely to fly directly in the face of Peking's wishes as far as making deals with non-Communist "capitalist imperialist" countries. All in all, Hanoi is probably quite acceptable to Peking as a "friendly power" to have on the buffer regions of her border. This is not to imply that there will not be friction between communist countries (particularly large ones) over conflicting borders and spheres of influence. Indeed the Soviet Union and China have had such disputes already, but such friction has yet to lead to the violence experienced in conflicts between communists and non-communists, e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Greece.

To repeat, as the new Nixon-Mansfield "retrograde" Doctrine begins to become a reality we will probably find an increase in at least declaratory Monroe Doctrine-type and Truman Doctrine-type sphere of influence policies on the part of the Russians and the Chinese Communists, and "expansive" foreign/military assistance policies, to say nothing of similar policies on the part of some smaller centers of Communist power. It is almost inevitable that "revolutionary" countries which identify with these high morale, dynamic, expanding powers of similar ideology (and some of the "internal" communist revolutionary forces in as yet noncommunist countries contiguous to the stronger Communist powers), will be stronger in the areas where we reduce our presence than the varied little nations and governments that we leave behind. Some may suggest that the Nixon Doctrine should therefore be compared to the British doctrine which in effect rationalized British withdrawal when the Monroe Doctrine staked out the Americas as our sphere of influence.

It is interesting to examine the desire for withdrawal and the acquiescence in American takeover from the point of view of the British in the early 19th century. They were removing their presence from an area and allowing another power to stake out a claim for many reasons, not the least of which was that the United States was not a strong competitor of Britain at the time. The similarity between the Nixon Doctrine the British-Monroe "reaction" Doctrine of the early 19th century ends here. We have no non-competitive country with a "Monroe Doctrine" to take over as we pull out. In fact, we aren't pulling out under pressure from a country of similar culture who wishes to establish a sphere of influence there as the British were in the Americas in the 19th century. (It would be quite a different matter if we were pulling out in the face of pressure from a large, friendly power--perhaps Japan, that would create an adequate buffer for us against the influence of the Chinese or other Communists.) We are pulling out in the face of a hostile nation establishing their own sphere of influence in an area in which we had an interest. This would be perhaps more like the British pulling out of the Americas in the face of pressure from a highly competitive power such as Russia or France or even Prussia in the 19th century; (or the actual pull-out of French influence in India in the late 18th century under pressure from her chief colonial rival, Britain). To be accurate, however, it is not even completely analogous to these changes of spheres of influence, for there is an ideological element involved here which may be more closely analogous to the changes of spheres of influence in the hundreds of years of active Muslim-Christian rivalry, or at least between republican and monarchist governments in the 19th century. The fact that originally the dynamic Muslims were first Arabs then Turks did not make that much difference in the sweep of

history. The important part was that Christians found themselves pulling out under pressure, first from North Africa and Spain and then from the Balkans. Nor, conversely, did it make that much difference to the Muslims whether Christian Britain or France dominated Egypt in the late 18th century; the important thing was that Muslims no longer did.

What could have been an important difference between the spheres of influence of European powers was whether a democratic or autocratic government held sway over an area (e.g., whether autocratic Russia or constitutional monarchist England or republican France held sway in Greece, The Balkans, The Levant, etc.).*

The problem of the direct and indirect influence of a large power professing an alien ideology vis-a-vis the small governments around it is not unfamiliar in the 20th century, it is a phenomenon we've lived with in Europe since the end of WWII and Asia since the 1950's. What is new in this case is the attempt to counter this type of threat in East Asia (in my judgment one of the most dangerous and persistent to a small, relatively weak power), by a regional security system which does not include another large power to balance the military, political and morale scales more for the small powers. This is not to say that there is evidence of an overt policy on the part of the Chinese Communists to invade massively the non-Communist countries on their periphery. In fact, even the large-scale use of Chinese Communist forces to support Communist wars of national liberation which arise in these peripheral non-Communist areas has not been recommended by the government at Peking. Nonetheless, the very presence of so massive a power compared to her small neighbors, and the common ideology between dissident elements within those small countries and that giant, dynamic power, tends to

*For a discussion of the traditional difference in behavior between groups in confrontation who have opposing ideologies and those who don't, see Part II, HI-1096-D, by Frank Armbruster, 1968.

reduce the level of opposition to such local and imported ideological and military forces to which (without the support of a large power) these governments are willing to go.

This attitude among these small nations cannot be ignored, despite the fact that for geographic reasons and also because of the marginal economy of communist China, her capability and desire to bring to bear massive conventional armed might in most of the areas on her periphery (specially Southeast Asia and India), particularly in the face of a resolute, well-armed, at least medium-sized modern "sponsor" power, is very limited.* Without strong outside backing, however, the governments of the smaller powers may even be (or may become) very marginal sources of governing power in their own land. Under these circumstances, only a small amount of actual military force applied in support of native subversive elements, perhaps trained in communist China or one of her communist allies, may be adequate to turn out a non-communist government in the area.

Even this phenomenon is not a new one in recent history. It was the evidence of identification with and the token support of, Hitler's Germany (which unlike China in Southeast Asia had a huge capability to move troops into Czechoslovakia) which gave strength to Conrad Henlein's Nazi Frei Corps insurgents in the Sudetenland. It was the lack of such support from Czechoslovakia's allies ("far away" in Britain and France) and moreover, pressure from them to capitulate to the Nazis, which both sapped the will of Prague to oppose these insurgents and convinced non-Nazi Germans in the Sudeten area that they should acquiesce in the activities

*See "China's Conventional Military Capability" by Frank Armbruster, a section in China in Crisis, Tang Tsou, editor, University of Chicago Press, 1968.

of the Frei Corps. Certainly the military support actually received by the Frei Corps from Nazi Germany was not nearly adequate to hold off a strong reaction by the far from inadequate Czechoslovakian army. It was the threat of action by that powerful, ideologically similar, Nazi neighbor in support of Henlein's Frei Corps which deterred adequate action by the Czechoslovakian army.

This is the kind of problem one may well have to cope with in East Asia in the milieu of the Nixon Doctrine. Even though the threats might not be explicit (or even exceptionally large from a military point of view), implicitly because of the ideological link between "native" dissident elements and the giant communist power of Asia, deterrence may indeed exist to actions on the part of the small governments in defense of their own positions.

II. A "THRESHOLD" PRINCIPLE

Determining the "thresholds" of United States involvement is one of the biggest problems of defining what the Nixon Doctrine really means. We may be talking about regional security whereby the nations in the region are supposed to defend against all kinds of threatening forces except those of Communist China, or even including small Chinese forces and excepting large forces from Communist China. This kind of a "threshold" approach would be desirable from the point of view of the United States. The real question is whether our new "posture," as it evolves under the Nixon Doctrine, will be sufficient to stiffen the opposition by these small governments to low-level Communist incursions taking place with the verbal and material support of Communist China. In other words, we are facing the old proxy-sponsor problem here. But this may be a case where one proxy has the advantage of at least a guarantee

against invasion of its home territory should its "fishing expeditions" outside its borders come to grief, while the other proxy might not have obvious equal support from its sponsor.

III. A SUBSTITUTE NON-COMMUNIST LARGE POWER FOR EAST ASIA

The evolving diplomacy of East Asia as a result of the Nixon Doctrine, even with guarantees above a certain threshold, may result in a very weak deterrent situation if the United States is adamantly against some other large power taking over at least part of the sponsorship of the area in exchange for greater influence there. In other words, a regional guarantee for this area, at least below the higher thresholds, may not have enough teeth to work without some other large power to stiffen the small nations in the face of a threat of an apparent coalition of the small local Communist nations, dissident native Communists, and Red China. From the purely economic or military points of view the obvious Asiatic power to fill this role, of course, is Japan. This is a large, economically powerful, competent country, which should have an interest in Southeast Asia, Taiwan and Korea. Furthermore, it is a country with a reputation for thoroughness and considerable competence in military affairs. One gets the strong feeling that China would prefer that she not have to deal with a rejuvenated Japan in this role. In fact, one gets the definite impression in looking at the new Chinese approach to the United States, that the incentive for China might be to get guarantees of the "neutrality" of the non-Communist states on her border (i.e., guarantees against military assistance pacts between these small nations and larger sponsors) from the United States and Japan. Our unilateral declarations about the status of certain areas in East Asia, including the

off-shore islands opposite Taiwan, without pro quo concessions from the Chinese might indicate to her that we (and Japan in her present mood) are easier to deal with than a Japan, awakened to her potentially perilous position by United States withdrawal, might become.

This issue of Japan's role and the effect of U.S. policy on it is so vital to any discussion of regional security in East Asia that without some definitive statements on the topic all speculations on such security arrangements are pure guesswork. The economic rejuvenation of Japan resulted in an increase in morale and a sort of nationalism but no noticeable militarism. Some statements by Japanese officials, including the chief of their self-defense forces, in the recent past seemed to imply that Japan was indicating a wider role for Japanese defense forces ("defense of mankind") and was even showing an interest in Taiwan.* This may have instigated the Chinese moves which led to the "ping pong" diplomacy and eventually the Peking trip. If the Chinese were trying to head off whatever chance there was of the Japanese filling any of the vacuum which might be created by United States withdrawal under the Nixon Doctrine, their moves do not seem to have been in vain. The Chinese-United States rapprochement has already had some salutary effects from the Chinese point of view. The pro-rapprochement-with-China forces in Japan got a big leg up when we began our new Peking policy. Any anti-Red Chinese forces in Japan were steam-rollered by the move, yet there are some disturbing implications that (if correct) may indicate that we have paved this road for Red China and perhaps foreclosed on some options which could be used at least as bargaining leverage later, perhaps without sufficiently weighing the costs.

*See "The New Diplomacy and the Power Balance in East Asia," by Frank E. Armbruster, Insight, Hongkong, November 1971.

For example, it is reported that Prime Minister Sato "wants to make his own deal with the Chinese, not let President Nixon trade off Japanese defenselessness for Chinese concessions...in Peking..."* According to the New York Times (January 8, 1972, p. 9) Japanese diplomats affirm that:

Japan has not decided how she wants to use her potential power or what role she wants to play in Asia, and the United States does not really know what sort of alliance it wants with Japan or what it wants of the Japanese in broad strategic terms.

Therefore, it was difficult for President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato "to come to firm agreement on how the United States and Japan would mesh their political, economic and military policies in Asia."

There seem to be some indications about what "regions" Japan was now interested in (or, rather, not interested in) from the point of view of underwriting their security. When Mr. Sato was asked at a press conference to explain his statement that Japanese and American China policy "is a little different," he said that United States' "commitments toward the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan were more firm than those of his government." It is also reported (quoting a State Department cable from our Ambassador in Japan) that Kei Wakaizumi offered this assessment of future Japanese policy:

"[Japan] (a) will agree that [Peking] is sole legitimate government of China; (b) will recognize that Taiwan is part of China; (c) will avoid any 'two China' implications; and (d) will rule out concept of an 'independent Taiwan' or a U.N. trusteeship over Taiwan."**

*Jack Anderson, The New York Post, January 6, 1972, p. 36.
There is much speculation on why the Chinese (and the United States) began the rapprochement at this particular time, but no hard evidence from a pragmatic, hardheaded negotiator's point of view. This article covers some of the publicly aired reasons as well as the one mentioned above.

**Jack Anderson, The New York Post, January 6, 1972, p. 36.

According to the New York Times, March 12, 1972, p. 6, the Japanese Government's "unified" stand on Taiwan, made public March 6, 1972, said that "in view of the fact that Japan had renounced all right and title to Taiwan, the Japanese government was not in a position to speak on the territorial status of the island . . ." But, the statement went on, the Japanese government finds Peking's position that the island is part of the territory of the Peoples' Republic of China "fully understandable, particularly since the Peking Government has come to represent China in the United Nations." While not stated in so many words, there is an implied recognition to Peking's claim to Taiwan in this statement, although some (apparently including Peking) seem to think it weaker than an implication in an earlier speech by Prime Minister Sato to the Parliament.

Either these Japanese feel this "isolationism" only about Taiwan or they simply do not want to risk the possibility of a new "detente" by confronting Red China anywhere that Peking has strong interests. This could be bad news for the Nixon Doctrine, and if Japanese morale erodes (as Germany's seems to have done in trying Ostpolitik while confronting the U.S.S.R.), it could eventually be bad news for Japan. The domestic attitude toward national security in Japan initially resulted largely from their loss of World War II and United States' instigated passivism through constitutional restrictions. As in Europe, after removing the offending government we did a spectacularly successful (but perhaps also somewhat naive) job of helping to set the stage in the late 1940's and 1950's for largely eliminating the one great balancing military and morale force in East Asia by insisting on a pacifist society in Japan, when a growing communist ideological and military base already existed in East Asia. This has fit in well with the Japanese businessman's

(and many other Japanese') current point of view of national affairs, i.e., security on the cheap (about 1% of the GNP in 1970) and full speed ahead with reinvestment in industry and trade, rather than expenditures on armaments.

Indications are that many Japanese in positions of authority, as well as well-informed influential private citizens, seem aware of the importance of one foreign area to Japan's security--Korea (and in fact there are still quite a few Japanese who apparently feel somewhat the same about Taiwan). They seem equally convinced, however, that the United States will always be so keenly aware and appreciative of this importance, not only to Japan but to the United States (the latter point may not be so indisputably correct or obvious as the Japanese may think), that we will invariably quickly spring to the defense of these two countries unilaterally, with no thought of the responsibility of Japan to defend her own interests. This is a less than profound (or even completely logical) foundation for Japanese national security. First of all, the Japanese have no monopoly on (at least what some people feel is) a less than completely adequate consideration of the hard realities of national security. The somewhat questionable approaches to security problems in the United States (even on the part of some people in the current and past administration and Senates) should be a warning to East Asian countries. If we are willing to sit back and not push ABM and counterforce capabilities for our own nation, while the Soviet Union builds a ground-based ICBM force currently 50% larger than ours in boosters, and ten to fifteen times the size of ours in throw weight (and still growing, with no end in sight), we are quite capable of standing by and watching the southern and central anchors of Japanese security (Taiwan

and Korea) erode. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, it is not so obvious as the Japanese might think that the average American will jump to defend Japan's interest unilaterally. In November, 1969 Prime Minister Sato made the following statement regarding the Japan-United States Security Treaty before the National Press Club in Washington:

"In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore should an occasion arise for the United States forces, in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Government of Japan toward prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition."^{*}

The Prime Minister doubtlessly thought that was quite a commitment on the part of Japan, and from the point of view of his domestic political problems, it might have been; but from the point of view of the average American, it could sound as if his country, with a population of over 104 million, and the third largest GNP in the world, was saying to the United States: "When our interests are threatened we will be glad to hold your coat while you fight for them." To think that even the most non-isolationist segment of the American public will gladly send American boys into battle for primarily Japanese interests, while Japanese boys wave goodby to them from the dock, could be a grave miscalulation. The fact that many "liberal" Americans are still jumping up and down on Tojo's grave "while the communists take over Asia" should not deceive the Japanese. These very people who "fear the resurgence of Japan" will feel the least responsibility on the part of America to intervene against the communists in "a land

*"Japan's View of Korea" by Major H.E. McCracken, Jr., United States Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1972, p. 45.

war on the mainland of Asia" to defend the interests of an unarmed Japan. And unless the Japanese have made every effort on their part, including landing the largest army they can muster on the mainland, the "isolationist" opposition and "non-isolationist" opposition is likely to coalesce into an immovable bloc to American involvement.

This is not to imply that the anti-war sentiment resulting from the Vietnam war is so strong that the United States will never again directly intervene to assist a country under attack by a superior military force. If we are convinced that a victim nation with a "clean record" is doing the best it can against an attack (particularly an attack by an avaricious, totalitarian force), but is still losing, we cannot be counted on to inevitably remain neutral. If past experience is any indicator, by the mid-1980s the American public may again be willing to assist a nation under attack with armed forces, particularly if the last adventure, in retrospect, looks successful. Even though the Korean War did not result in a World War II-type victory with dancing in the streets, and in fact was a very unpopular war after the first year of combat (more unpopular than Vietnam, for equal time periods and even lesser numbers of casualties), by twelve years after the end of the Korean War the public again supported an American intervention (this time even without U.N. sanction) to support a small nation in Asia. Furthermore, we supported Korea with our servicemen only five years after the end of a war in which we defeated (among others) the Japanese and opened the way for Chinese influence in the area where we then sent our boys to fight Chinese. On the other hand, prior to Pearl Harbor, it was hard to get the average American interested in involvement in World War II.* The high casualties per

*See, The Forgotten Americans, by Frank E. Armbruster, Arlington House Publishers, New Rochelle, New York 1972, pp. 102-108 and chapter 1, Appendix II this study by Doris Yokelson.

unit/time involvement in World War I and the rude awakening from our commendably selfless (if one believes in Democracy, for which we were going to "make the world safe"), if not naive attitude, caused by selfish motivation of "perfidious Albion" and the "deceitful French" (which became so obvious at Versailles and later, when "secret treaties" came to light) led to a rejection of involvement in European wars and a cynicism about cause which was hard to undo. Nonetheless, once we were in, we did the overwhelming portion of the fighting to recover for the French and British what they had made a very bad show of attempting to defend for themselves against a numerically inferior German force a few years earlier. But, the Europeans had fought, and there were British forces and even some "token" French forces with us in the drive through France in 1944. In the future, the average American is likely to expect the country under attack and that industrial giant of Asia, with its proven military competence, to have done their utmost to handle attacks on their "security zones" before American men go into battle.

As mentioned earlier, however, present U.S. policy in East Asia, particularly the Red China-U.S. "rapprochement," seems (at least on the surface) to be accelerating Japan's movement toward a policy similar to West Germany's "Ostpolitik." Such policies, as we have learned in Europe, are not conducive to stiffening non-communist regional security arrangements. They apparently can, however, be conducive to strengthening the control of an opposing major communist power over its regional security groups and their individual members. The way the U.S.S.R. coolly engineered the "Warsaw Pact invasion" of Czechoslovakia in 1968, while bluntly notifying West Germany, France (and apparently the U.S.) of her intentions ahead of time (presumably as a warning to these powers not to try to influence the upcoming events), without

seriously disturbing East-West relations and at no diplomatic cost to the Soviets, underlined the increased freedom of action (at least within her own camp) "detente" policies can give a large, dynamic, totalitarian, ideologically committed power.* At the same time, there is no indication that detente policies practiced by the West significantly hinder these communist powers in making and pursuing policies toward members outside their orbit which are detrimental to the Western powers, who are striving for detente. On the other hand, there is no evidence to support the theory that a less than detente policy will knit the communist powers tighter together. All the great schisms and attempted schisms in the communist world (Yugoslavia, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, China, Albania and even Rumania and Czechoslovakia) did not come as a result of detente initiatives from the West. In fact many of them came under strong Western Cold War policy attitudes, and with such "hard-nosed" diplomats as John Foster Dulles "in charge."**

The pragmatic person might question the wisdom of a status quo power making any concrete concessions to establish or strengthen such "detentes" with dynamic powers. Throughout the period of increasing emphasis on "detente" and Ostpolitik policies by the NATO powers, the Soviets armed and re-armed the Arab world, perpetuating the arms race in the Middle East, expanded their "presence" and influence (largely through their fleets) in the Mediterranean, Red and Arabian Seas, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, increased their divisions in Europe (5 in Czechoslovakia), etc. In other words, the pressure which is potentially likely to be placed on the West in the event of a violent confrontation between a communist and non-communist power has not decreased.

*For an extensive discussion of such dangers from detente policies see a study delivered to ISA in the spring of 1966, "European Trends and Issues," HI-682-D/1, Part I, Themes for Alternative West European Futures, especially pp. 2-6, HI-682-D/3, Part III, The Detente and its Possible Effect on European and United States Policy, especially pp. 15-30, by Frank Armbruster

**Ibid. Passim

Nor is there any evidence that, in the event of such a confrontation, any member of the ideological grouping of the communist world is likely to come out for the non-communist contender (as non-communist powers have come out for the communist contender, e.g., North Vietnam, Viet Cong, Pathet Lao, Communist China--vs. Nationalist China--etc.). Even in the area of the strategic weapons arms race, the detente policy has had no significant effect. On the contrary, all through the "detente" period and through our six-year moratorium on building strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviets have carried out a huge strategic weapons building program, so that as indicated earlier, they now have 50% more (and much larger) ICBMs than we and a rapidly growing force of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (also larger than ours) which will soon surpass ours. And there is no sign of their stopping either building program.

The whole idea of regional security arrangements is for united opposition to enemy pressure in times of threatened or actual severe confrontation. But a strong detente approach, particularly by the major member of the group, and especially in a free society, is very unlikely to foster feelings for the need for such united opposition. This feeling cannot be generated on demand in free nations, nor can defense budgets be passed to provide the military forces which will be needed in time of crisis. Perhaps more importantly, the morale of the leaders and population of a free nation which pursues a detente (appeasement?) policy in relations with a dynamic, demanding, totalitarian power, is likely to deteriorate and lead either to a complete erosion of the free country's ability to maintain its position (it "turns to mush") or, if its dynamic opponent overreaches itself and takes too much too fast, its ire may finally be aroused and it may try to retrieve its long-term losses in a large, disastrous war (à la the Allies in World War II).

Today, with nuclear weapons, a nation has a definite third, but in an extreme crisis, possibly a very hazardous choice. It can go for a deterrent of at least its homeland via the nuclear proliferation route. But, if its morale is really shot, even these weapons will do little to change its image and flexibility in protecting its interests. Furthermore, its own weapons and what they and enemy retaliatory fire may do, become a deterrent to the nation, if it has any morality. (Britain was one of the first nuclear powers, but one gets the feeling that today her weapons provide little deterrent to anything except invasion and, for the reasons just mentioned, one has doubts about that.) In any event, nuclear weapons are of questionable value as a deterrent to "salami tactics" against other members of a security group. (We did not use them in Korea or Vietnam, even though our enemies did not possess them.) And there are good and valid arguments against nuclear proliferation.*

Even if we had not done so thorough a job of defeating and "pacifying" Japan, or if she should rejuvenate militarily and begin to think of her own "Monroe Doctrine" for the area, however, all the problems of East Asia would not be solved. The smaller, free nations in the area are likely to object to an increase in Japanese influence and may flatly reject the idea of military, political or morale support from that source. Certainly the United States, as well as other nations, would object to Japan's providing even part of the nuclear umbrella in this or any other area. We have frequently declared our policy against nuclear proliferation and one assumes this policy continues to apply to Japan. It is not clear however, that the United States will obviously find it in her own interests

*Max Singer, "A Non-Utopian, Non-Nuclear Future World," Arms Control and Disarmament, 1968, Vol 1, pp. 79 to 97.

to adamantly oppose the idea that some of the military, economic and political responsibility in the area should be shifted to Japan. This is not to say that the small powers on the periphery of China are entirely misguided in their fear of Japan, and that it is indisputably in their interests to have the Japanese become a power in these areas. Far from it. These small states may really see a danger to their domestic independence if Japan were to become influential in their areas. But, to the extent that the United States can feel secure that Japan will not intervene in their internal affairs and that freedom will not be jeopardized by Japanese support, it is not clear that it is in our interests (particularly in light of the Nixon Doctrine) to be unalterably opposed to Japanese involvement in regional security arrangements in East Asia, below the nuclear level.

Hypothetical as this point is, however, the question of Japan raises the first branch point in any scenario that one wishes to write about the future of East Asia, and it is so important a point that it must be considered. We must consider it if for no other reason than to discover exactly what we are doing if we at this point foreclose conclusively the option of ever having Japan included in the regional defense arrangements there. (Later, in the section on Taiwan and Korea, I will discuss reasons why, at least regarding these areas, Japan may have second thoughts some day on non-involvement with small non-communist East Asian states as a fundamental, unswerving, security doctrine.) If we further determine that our policy should be one which not only prevents Communist Chinese influence from increasing in these areas, then we have a much more complicated situation in applying the Nixon Doctrine of reduction of U.S. presence in the area.

Let us look for a moment at what such a decision would mean and how complicated real security without Japan in East Asia is. Certainly without such a power, the United States would probably have to be willing to accept a lower threshold of where she would bring in United States support to stiffen the non-communist nations in East Asia against threats from Communist China or her proxies. This threshold might be lower than one might expect, even in the area of counter-subversion against local communist guerrillas. If the credibility of our conventional deterrent to communist incursions in East Asia is reduced because of our performance in Vietnam and because of the Nixon Doctrine and its after-effects, as we reduce our presence there, then it may be hard for us to stiffen the resistance of these countries without sending rather large numbers of troops. To repeat, the ability of these countries to defend themselves depends not only on the numbers of local troops and equipment, but on the morale of the government and the country under threat. In order to make their own forces reliable and competent to apply the amount of defensive effort that their equipment and numbers should warrant, against even a relatively low-level threat, one may have to begin "stiffening" processes early in the game. In other words, a guarantee of American presence should things escalate, may be needed early to have these forces operate at a level which would require escalation by the enemy to overcome them.

It is difficult to imagine the morale of these forces somehow remaining high under the threat of the communist carrot and stick approach (which is normally used by them in this kind of an operation) without the support of a large power. The probability of their holding firm to a relatively high

threshold of conventional activity (which we may like to see reached before we apply our forces) is likely not to be great under these conditions. On the other hand, if the Japanese forces were a credible deterrent, and in fact, if Japanese forces were moved into the area, not only might the local forces hold better, but the communists might think twice before escalating at all. The movement of this threshold up or down, due to the forces (proximate or distant) of a credible, large "sponsor," is a key to the whole idea of regional security. If we distrust the Japanese in the area and are willing to maintain a relatively high military establishment, with a significant number of troops in the vicinity and in a ready status elsewhere that can be moved in, neither Chinese nor Japanese influence can encroach there. But this goes against the basic premise of the Nixon Doctrine, which seems to call for reduction of our forces and actual transfer of a greater share of the defense responsibility to countries in the "region."

It is, of course, possible that we might be able to reduce our forces considerably below what they are now and still be able to maintain a posture adequate to stiffen our allies without the help of Japan. The question is, just where is this level of troop commitment and, wherever it is, are we willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain such a posture to defend the area against communist threats, in order to keep Japanese influence out of the area.

IV. REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. Indochina-Thailand Regional Security.

If we look at alternatives to a rather large U.S. presence or a Japanese presence in this region, the prospects are not encouraging.

Perhaps the most substantial military alternative outside Japan, but one

which is probably politically highly unlikely, is a regional security agreement whereby Taiwan pledges a significant section of her 315,000-man army (which is needed to defend the homeland), and Australia and New Zealand pledge tens of thousands more. These are also small powers, however, and when the chips are down, nations in Southeast Asia may still feel alone in the shadow of Red China. (It has been suggested that the involvement of Nationalist Chinese troops might trigger the involvement of Communist Chinese troops. This would depend on where the Red Chinese were trying to send their troops and how many they were attempting to send; there are rather severe limits on their ability to send troops into many areas. Nonetheless, this is a valid point and in addition Chinese (perhaps even anti-communist Nationalist Chinese) are disliked in much of Southeast Asia.)

There is only one large country in Southeast Asia, as far as population goes, in fact she is one of the largest countries in the world in that respect, and that nation is Indonesia. She has a population of 114.5 million people and armed forces numbering 319,000 at present, with a mobilization potential greater than all the non-communist countries of mainland Southeast Asia combined. If this variety of nationalities and sects called Indonesia could be welded together in a solid front of opposition to communist takeovers in nearby Malaysia and Singapore, as they seemed to do in opposition to their own communists, perhaps a fight could be made of it. This is a questionable situation, at least from the military point of view, however, since these people have never in modern history been really good militarily, and they may not actually have that much interest in "foreign" military operations at the moment to bring their armed forces to a level which could be effective in combat. Currently it is thought that only one-third of

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the Indonesian navy is operational and only about two-thirds of their combat aircraft are operational. They have financial problems, but one feels that they have more difficulties than that as far as building a competent military force is concerned. Of course, it is possible (but not strongly probable) that all this could change. Indonesia is a very large country and she might develop economically and politically to a degree where she has very high morale and could man a very large military force. The problem is that such developments usually take a considerable amount of time, if they are possible at all. If we wish this big nation to be one of the members of the regional defense team, able to face the communist threat, she should be in the process of developing all these complicated and sophisticated forces within the country necessary to bring the morale up to this task, right now. At least at present, therefore, Indonesia does not qualify as a big nation either, in the sense required to stiffen the small nations of Southeast Asia against the communist threat.

From a practical point of view, of course, neither of the above alternative looks good. For example, even if Taiwan were to feel it were militarily feasible to become involved in a war against a communist power other than Red China in Southeast Asia, she is hardly likely to feel magnanimous after her rough handling in the United Nations and further rough handling that is no doubt in store for her in the "family of nations." Singapore and Malaysia both refused to support making expulsion of Taiwan an important question (requiring two-thirds vote to do it) and Laos abstained. On the actual question of expelling Taiwan, all three voted in favor of the proposal. (Though one might understand why Laos, with Chinese Communist troops actually on her soil and under threat of full-scale attacks from North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces, would hesitate to oppose the red Chinese, her actions

may not endear her to Taipei.) Now the Red Chinese Hallstein-type policy* is squeezing Taiwan out of all international groups, U.N. and non-U.N. alike. Even the sending of troops from Taiwan, however, may not be as far-fetched as a strictly Southeast Asian regional security team.

It is hard to conceive of a coalition of small governments on the periphery of China, including Indonesia, all armed to the teeth, and all so committed to a mutual security arrangement that their combined forces would be applied to any threatened spot, and when applied would be so large, so well trained, and so formidable, that they would force such a major "destabilizing" escalation on any one or a combination of China's "proxies" or China herself, that it was likely to trigger a big war (which presumably would mean the involvement of the United States) and therefore would be, one hopes, against the foreign policy of Communist China. Such a regional arrangement of small powers, with such heavy military commitments and which have such high elan that they all would spring to the defense of a single threatened member, would be a rather unique situation, not only in Asiatic, but European history. What generally happens when a great power, or even its proxy, threatens a member of a group of small powers, is that the others look for a way out rather than a way to join their neighbors in confronting the giant. This is particularly true if they are under heavy pressure from dissident local elements within their own population. Regional arrangements without a large keystone power usually do not function too well in the face of threats from another alliance system which does have within it a committed great power. If this enemy alliance is bound together with a dynamic ideology and its

*The Hallstein policy was one under which the Federal Republic of Germany withdrew diplomatic recognition from any country which recognized the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

states (including the large state) are competent and armed for war, the problem for the group opposing them is an order of magnitude higher.

A middle ground might be reached by committing a small number of U.S. troops as "hostages" to our good faith (as some people look on the U.S. troops in Europe) and thus coaxing into a more binding commitment the small powers in East Asia. Since the more modern and competent of these nations are all far, off-shore islands, however, until China gets a much better fleet and airforce, it will probably be harder to get the kind of commitment from them that we got from our NATO partners under the Soviet gun in Europe. Furthermore, as long as Hanoi continues to follow a hot war policy against her neighbors, the like of which has not been seen in Europe since World War II (not even in the Greek communist civil war), even U.S. "hostages" in Southeast Asia may not turn the trick. In fact, if we continue to allow Hanoi to use those U.S. prisoners as blackmail material to attempt, with impunity, to force a conciliatory foreign policy out of us, U.S. "hostages" may cease to effectively underline our credibility. Which brings us to a sensitive, but essential point in any U.S.-instigated regional security agreement: In the light of the factors mentioned above as well as Congressional resolutions, the statements in the media, and even statements from the Executive office, United States forces soon may no longer provide a convincing tripwire against communist conventional aggression in East Asia. The way we have failed to support Cambodia, even with money, against aggression by a foreign communist army may be prophetic. American troops might soon have no more deterrent image in Southeast Asia than the U.N. troops had in the Negev buffer zone after the 1967 seven-day war.

On the other hand, there is one deterrent capability United States forces might maintain. If the unexpected should ever happen and troops from a changed but still high morale Japan should ever come into the area, a number of American troops in the region might greatly reduce the fear of domination by Japan on the part of the host country. The general idea of this arrangement would be that the possible resolve of the Japanese and the presence of a small number of Japanese troops would tend to convince the host nation (and a perhaps potential communist aggressor) that help would indeed be forthcoming. This should both stiffen the resolve of the host country and reduce the probability of the attack. The presence of American troops, while perhaps soon not providing a credible tripwire against the communists, should continue to provide a credible deterrent to Japanese domination of the host country. Furthermore, if high morale, competent Japanese troops were ever introduced into South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, even in numbers too small to be a logical threat to the native armies themselves (perhaps in the role of advisors and small, highly skilled combat teams) the organizational logistic and airpower capabilities of the Japanese would pose a potentially formidable adjunct to the armed forces of those countries.

To repeat, Japanese assistance in security arrangements in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in East Asia will require a significant (and now, apparently, remote) change in attitude on the part of the Japanese population as a whole. If we look at the low probability but high consequence proposition that there will have been an adequate change of heart among the Japanese by the late 1970s to weather this storm, and if the "rising militarism" does not unduly alarm the average citizen (and if he is not squeezed financially or otherwise to support these operations), even a constitutional

change might be possible. Since we are discussing events which may occur in the late 1970s or early 1980s, however, we must consider the significance of a policy whereby we rule out now Japanese interest in ever becoming involved in security arrangements.

1. The Ground Force Strength of Indochina and Thailand.

Let us look at the potential ground force strength of a purely local security alliance for this area of East Asia. The combined forces of South Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia exceed three-quarters of a million men. The most effective military unit in the area is the army of South Vietnam, about 420,000 men. This force is made up of ten infantry divisions (each division has three regiments of four battalions each--battalions only average about 500 men each, so divisional combat manpower is about 6,000 men per division); one airborne division (3 brigades); six independent armored cavalry regiments, 18 ranger battalions, one special forces group and 35 artillery battalions. This army has about 250 light tanks but no mediums or heavies. The para-military forces are composed of regional forces (285,000) of about 1,700 rifle companies, popular forces (250,000), a home-guard of 7,500 lightly armored platoons, the police field force (20,000) including special internal security units and a People's Self Defense Force of 1,500,000. There is also a Marine Corps (15,000) of one heavy infantry division. The 110,000-man Thai army (4 infantry divisions, including three light tank battalions and one regimental combat team) may be the next most effective group. The Laotian army (52,600; 58 infantry battalions and one artillery regiment of four battalions) and para-military and irregulars (36,000) may be the next most effective, and the Cambodian army of about

175,000 men (200 infantry and commando battalions, one tank regiment, one armored car battalion) perhaps the least effective. These countries lack first line medium tanks and (particularly in the case of Cambodia) other modern equipment as well; but it is in the planning, logistics, training and field command categories where they are really weak. On the other hand,, a relatively small contribution by a modern military power as far as numbers of men are concerned, could perhaps make a significant difference in these areas.

2. The Ground Force Threat to Indochina and Thailand.

Facing the armies of South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand are basically one large "proxy" army of North Vietnam and, of course, the huge "sponsor" People's Liberation Army of Communist China.* Actually, however, these full armies aren't really "facing" the armies of Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. The full strength of even the North Vietnamese army cannot be brought to bear in any one of these areas because of the geographic constraints on deployment and logistic capabilities, and the inability of the North Vietnamese air force (in the face of a modern air power) to guarantee control of the air over battle areas in Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, and the inability of their navy to control the sea lanes. Deployment and logistic problems for the People Liberation Army of China are even greater. Moving large numbers of Chinese units into South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand is an extremely difficult task, particularly if control of the air cannot be maintained by the Chinese air force.

*The terms "proxy" and "sponsor" are in quotes since these countries do not exactly play these roles. Actually Hanoi has "sphere of influence" and domestic policies all her own, and she is supported by the U.S.S.R. as well as Red China. But from the point of view of the non-communist Southeast Asian countries, this bloc of Communist forces near them (like the Warsaw Pact in Europe) are very likely to look like a group of small forces backed by a Behemoth, which comes in when they get in trouble or when they are undertaking

On the other hand, there are adjuncts of the army of North Vietnam which are not included in their 480,000-man table of organizational strength. These adjuncts are the minority of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam which still are native to that area, and the Pathet Lao forces in Laos. The latter force is, however, quite ineffective, even in the face of the Royal Laotian army, unless the Pathet Lao is supported by regiments of regular North Vietnamese troops. Apparently even the Viet Cong cannot function independently against the South Vietnamese forces anymore. Up to three quarters of the so-called Viet Cong units in South Vietnam are now made up of regular North Vietnamese soldiers. Nonetheless, when estimating the size of the proxy force facing the non-communist armies of Southeast Asia, it would be a grave error to simply look at the total strengths of the North Vietnamese army. In fact, one must also add the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia and the scattering of communist guerrillas in Thailand to these proxy forces. The latter two groups are very ineffective, but the value of the indigenous Viet Cong and Pathet Lao is significant, if for no other reason than they make excellent guides and local guerrillas in support of the alien North Vietnamese troops when they enter South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

This North Vietnamese army is a vital element, however, for it provides an immediate deterrent to pursuit of raiding V.C., Pathet Lao, and even Khmer and Thai communist forces to the "base areas" in North Vietnam and North Vietnamese-occupied Laos and Cambodia. It is a big, well-trained, highly indoctrinated (almost brainwashed), brutally policed and rigidly disciplined army of 14 infantry divisions (12,000 men to a division, 3 infantry and one support regiment), one artillery division (10 regiments), 2 armored regiments and about 20 independent infantry regiments. It is equipped with over

100 medium tanks (60 of them T54s), 300 light "floating" tanks, modern Soviet-made artillery, etc. This army is backed up by 20,000 frontier, coast security and people's armed security forces and 425,000 regional armed militia, all under the tight control and discipline of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The Chinese ground forces, of course, make up the largest conventional military power in East Asia. But many other factors must be considered if the real capability of this force is to be judged. These factors will be considered later; but first let us talk about Chinese military threat estimates in general.

The Chinese Communist threats outlined in this paper all deal with the current conventional military capability. This obviously could change. To date, however, the Chinese have not indicated any desire to start a large arms manufacturing effort in the areas of heavy equipment either for ground or sea forces. If they should make such a decision, and even if there were no warning of it, when they began to implement this decision, we could get some indication of it. For example, if the Chinese began to lay down some large keels for naval vessels in their shipyards, or if they began to train air crews for carrier operations or any such indication that they were going to a larger naval force, perhaps even with a naval air contingent, we would have considerable warning. Such forces are not built up overnight, and it would take years of great effort on the part of the Chinese to develop such a force. We might get some such warning also if they went to casting large numbers of tank hulls for Soviet-type T-54/55 tanks (Chinese designation T-59) or newer models. Here again, armored divisions aren't built overnight, and it would take a large effort to produce this kind of equipment in amounts adequate enough to supply destabilizing numbers of new armored divisions. Even the mass production of new aircraft is

something which is difficult to hide, and we should get some warning if they begin to build up their production of military aircraft. So far, there are no signs of large-scale production of any new fighter planes, for example. Even the T-16 bomber production seems to have been limited (so far) to a few dozen such aircraft.

I'm primarily referring here to their capability to produce such equipment rather than their intent, because it is the capability which is often the only tipoff as to what such a closed society is up to. On the other hand, there should be other longer range, although perhaps not so reliable, indicators of some change in the Chinese Communists' attitude towards conventional military buildup. The efforts I described above would take a large portion of the Chinese industrial capability, which in turn would mean a grave cutback in the required civilian components of the Chinese society. This means there has to be some fat on the animal before large-scale production of this type is undertaken, unless the country looks forward to many lean years. As long as the Chinese Communist industrial capacity does not drastically increase, and as long as their economy is marginal as it is, a decision to go into such military production is a very large one indeed. We may get some warning if they suddenly get some excess capacity, or we may get some forewarning of a shorter time frame if they begin to take measures in the economy which indicate that they are looking forward to lean years in that section of the economy which is affected most by such military production. The same kind of plants that turn out tank parts turn out parts for locomotives, rolling stock, tractors, etc. The same steel that is needed for railroad rails and car axles, frames for tractors and trucks, and so forth, is needed for tanks and ships. More importantly, the electronics gear that such equipment requires and the internal combustion

engines, could much more easily be used in the civilian economy and they are usually in short supply.

In any event, if the Chinese should seriously start an attempt to change their conventional military posture, there should be warning time of at least a couple of years, which would mean that with the up-to-date production capabilities of the West, perhaps even including Japan in this case, within a very short period of time we should be able to quickly supply equipment of adequate capability to the threatened powers on the perimeter of China. It's a big event when the Chinese turn out a few supersonic fighters, but in the West, including Japan, this is a minor effort and in fact in times such as today, we actually have a lot of capability in the supersonic aircraft area which is going begging. We could turn out large numbers of these aircraft without even knowing we were doing it (except, perhaps, for some increased prosperity such "pump priming" might bring to the economy). The same holds true for tanks, artillery and even larger aircraft. Of course, the shipyards of the non-communist world have a fantastic capability to turn out numbers of surface ships within a year after the decision was actually made, which would probably equal many, many years of Chinese effort. What I am saying is that, barring some odd occurrence (such as a "rapprochement" with the U.S.S.R, or even some large Western power, who would grant Red China huge, long-term credits, open her large arms industry potential to her and quickly rearm her) we don't need a long lead time as far as warning is concerned on an attempted change of conventional military posture by the Chinese Communists; but we do have to watch for this change and we do have to have a policy about whether or not we are going to counter it when it occurs. We could, of course, use any "strategic"

warning we can get, but even the "tactical" intelligence warning, which we are almost certain to get, should be adequate in this case of relative, crude (and in our case, "off the shelf"), conventional equipment buildup. For these reasons, in this paper the current Chinese conventional capability is always given as an indication of her deployment and priorities in defense areas today, then a rough estimate for the early eighties based on a guess at her probable priorities for that period and her probable arms program then.

The current ground forces of China consist of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of 110 infantry divisions (12,000 men each), 5 armored divisions 3 cavalry divisions, 2 airborne divisions and about 20 artillery, divisions. They also have 300,000 security and border troops made up of 19 light infantry divisions and 30 independent regiments and public security forces and civilian militia numbering as many as 200 million or more, but with about five million which could be considered effective light military forces. This army is well disciplined, indoctrinated, policed and integrated into the communist system of government of China. Commanders of the military regions often double as civilian governors, particularly in outlying regions and the PLA is a vital link in government control of social, political and economic programs. The ground forces (air and naval forces are also under the PLA) are not well-equipped compared to the forces of the U.S.S.R. or modern Western powers, but are better equipped than any small, free world power on her periphery. Their armored outfits have many modern medium and some modern heavy tanks (T54/T59, JS-2) and the ground forces as a whole have an ever-increasing number of modern artillery pieces. The divisional slice of 20,000 probably means that some of the divisions listed are "paper divisions" to be filled out in time of crisis. To some extent it probably

also reflects the low capability of the Chinese to use their huge land forces outside the Zone of Interior. Using forces in the ZI requires a much smaller logistics "tail."

The number of Chinese Communist divisions which actually are in the vicinity of the northern borders of Vietnam, Laos and Burma are about twelve in the Cheng-tu and Kunming military regions, with part of the divisions of the Canton military region also being within a medium, road-march distance of the border. There are about another twelve divisions in the Canton military region, but these, along with about an equal number in the Wuhan military region, are also needed to support the twenty-eight divisions immediately facing Taiwan in the Fukien Province area. The number of these divisions that would be available for immediate movement into this area would depend upon threats from other directions. If things were quiet along the Taiwan Straits area, some of these divisions could be moved down to the region near Indochina. Given enough time, of course, and quiet situations in other military regions, more divisions could be moved to this area, but there is a limit to how many could be supported in a combat mode outside of China. The deployment and logistics situations are just not good when one gets west of the Canton-Wuhan railroad. Probably no more than about thirty divisions could be supported in a combat mode in the area west of the rail line connecting with the border of North Vietnam, northeast of Hanoi; and of course, far fewer could be supported down into Laos, particularly the pan-handle area and Cambodia. The Chinese are building a road into Laos and have apparently completed it right across Laos to the vicinity of the Mekong River, the border between Laos and Thailand. This would allow them to deploy fairly sizeable units into that relatively deserted area behind the screen of the Pathet Lao forces, but of course this Chinese force could not be anywhere near

the size of the forces that could be supported in the area north of the Chinese border around Kunming. Because they are alien troops in an alien land, the minute they cross that border and because the region of Indochina is probably looked on by Hanoi as their sphere of influence, and furthermore, because the army of North Vietnam--480,000 men--is itself too large to use in that area, the probability of Chinese divisions coming in, unless the area of northern Laos or northern North Vietnam were threatened with conquest by very large, modern, non-communist forces from the south, is rather low. The punch of heavy divisional attacks can be provided by the North Vietnamese, if this is necessary, at least to the extent that it is possible to support large divisions in this area.

Another important factor is that the Chinese are severely disliked in that whole area of Indochina. Bringing them in might do much to reduce the effectiveness of the local guerrillas, and therefore the effectiveness of the regular forces that would be working with them. The traditional dislike of Chinese and the fear of invasion from China by all countries on her borders, including the communist nations today, might be a strong factor in reducing the effectiveness of any local forces operating with them.

On the other hand, there have been some reports that speculate about Chinese reasons for continuing that road in western Laos. When it was begun in the fifties, it was felt it had to do with China's desire to support a communist takeover of the Meo tribal independence movements in western Laos, eastern Burma, and northern Thailand. After the Bandung conference, this project was supposedly dropped, but now that the Chinese have extended the road and continue to maintain thousands of troops in Laos, there is some speculation that some such program is again afoot to

secure this area as a direct Chinese-dominated area, as compared to the rest of Laos, which she seems to be satisfied to leave to "friendly" North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao domination.

By the early 1980s, the conventional military threat from China in this area would probably be somewhat, but not drastically, higher. By this period, her armored forces may have reached ten or twelve divisions, which means that two, or perhaps three "tank" divisions would normally be assigned to this region. The total number of divisions in this area would probably not increase but the equipment, firepower, and mobility of the infantry divisions (as well as the tank divisions) should increase considerably. By that period, these divisions might begin to look like current Soviet divisions; e.g., with more and better heavy artillery, better transport, heavier logistic support, etc.

3. The Air Threat of Red China and Its Impact on Southeast Asia.

The Chinese Communist air force is made up of about thirty TU-16 badger medium bombers, and 150 IL-28 light bombers. There are also a few old TU-4 "bull" bombers still flying around, but these copies of the American World War II B-29s are of doubtful value for combat activities. The air force is made up primarily of defensive aircraft of the fighter category, and it has many of them. There are about 1700 MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and up to 800 MiG-19s, with a growing number of MiG-21 fighters. In addition, there is a naval arm made up of about 100 IL-28 torpedo-carrying, light bombers and about 350 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters. These fighters are said to be under naval command, but to be integrated into the air defense system of the country. All these aircraft are shore-based, they have no carriers. The deployment of the aircraft is probably similar to the deployment of the

ground forces and the naval force. In other words, the bulk of the defensive aircraft are probably deployed generally opposite Taiwan. The current air defense system, with its radar net and scattering of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, is located in this area and is being expanded to cover other parts of the country. The current deployment of aircraft, however, is perhaps even less meaningful than the deployment of naval forces, for aircraft are more mobile and could be concentrated in critical areas rather rapidly. This, of course, depends upon how much of a threat might be posed simultaneously in another area of the country and also to perhaps a lesser extent, on the ability to support these aircraft in any given military region or limited number of regions. Basically, however, these light aircraft are not too demanding on the depots and fields to which they may be deployed, and one could assume that almost any area in China could support a sizeable number of them.

The important point is that all of these fighters are basically short-legged aircraft; even the MiG-21 has a combat radius of only 375 miles, with no external stores. If the aircraft is dirtied up with iron bombs or missiles, the drag has a significant effect on the range and speed of the aircraft. Jane's, All the World's Aircraft, estimates that with external fuel tank and air-to-air missiles, the MiG-21's maximum speed drops from Mach 2 to Mach 1.5. If the Chinese wish to use their light fighters against the naval forces of a Southeast Asian regional defense group, or even against their heavier equipment on the ground, these aircraft would have to carry external stores to give them the punch to be effective. In this case the range and performance of the aircraft would be cut down. The larger aircraft, the 250 IL-28 "Beagles," and especially

the 30 TU-16 Badgers, of course, have a much longer range and can carry a significantly larger load. The obsolescent Beagles' capability, with a relatively small load of iron bombs that they can deliver, may be less than adequate to take out a significant portion of the naval forces of a regional defense group in the face of any significant defensive fighter opposition. The same might be said for the 100 torpedo-carrying IL-28s.

The larger TU-16 Badgers (150,000 lb. aircraft) can carry a significant iron bomb load (perhaps about 10 tons on a medium range mission), but their attacks must normally be delivered in a level bomb run, from either high or low altitude, which is less effective against small maneuvering targets. Delivering a high altitude bomb attack against naval units consisting of destroyers and D-E's is usually relatively unproductive. The rapidly maneuvering, highspeed vessels are just too hard to hit. Low-level attacks by such a large aircraft are difficult, and the big planes are vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire of all types if they attempt to come close enough to a target to increase the probability of hits. It also takes a considerable amount of bomb tonnage to knock out ground force military units once they are deployed, and even delivering air attacks against units in route march in country that is relatively heavily forested takes a significant iron bomb tonnage to be effective. It is doubtful whether it takes the amount of tonnage that we have used in Laos and Vietnam, but it is fairly certain to take a heavy delivery to get adequate numbers of weapons on target. The big, clumsy Badgers, the most efficient Chinese delivery vehicle, are also easy prey to enemy fighters if unescorted. If they are escorted by the short-legged MiG's, their range is cut down.

In the face of any significant air opposition, the Chinese would have to depend more upon their lighter and more maneuverable aircraft. The particular aircraft that they have--the MiG series--are notoriously bad when it comes to delivering conventional weapon tonnage on target. The later MiG-15s and MiG-17s have an external stores capacity of only 1,100 pounds; nevertheless, they have so many--1,700 of them--that concentration of a significant fraction of this fleet in any given area would create a considerable bombing threat. The MiG-19s probably could not carry the bomb tonnage that a United States' aircraft of similar weight (about 20,000 lbs) would carry; in any event, they seem to only have enough external store "hard points" to carry a few air-to-air rockets. The MiG-21, of similar weight, seems to have only one attachment under the fuselage for external stores, and attachments for two air-to-air missiles under the wing.

The value of the MiG-19s, like the MiG-15s and -17s, is their large numbers. If these aircraft can be equipped with some type of air-to-surface weapons delivery capability, their numbers--800 of them--again would create a considerable threat to the extent they could be concentrated in any one region, despite the probably low tonnage delivery capability per aircraft. There are not that many MiG-21s, so the same does not apply. In any event, the Chinese would probably use their older MiG-15s and -17s to act as fighter bombers with the supersonic MiG-19s and newer supersonic MiG-21s providing the air cover. If enough of these aircraft were concentrated in the area of Hainan and the mainland behind it, the entire area of North Vietnam and the Tonkin Gulf as well as I Corps in South Vietnam and all of Laos would come under the air umbrella of the Chinese. This in turn would allow the fields in North Vietnam to become secure bases for more Chinese aircraft which might allow even the short-legged MiGs to dominate all of

Laos, parts of eastern Thailand, northern Cambodia, and much of II Corps, as well as I Corps. Certainly "counter-air" strikes against airfields in these areas by large numbers of Chinese fighters, fighter bombers and bombers could deny the use of these fields to a Southeast Asian regional security group's aircraft.

If the Chinese air force were to enter a war going on in Southeast Asia, therefore, the entire picture would change without immediate heavy support from large Western air forces. The Chinese Communist air force is predominantly defensive, but it has so many fighter aircraft that, as far as combat aircraft are concerned, it is the third largest air force in the world. That many fighters cannot only protect the homeland, but also can dominate the air space adjacent to the homeland unless they are challenged by a first class, at least medium-sized air force. Unlike the Red Chinese navy, the air force is something to be reckoned with by any power. Of course as long as this air force dominates the air space over areas adjacent to its coast or the coast of nearby countries, a Southeast Asian regional defense group's navy could not operate in the ocean areas which are under the hostile Chinese air umbrella. There would be considerable periods of time in certain seasons when air cover would not be that easy in these regions, but the weather is never so bad that one could count on an extended period of time when the Chinese air fleet would be forced to be inactive. Obviously if this air force is functioning, the ocean area in which the Chinese South Sea fleet functions, up to two or three hundred miles from the coast, would be untenable for the Southeast Asian regional security fleet.

In the mid 1980's the Red Chinese air force should have a sizeable contingent of TU-16s, perhaps upwards of 600 if they continue production at the

current estimated rate. But they may look on these "Badgers" as their strategic, nuclear bomber force and may not build that many, nor risk whatever planes they have against real fighter opposition in a non-strategic war. Against the Laotian or Cambodian, or even Thai air forces, however, (particularly if we have not upgraded them), they may use them for iron bomb delivery against military targets, or even cities in Southeast Asia. If they deployed a couple of hundred of these relatively long-range bombers (1,500 miles combat radius) in southern China with an iron bomb delivery mission, this could add another dimension to the problems in the area.

The deployment of modern fighters (including perhaps the rumored new, twin-engine Chinese-designed plane) will, of course, take place. MiG 21s will probably be as numerous in the Chinese air force as MiG-19s are today (800).

The normal deployment of fighter aircraft in the Kunming military region will probably be about 150, which is probably about what it is today. But as mentioned earlier, aircraft are much more easily deployed than ground troops, particularly if there is prepositioned POL, ammunition and supplies in the area. If a sanctuary status for the Chinese homeland is established, (i.e., immunity from "counter-air" strikes by a hostile airforce against airfields crowded with military aircraft inside China) the fields in the region could probably easily handle two or three times their normal allotment of fighter squadrons under emergency conditions. (At least they could handle this large number of sorties in "pulses," which would use up the excess POL and ammunition in a high level of sorties for a short period of time, then go down to a much lower sortie level until the transport system had built up a sizeable stockpile of material, when the process

would start over again.) Additional aircraft could quickly come from the Canton military region, which probably has about 350 aircraft assigned to it or the Wuhan region, or even further away, with a slightly longer deployment time. By the early 1980s, the northern portion of Laos, Thailand and (from Hainan Island), northern South Vietnam will be within range of several hundred Mach 2, Red Chinese fighters based at home. It is doubtful that the numbers of fighters will increase over what they are today, so this coverage is about what it is currently, but the quality and firepower of communist aircraft one could see in this area should greatly increase. This means that the air umbrella over the communist ground forces in these zones would be rather formidable even if fields in North Vietnam were not used. Of course, if Chinese fighters or large numbers of similar North Vietnamese aircraft are deployed in North Vietnam, they could cover all of Laos, much of eastern Thailand, half of South Vietnam, and northern Cambodia. But in this case, the probability of sanctuary is much less and their bases would likely come under attack.

This means that all the military forces of the small nations in Southeast Asia are in imminent danger of losing control of the air over the battle area in the northern zones at the very outset of hostilities, and perhaps much worse later if the communists turn loose their air force on these countries. Without the support of a power with real air and ground military potential, this possibility of locking horns with the Red Chinese and/or a modern, expanded North Vietnamese air force, and the strikes against the homeland this might involve, could deter small, non-communist countries from using what air power they have to support their own armies by attacks on communist logistic lines, or even giving their own troops close support.

4. The Inherent Weakness of the Indigenous, Non-Communist Counterforces in Southeast Asia.

In Indochina and Thailand, as we have seen, the balance of ground forces between the communist and non-communist countries is not that one-sided against the non-communist nations, at least as far as manpower and equipment are concerned. The imbalance between Laos, Cambodia, and even Thailand and North Vietnam, stems largely from the significantly higher fighting capabilities of Vietnamese, both North and South, compared to their Khmer, Lao, and Thai neighbors. The edge that the North Vietnamese have in fighting ability over the South Vietnamese is not as large as that they have over the Laotians and Khmers, but nonetheless they have a significant edge, particularly as long as they can export their forces and fight in the homeland of their neighbors in a fashion which requires the neighbors to both protect their civilian population and try to cope with this invading army. These forces of North Vietnam, linked with indigenous communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam, which form a screen of "guerrillas" to operate in front of the regular forces of North Vietnam, create a sizeable threat against all the neighbors of North Vietnam for several reasons.

The effectiveness and morale of the non-communists does not seem to match those of the communist forces, often apparently, for reasons which are not necessarily that subtle. First of all, the forces opposing the communist guerrillas normally use highly questionable tactics in combating this type of warfare; secondly, the North Vietnamese (the Prussians of Indochina) may just have an inherently greater fighting capability; and, third, perhaps partly because the non-communist troops are forced to act defensively, fighting on their own home territory and the North Vietnamese are always

invading.* But perhaps most important, the status quo, non-communist forces have no theory of victory, while the dynamic, expansionist communists have. German commanders noted, until the last years of World War II, that the German soldier was better than his counterpart in World War II in the face of overwhelming odds, and some even attributed this to National Socialism. One feels, however, that this was likely to have been to some degree the result of the success of the new, aggressive, mobile type of warfare, begun by the Germans in World War II. These troops, unlike those mired down in the trenches after 1915, had a theory about how victory could be once more achieved in warfare, and when it initially succeeded, it took a long time to discourage them, even when they were "temporarily" in retreat. The forces we now support against communist threats in Europe, Korea, and Indochina are forbidden to even consider victory as an alternative. Communist countries are always sanctuaries, so even if the South Vietnamese, Laotians and Khmers were capable of it, chasing their tormentors to their lairs and ending the problem once and for all is out as a non-communist theory; we also tend to frown on aggressive, ideological, nationalistic alternatives as political theories of victory, particularly if they smack of "right wing," strong, central governments. (Syngman Rhee did not sit well with us, nor is Park that popular with us; we were not happy with Ky; we are not even too happy with Thieu, etc.)

*The eagerness with which the South Vietnamese gallop off into Cambodia some indication of the value of the "attack" mode. Even the movement into Laos was at least done on a non-communist "initiative" and though the South Vietnamese were mauled in a rather inept "raid," the troubles were in Laos, not in Vietnam, and when the troops came back they were unpursued and returned to an undisturbed "base area." This is precisely the way the North Vietnamese operate: they initiate a large attack (usually very inflexible and not always exactly brilliant) at the time and place of their choosing, into a non-communist area in South Vietnam, almost invariably get brutally mauled, and pull back into an undisturbed base area to recuperate, while the South Vietnamese do the same but also have to cope with the shambles in their own area caused by the attack.

There may be other reasons for this difference in morale that may have to do with the attitude about the way of life, principles, or "ideology" on the part of the sponsors who support these various contenders for power in Indochina. On the one hand, we have a large, very bellicose, very "dynamic," communist China, that abets the most flagrant invasions and cruelties on the part of her communist proxies in their "anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist" wars of national liberation. On the other hand, we have Western powers that are constantly on the defensive, in the press, as far as the righteousness of the defense of the homelands of the invaded, non-communist countries is concerned. The general ineptness and half-hearted support of "our side's" anti-communist crusade is not conducive to high morale.

When we withdraw even the kind of support we've been giving and, further, when we consider the fighting capabilities of the Laotians, Khmers and Thais compared to the Viet's, the numbers game no longer means that much. Furthermore, from their point of view, the numbers game may appear all against them, for they may have an understandable tendency to count in the "sponsor," too--the communist giant to the north. In any case, as mentioned earlier, the deeper one goes into the details of the ideological, military, political, and international aspects of the confrontation in Indochina, the more evident it becomes that these countries are likely to need some morale-building support, probably very early in the game. This stiffening will have to come from a competent, self-confident, large power, if we want these nations to even defend themselves against subversion or low-level guerrilla attacks, which they may see as the vanguard of a full-scale, communist invasion. If the United States leaves this area and the communists look as if they have won, or at least not lost, even in the face

of the U.S. power and we then try to jury-rig some small combination of countries to oppose a force which (it will undoubtedly be said) that we ourselves could not contain, then Indochina could be in danger. If, on the other hand, the forces remaining in the area are stiffened by the support of a power to be reckoned with, the picture could be quite different.

B. Malayan Regional Security

If Indochina and Thailand should fall, Malaya could be very vulnerable. A consolidated Southeast Asia under control of the communists would leave the small ground forces of Malaysia--to date totaling about 50,000 men--facing a border which would be a potential front for very large numbers of communist guerrilla and conventional forces. The tiny army of Singapore--currently about 16,000 men--could be expanded; but nonetheless, even if these nations teamed up, this would be a very small force to face the numbers that could be brought to bear against these two small countries. Since the United Nations votes, mentioned earlier, Taiwan may not feel friendly to these two powers, even if they come under threat from the communists in the north. We can presume that if Japan didn't support the countries of Indochina and Thailand in Southeast Asia, they probably wouldn't be supporting the Malayan countries, either.

The Indonesian army (250,000 strong) might make a contribution if the alliance of Southeast Asian powers can maintain control of the sea on both sides of the peninsula and control of the air over it. As indicated earlier, Indonesia is currently not noted for its efficiency or military competence, but the sheer numbers of Indonesian troops that might be able to be put into the field to fight the infantry-type war which would probably be fought in

the jungles of the peninsula, could make a difference. The difficulty here would be two-fold: (a) Indonesia would probably not want to commit her troops until it was clear Malaysia and Singapore could not hold out; and (b) it is unlikely that Malaysia or Singapore would want to import hundreds of thousands of Indonesians until the situation was truly desperate. By that time, subversive elements in the two small countries would have a very good argument about being the wave of the future and looking like the owners of the bandwagon upon which people should climb. In other words, the danger here might be from internal collapse before the government of either or both countries called for the kind of assistance which could convince those sitting on the fence that the communists were not going to succeed.

Before we get to the point where we can talk about the commitment of ground forces as identifiable units from a friendly neighboring power, however, we must of necessity look at levels of assistance far below such an obvious commitment to defense against communist subversion or attack. If we can assume that even in times of emergency a regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia will work, similar to regional security arrangement elsewhere (people may not want to get too deeply involved), we must realistically assess what actually might occur at the time of such a crisis. We must make this assessment now because training and exercising of forces, which would be essential if the assistance were to come in and act smoothly at the time of crisis, must be carried out ahead of time. The "non-committal" areas of low-level commitment, however, might cover a larger spectrum than some might think, and therefore require a good deal of such exercising.

C. Possible "Non-Militarized Self-help" Program
for Southeast Asian Regional Security

1. Counter-Insurgency Assistance Forces.

The one thing that a regional security group in Southeast Asia would have, perhaps more so than any group elsewhere, is a significant number of people experienced in successful, counter-insurgency warfare against the communists. The Philippines developed and continue to use a successful, constabulary-type, counterinsurgency police operation in the jungle areas of Luzon. The Malayans also have people experienced in such operations. Furthermore, both countries have people experienced in the coordination required to make constabulary and urban police operations function. They also know about specific military operations by conventional forces to make the constabulary and police operations successful. Many of these people are now in their forties but counterinsurgency requirements have not changed and this wealth of experience at low-level warfare against insurgents in tropical areas, particularly guerrillas operating in jungle areas, is very valuable to the actual conduct of warfare against communist forces that are likely to try to subvert and attack these Southeast Asian countries. In other words, if these nations can be stiffened to the point where they will defend themselves against such attacks, there is enough talent in the area to train indigenous forces to handle low-level guerrilla and conventional insurgent attacks or to assist indigenous forces in such activity. The New Zealand and Australian forces, although probably not as well qualified as counter-guerrilla fighters per se, also have quite a capability to train and fight with indigenous forces in low-level insurgency operations. They have the technical know-how to integrate into a counter-insurgency operation the technical equipment (artillery, ground radar, communications equipment,

etc.) that is appropriate. American forces, of course, may be able to do some of this, too.

There are some facets of counter-guerrilla warfare, however, where Americans might make the best cadre for training indigenous forces. One area would be the use of dogs for ambush and tracking activity. Dog handling is just not that common a talent in the tropical areas. The ability to handle dogs in counter-guerrilla operations basically stems from the ability to handle dogs for other operations, such as in hunting. This activity occurs primarily in the temperate zones, and in the United States more than in any other country. The result of this reliance upon dogs for detection and tracking purposes in hunting has been a reservoir of talent in training dogs to detect and track men and also to act as alert "burglar alarms" for troops manning ambushes.

Other activities closely associated with counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare, such as the use of helicopters, would also probably depend to a significant degree upon training given by the vast reservoir of Americans who have experience with these aircraft. The same could be said for the complicated filing systems and communication networks which may be needed in the rural and urban counter-insurgency police operations. Here, American organization and filing know-how could add considerably to the defensive operations of these nations.*

* For a more detailed discussion of this type of training and assistance, see "A Military and Police Security Program for South Vietnam," by Frank E. Armbruster, in the book, Can We Win In Vietnam, by Frank E. Armbruster et al., Frank A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1968. In particular, see Section II, "Constabulary Security Operations" and note the section under "Native and U.S. Personnel," beginning on page 259.

These low-level, counter-insurgency advisory and cadre programs can be initiated and terminated with a minimum of effort, publicity and commitment. Withdrawal need not incur a great loss of face. The whole approach is one of advice and stiffening in low-level warfare. (The Soviets' manning of MiG-23s over the Suez Canal is an example of minimum effort, without unretrievable commitment, to stiffen a friendly force.)

2. NATO-type Joint Force Possibilities

There is another approach to a "non-committal," regional security program in Southeast Asia which may be apropos, regardless of whether or not a large power is involved. This approach is one whereby all the powers in the area pool the "technological" segments of their armed forces to help blunt a communist attack. This type of activity is much easier and much less of a commitment than the application of men to fight in a ground war. I am referring of course, to the use of sizeable amounts of air and sea power, which results from pooling these forces for the area.

a. A Joint Air Force

A combined air force for Southeast Asia which includes the air force of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, South Vietnam and Laos (and perhaps even Australia and New Zealand), would make a more credible force to provide a deterrent to (and perhaps even air support for ground defense against) communist attacks in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand than any one of these countries' air force alone. These air forces could be moved around and the fields that are now occupied by U.S. air strike forces could be occupied by the aircraft from these powers. Yet, tentative membership in this "allied air force" need not be as binding as one might think.

Laos currently has 75 T-28 light strike aircraft along with some AC-47 gunships; the Philippines have 20 F-5 fighter ground support aircraft and 8 T-28 support aircraft, as well as 26 F-86-f day fighters and 3 T-33 armed trainers. Thailand has 11 F-5a and F-5b fighter bombers, 20 F-86f day fighters, as well as 55 T-28d and 40 T-6 and 16 OV-10 COIN aircraft. South Vietnam has an air force of 275 combat aircraft, consisting of a fighter-bomber squadron with the F-5 aircraft, 6 COIN squadrons with A-37s, 3 fighter-bomber squadrons with the reciprocating engine skyraider, and 80 O-1 armed light aircraft. They also have 20 AC-47 gunships. Those aircraft that are operable (about 65% of the fleet) in the Indonesian air force which might be brought into the pool of the international air force operating in this area, probably include a percentage of the 22 TU-16 bombers, some equipped with the kennel air-to-surface missile; 10 IL-28 light bombers, 5 B-25 light bombers, 10 F-51d light strike aircraft, and about 20 MiG-15s and 40 MiG-17s. There are also about 15 MiG-21s, most of which are in storage, but overall this still adds up to over 80 combat aircraft, which could make a difference, at least in a ground support role.

New Zealand's air force consists of only 27 combat aircraft, all sub-sonic jet fighter bombers (14 McDonnell-Douglas A-4k and TA-4k, and 13 older, deHaviland Vampires), but her crews and maintenance and control groups should be first rate. Australia's air force is a different matter. Her combat aircraft include one jet bomber squadron of Canberra B-20s, two fighter-attack squadrons of Mach 2+ F-4e Phantoms, and 4 interceptor strike squadrons of 1430 mph Mirage III-0. She is supposed to have 210 combat aircraft, but this may include 64 MB-326 and MB-326h aircraft, the trainer version of this aircraft, as compared to its attack or trainer/attack version. Whatever the number, without counting her naval A-4g Skyhawk fighter-bomber squadron aboard her carrier, she has the highest combined capacity, the best equipped and probably best manned and trained air force in that part of the world.

There are enough airfields in South Vietnam and Thailand to support all these aircraft. If the southern end of Laos were overrun, the Laotian air force could be evacuated to Thailand and also operated from those bases. All in all, these aircraft present a formidable array of airpower, which should be adequate to handle the ground support mission for the defending ground forces in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand.

Outside of the ground support mission, however, with the exception of the F-4e's and perhaps the Mirage III's of the Australians (if they were part of the regional defense alliance), the aircraft available may not be adequate for the entire job. The non-Australian aircraft would have difficulty maintaining control of the air even today in the face of, for example the 40 MiG-21f and Pf interceptors of the North Vietnamese. These are equipped with the ATOLL air-to-air missile, and they have the edge in speed over all the non-Australian aircraft mentioned earlier, except possibly the operable

Indonesian MiG-21s, which are probably of an older vintage and do not have the air-to-air missile capability. The 25 MiG-19 interceptors of the North Vietnamese air force can probably be handled by the F-5s of the non-communist Southeast Asian countries, while the F-86's of these countries are probably a match for the 70 MiG-17s and 20 MiG-15s of the North Vietnamese air force.

Hopping up the Southeast Asian allied air forces with a few F-4's or maybe even old F-104's or something, to match the MiG-21s, would probably give them a capability of maintaining control of the air over the battlefield as well as giving close air support to the ground troops, if only the North Vietnamese air force were opposing them. (But, as indicated earlier, it is by no means certain that we will take even such cheap, relatively riskless, supportive actions in Indochina--or elsewhere--these days.) If the Chinese Communists or the Soviets should soup up the North Vietnamese air force with more MiG-21s, we would have to increase the number of modern fighters in the inventories of the Southeast Asian allied air force.

In the area of training people to fly and maintain these aircraft, the Taiwanese and Japanese could be very helpful. Help in the training area could also come from the Australians and New Zealanders, and naturally United States aid in training indigenous forces to fly and maintain these aircraft would be a very important factor.

Coordination and command and control of the "international air force" would be areas where American expertise could play a large role in increasing efficiency. Furthermore, it is a kind of force that could be exercised in C-PX's with very little effort, except cooperation, and in actual maneuvers where small numbers of "allied" aircraft from these

countries could occasionally be deployed (in times of great tranquility) to bases that may require them in time of crisis. The air arms of these countries, with the possible exception of Indonesia, are probably much better fitted to work together than are the ground forces. They are basically smaller organizations, many of which were originally trained by Americans, and have continued to have contact with them, and therefore operate more or less in an American way, which is familiar to all.

CPX's, and even the occasional flights of small numbers of aircraft to their forward deployment areas, in no way commit the powers involved to action in time of crisis. The planes will for all practical purposes always be at home, and though so quickly deployable to their forward deployment areas (if well enough trained and exercised) that an enemy must always count them as part of a potential opposition force, the nations are really not committed beforehand to anything. Furthermore, the commitment decision can usually be put off until the last minute (the better the training and planning, the later the decision to commit can be) and this highly mobile force can also be quickly and easily pulled out (compared to large numbers of ground troops).

If the Chinese Communist air force should enter combat against this allied air force, the picture would change entirely. Within range of the several hundred Mach 2 fighters she will probably be able to put into the air over northern Southeast Asia by the early 1980's, the job of the allied air force would get quite difficult. If they couldn't do a quick air suppression attack or two to catch some of these communist planes on the ground ("sanctuary" in China and even North Vietnam would of course rule this out), they would have to expect to see a lot of these planes in the northern battle zones. In this case, even with Australia in, it might take

a U.S. or other air "presence," representative of a great power, to stiffen the small states and deter communist "adventurism" in the area.

b. A Joint Navy

Another "technical" area that would perhaps better lend itself to co-operation without undue "commitment" would be naval activities. These forces, again, are relatively small in number compared to the navies of modern nations, and have in many cases common ex-American equipment, yet the combined naval strength of the Southeast Asian powers outnumbers the naval force of North Vietnam. In fact, this fleet outnumbers the surface navy of Red China and overwhelmingly outnumbers the Red Chinese South China Seas fleet. In the weight of metal that can be unleashed in ship-to-ship or inshore bombardment, for example, there is simply no comparison.

The Royal Thai navy has one ex-United States destroyer escort, displacing 1900 tons at full load, and 4 frigates, 3 of which displace over 2000 tons full load, another of which displaces 1350, full load. The main batteries of these D-E's and frigates are 3-inch, 50 caliber guns. Thailand also has an assortment of minelayers, gunboats and patrol and torpedo boats.

Judged in number and size of units, Indonesia has a formidable navy by East Asian standards: she has an ex-USSR Sverdlovsk class cruiser, displacing 19,200 tons full load, and armed with 12 6-inch guns and 12 3.9-inch guns in her main and secondary batteries. She has seven ex-USSR Skori class destroyers, each displacing 3,500 tons full load and carrying 4 5.1-inch guns in her main batteries. She also has 11 frigates, 7 of them ex-USSR Riga class, displacing 1600 tons full load, 2 Surapati class, displacing 1500 tons full load and 2 Pattimura class, displacing 2200 tons

full load. These ships have 3.9, 4-inch and 3-inch guns in the main batteries. They are all modern ships, built in the post-war period in the Soviet Union, with the exception of four of the frigates, built in Italy. All of these vessels are equipped with torpedo tubes, the ex-Sverdlovsk cruiser having 10 21-inch torpedo tubes on board; and she's also equipped for minelaying. The Indonesian navy also has 12 ex-U.S.S.R. W-class submarines. Six of these are operational and six are in reserve. There are also two extra submarines being used for spare parts. The W-class submarine is a long-range vessel; in fact it is the backbone of the Red Chinese submarine fleet of 32 vessels. These submarines are equipped for minelaying also. The Indonesian navy also contains numerous patrol vessels, torpedo boats, submarine support ships, landing ships, transport oilers, minesweepers, etc. It is a big navy--far bigger than the Red Chinese, and of course, with the exception of the Australian navy, far bigger than anything else in Southeast Asia. Its overall condition and combat readiness, however, is probably not up to the standards of the smaller Chinese communist navy, or perhaps even those of North or South Vietnam.

South Vietnam has two rather large escort vessels, displacing about 1,900 tons full load, and a series of smaller vessels for inshore operation--motor gunboats, coastal minesweepers, and so forth. She also has some large landing ships capable of handling over 4,000 tons full load and better than 2,300 tons when beaching, and a series of landing craft and smaller landing ships. She also has a series of minesweepers and other small vessels.

Cambodia has a few inshore, small vessels.

Australia, of course, has a very large, modern navy, complete with an aircraft carrier, four modern submarines, three guided missile destroyers, displacing over 4,000 tons full load, and five gun destroyers, displacing between 3,450 and 3,600 tons full load. She also has three fast, anti-submarine frigates, displacing 2,700 tons full load, and six escorts of around 2,700 tons full load, all of which outgun anything the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists have.

New Zealand has a much smaller, but also very modern navy with two general-purpose frigates, displacing 2,800 tons full load, and 2 anti-submarine frigates, displacing 2,557 tons full load. She also has a series of escort minesweepers, patrol boats and so forth.

Even without the Australian and New Zealand navies, the possible "allied" navies of Southeast Asia present a formidable surface naval force. If the Australian and New Zealand navies are added, the allied fleet becomes an overwhelming naval armada for that section of the world. Assuming the air forces of these powers, including the naval air force of Australia, based on its two carriers (perhaps with some United States, Taiwanese or Japanese support), could maintain control of the air over the coastal areas that this fleet would attack, the "allied" fleet could dominate the coastline of all of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it could transport landing forces of considerable size to any portion of the exposed coast of North Vietnam, or even the coast of China herself, in the South China Sea area.

Portions, or all of this allied naval force should be able to plan and exercise together to the extent that they could act as a unified force in time of emergency. Since all of their activities could be confined to the international waters of the high seas, their movements could

not even be called threatening. Any landing operations they would like to practice could be carried out on the shores of Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, or even South Vietnam. This force is one that could be exercised without really committing the member nations excessively, even more readily than a joint air force. It might even actually be "used" in wartime without excessively committing the countries involved. Until a ship in international waters actually brings her batteries into action against an enemy ship, plane or shore target (or is herself attacked), she is at peace and the nation who owns her is a neutral. Any nation of the allies who owned the fleet could pull her ships out right up to the time they moved in to attack. Unlike ground forces (but like air forces), the naval forces need not be that evident, even when they are operating in inland waters. As long as the sailors don't actually go ashore, a ship is a ship and the flag doesn't make that much difference to the local peasants as long as she just lies out in the channel of some river.

D. The Chinese Communist Naval Threat in the South China Sea.

The entire Chinese navy boasts four ex-Soviet Gordy-class destroyers displacing 2,150 tons at full load. There are rather heavy guns on these vessels, however, each one sporting four 5.1 inch guns in the main battery. They can make thirty-six knots and carry six 21-inch torpedo tubes. They also have five frigate-type ships, all Soviet made, displacing between 1,600 and 1,800 tons full load. Their main batteries are 3.9 inch guns, each ship carrying from three to six such guns in her main battery. Some are also equipped with three 21-inch torpedo tubes and all can make about 28 knots. They also have eleven escort-type ships, each displacing between 800 and 1600 tons full load. These ships have main batteries consisting of everything from 3.9 to 5.1 inch guns, no more than two of which are in the main

battery of any single ship. They do not seem to carry torpedo tubes. The rest of the surface fleet of the Chinese consists of a couple of dozen submarine chasers, fifteen missile patrol boats, thirty minesweepers, forty-five auxiliary minesweepers, and hundreds of motor torpedo boats and motor gun boats. They also have about 530 landing ships, many of them less than 100 tons.

The undersea fleet is much more impressive. They have one Soviet G-class-type submarine, displacing 2,800 tons submerged. There are three vertical, ballistic missile tubes in the "sail" of this boat. They also have 21 W-class submarines, each with a displacement of 1,600 tons submerged. There are four Soviet R-class submarines and seven Soviet S-1 and MV-class submarines. The S-1 class displaces 1,000 tons submerged, the MV-class only displaces somewhat over 400 tons submerged. These latter submarines are much shorter-ranged, and might be considered to be primarily coastal-type submarines.

The South Sea fleet, deployed from Chiang-wan to the North Vietnamese frontier, presently consists of about 300 of these vessels. It has bases at Huangpu and Chanchiang; this fleet could, of course, be reinforced in time of emergency, but the Chinese seem to prefer heavy deployment of their naval forces opposite Taiwan, just as the heavy deployment of their ground forces is in the area facing Taiwan. (The East Sea fleet, facing Taiwan, consists of 700 vessels, two and a half times as large as the South Sea fleet.) As the current South Sea fleet probably has only about one destroyer and one frigate to supply heavy surface firepower when needed, her missile patrol boats, torpedo boats and hydrofoils provide the major threat, particularly at night, in the vicinity of her coast. These small boats, however, particularly the

motor torpedo boats, have proven to be singularly ineffective in World War II and thereafter against larger surface ships on the high seas. It isn't likely that the firepower provided by the motor torpedo boats and missile patrol boats of the Chinese Communists could challenge the combined surface fleets of a Southeast Asia regional defense group in the South China Sea or the Bay of Bengal. Her submarine fleet is another issue. The 21 W-class boats are long-range cruise-type submarines, all built after World War II, with combat radii of 13,000 to 16,500 miles, a submerged speed of 15 knots and a surface speed of 17 knots. Some have been assembled as recently as 1964 in Chinese yards, presumably from Soviet components, and all can lay mines as well as attack with torpedoes. These submarines present a threat on the high seas to a surface fleet, particularly the slower units and/or those with less than excellent submarine detection and defense systems. Even the smaller boats provide a considerable threat, with significant on-station capability all along at least the eastern coast of Southeast Asia.

By the mid-1980's the Chinese naval forces should be larger and more modern, but probably not outstandingly so. The South Sea fleet should sport at least two destroyers and two frigates, and more numerous and modern missile patrol boats, torpedo boats and hydrofoils. They are likely to have a few more modern submarines also. All these vessels should have improved detection and fire control systems and weapons.

V. REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE TAIWAN AREA

As noted earlier, the area of the Taiwan straits, the off-shore islands and Taiwan itself are looked on by the Chinese Communists as an area of vital interest to them. Furthermore, Taiwan is a prime target

for Peking as far as desire for domination and reincorporation into the body of China itself. In fact, along the whole "arc of crisis" from Southeast Asia to North Korea the one area that is likely to remain in the top priority of Chinese foreign military policy determinants is the off-shore islands and Taiwan. At first glance this could seem to be an area of high danger and one which should be avoided by any nations who are likely to become involved in regional security arrangements. Largely because of military reasons and the pragmatic and cautious foreign and military policy traditionally practiced by the Chinese Communist government, this area is not such a tinder box as one may think. Even the little island of Quemoy, nestled in the harbor of Amoy, only two statute miles from mainland Communist China, is not that likely to be taken over by the Chinese Communists by military force. This is not to say that they couldn't take it if they wished, but that it would be a risky proposition to do so and if they took the island the gain would not be adequate for the risk that might be involved. Apparently the Chinese Communists do not believe in "adventurism" any more than any true Marxist would in any country. And an attack on Quemoy would appear to be real adventurism.

There are 50,000 Chinese Nationalist troops sitting on Quemoy in one of the best fortified areas in the world. But even these military difficulties involved in taking Quemoy itself do not indicate the entire risk involved in an attack on this island. The Nationalist Chinese have never recognized the mainland of China to be a sanctuary as we have. Therefore, any attack launched against Quemoy (which is considered part of Nationalist China) brings up the possibility of a Nationalist Chinese

airstrike against the mainland. This is a far cry from empty threat. In the Straits Crisis of 1958, the Communists lost control of the air over the Taiwan Straits and places like Amoy were in danger of being visited by Chinese Nationalist bombers. This area had a significant military buildup, including airfields, but the number of aircraft currently supported in the area and on these bases is not known. The only way for the communists to guarantee against recurrence of this experience is to build up their air power near Amoy to a point where it can assure control of the air. Yet concentrating too many aircraft in a zone where they would have a significant "on station" time over the straits near Amoy could invite other kinds of difficulties in time of crisis. An Israeli-type first strike against these airfields similar to the one carried out in the Middle East war in 1967 could put out of operation an even larger segment of the communist air force which would at least temporarily make things worse for the communists.* The difficulty that the Chinese Communists face here, of course, is that, like Britain in 1940 or Israel in 1967, any attack against Taiwan which was not stopped on the far side of the Strait, or on the Strait itself, is likely to mean the end of the government of Taipei and the end of a way of life far superior to that which would be imposed by the communists. Under these circumstances, the Taipei government is quite likely to react very quickly to a threat which, if allowed to develop, could spell its demise.

For this reason, attacks on Quemoy could become the worst kind of adventurism from the point of view of the Marxist in Peking.

*See "China's Conventional Military Capability," by Frank E. Armbruster, in China in Crisis, Tang Tsou, ed., University of Chicago Press, 1968.

A. The Current Balance of Power in the Air.

The whole idea of taking on the Chinese Nationalists is obviously looked on by all Chinese Communists as a potentially large-scale operation which one feels the Chinese Communists hesitate to precipitate. There are good reasons for this attitude. The Chinese Nationalist air force that would contest the air space over the straits is by no means the smallest in Asia. It is made up of over 385 combat aircraft, all fighters and fighter-bombers, which, although far less numerous, are almost as good as those in the Chinese Communist air force as fighters, and generally far superior as light bombers and attack aircraft. They have 80 F-100 A and D fighter-bombers, the latter of which can lug 7,500 pounds of exterior ordnance under its wings; they also have 70 F-5a tactical fighters which can carry 6,200 pounds of exterior ordnance, and even their 45 F-104g interceptors can carry over 4,000 pounds of exterior ordnance. All the "Century series" aircraft are supersonic, with the F-104 capable of a speed of Mach 2.2. Nationalist China's 150 F-86f interceptors have a top speed in level flight below the speed of sound, but this version of the old F-86 has a stronger wing and can carry a large load of exterior ordnance compared to its opposite numbers, the Communist Chinese MiG-15s and -17s.

Obviously, this air force has a considerable punch in a bomb-delivery mode, and since these small fighter-bombers are hard to stop on the way in, in an air war with the Nationalist Chinese, Red China would risk an awful lot along the coast and for a good distance inland, (even the smallest Nationalist planes have a combat radius of over 400 miles). On the other hand, in their fighter mode, these Nationalist aircraft could cause all kinds of problems for the Chinese Communists' first-line MiG-19s and even for their relatively few MiG-21s. It would take a commitment of a considerable portion of the

Chinese Communist air force to overcome the Chinese Nationalist air force, even before it was reinforced by aircraft from friendly powers, but if a concentration of aircraft is made in an effective area, they may not only be "at risk" but "provocative." Communist air reinforcements would, therefore, have to be massed as far back on the Wuhan-Canton reserve line as possible, but near enough to give the aircraft a substantial "on station" time over Amoy and the western part of the Straits. This latter requirement, at least for their current short-legged fighters and fighter-bombers, might make it difficult for them to base these aircraft beyond the threat of a counter-air first strike by the long-legged Nationalist fighter-bombers from Taiwan.

B. The Current Balance of Power on the Sea.

The Chinese Nationalist navy has a sizeable surface fleet compared to the Chinese Communist navy. She has seven destroyers, two of them ex-U.S. Fletcher class, displacing over 3,000 tons full load, and carrying four 5-inch, 38-caliber, dual-purpose guns in their main batteries, and ten 40-mm guns, or six 3-inch anti-aircraft guns in twin mounts. They are also equipped with five or ten 21-inch torpedo tubes and they can make 35 knots. The Nationalists also have an ex-Japanese Kagero-type destroyer, displacing 2500 tons full load, carrying 3 5-inch, 38-caliber guns in the main battery and two 3-inch guns in the secondary battery, as well as ten 40-mm guns distributed fore and aft. They have two ex-U.S. Gleaves-class destroyers, one mounting three 5-inch, 38-caliber guns and the other mounting four 5-inch, 38-caliber guns. These ships displace 2,575 tons full load, and can make 34 knots. In addition, there are two ex-U.S. Mayo-class destroyers, displacing 2,450 ton full load and carrying four 5-inch, 38-caliber guns in the main battery. These ships can make 34 knots. Taiwan also has six frigates,

ranging from 1,400 to better than 2,200 tons full load, and carrying main batteries from two 5-inch, 30 caliber guns to three 3-inch, 50 caliber guns; these boats have a speed of between 19 and 24 knots. She also has a large number of escort patrol vessels, fleet minesweepers, coastal minesweepers, submarine chasers, gun boats, and a sizeable fleet of medium landing ships and tank landing ships, 36 of them, all told. She also has about 38 landing craft and a large fleet of patrol craft.

Obviously if the Chinese Communists cannot gain control of the air over the straits, this sizeable fleet with its main batteries of many large heavy guns and secondary batteries of hundreds of automatic cannon, to say nothing of its torpedo launching capability, would pounce on an invasion fleet of landing craft from the mainland like sharks among a school of carp. Furthermore, under the protection of a friendly air umbrella, surface vessels with their excellent ranging, aiming, and fire control systems, can pour a deadly accurate, large weight of metal into any installation along the coast. Shore batteries could drive them off, but since they have such extreme speed and high maneuverability they are not an easy target, and furthermore, since they have the choice of where they strike they can avoid the more heavily defended places, or gang up in a group and overwhelm the shore-based artillery of any one defended installation.

These highly maneuverable, fast vessels would also make difficult targets for Red China's submarine fleet. Her vast flotilla of motor torpedo boats might try to engage them, but here again, they are hard to hit with torpedos and they have an overwhelming amount of firepower to handle any motor torpedo boat which comes within range of the main batteries or automatic cannon on these destroyers. (High velocity automatic cannon are useful for things other than shooting down aircraft.) Whatever percentage of the fleet

of 15 Red Chinese missile patrol boats that might be in the area of the Straits might attempt to engage the Nationalist destroyers with missiles, but we don't know how effective these are against a rapidly maneuvering, swift vessel with a narrow beam, such as a destroyer. Of course, without control of the air, all these light vessels of the Chinese Communists are extremely vulnerable to attacks by any of the Nationalist fighter bombers (with their heavy loads of rockets, bombs and automatic cannon) called in by the Nationalist naval units under attack. There is always the possibility that the Chinese Communists would risk their entire "heavy" fleet of four destroyers, four destroyer escorts and eleven frigates, in the Straits area against the Chinese Nationalist fleet, but they would still be outgunned and without control of the air, very vulnerable to air strikes by the Chinese Nationalists.

The actual East Sea fleet that faces Taiwan, as mentioned earlier, is the largest fleet of all. It has bases at Shanghai and Chou San and is deployed along the coast from Lien Yunkang in the North to Chuan Wan in the South. This fleet has 700 vessels in it, the North Sea fleet and South Sea fleet combined have 540 vessels. There is a good probability that a high percentage of the 530 landing ships and landing craft, as well as a proportionately large percentage of their submarines and surface firepower, in the form of their destroyers, frigates, corvettes and missile, torpedo and patrol craft, are normally assigned to this East Sea fleet.

C. Spectrum of Military Confrontation

Obviously the type of confrontation which is likely in this area is entirely different from what one would expect in Southeast Asia. Here, there is a clear delineation between the "enemy territory" and friendly territory.

There is a buffer of 100 miles of blue water between mainland China and Taiwan. Even between Quemoy and the mainland there are two miles of salt water which clearly delineate the borders between these territories. Gunners know which way to shoot, aircraft know where they are likely to encounter hostile targets, and there is this large battle area on the surface, below the surface and over the Straits where all kinds of military activity can take place without endangering the lives of non-combatant civilians. There is always, of course, some small danger of infiltration, but only from small groups or individuals in boats; any sizeable movement of forces becomes obvious. Even if there were to be guerrilla activity on Taiwan it could not screen the movement of large forces into the area from the power source nearby. This makes all the difference. There is no contiguous Communist territory with large amounts of military force which can be moved in once confusion had been spread in an area by the guerrillas; in this respect Taiwan is not like Indochina and Thailand, but more like the Philippines. The HUK communist guerrilla operation there simply couldn't get the succor it needed from the Chinese mainland because of the hundreds of miles of the South China Sea that separates Luzon from the mainland.

Taiwan, therefore, is not likely to need help against guerrilla attack, but rather a stiffening against the threat of conventional attack; first, by the Chinese Communist air force, then amphibious forces from the mainland. This is purely conventional warfare activity in which the United States has a significantly greater capability than in the area of guerrilla warfare.

The easiest way the Communists could prevent Chinese Nationalist air strikes against the large, vulnerable military installations around Amoy, including the Amoy-Ying-Tan railroad, would be to strike the potential

Nationalist aircraft on their bases. This would mean an air strike against Taiwan. In fact, it might actually call for a preemptive first strike out of the blue against the Nationalists' aircraft on their bases just prior to the Communist amphibious attack on Quemoy. (The alternative to fighting off Chinese Nationalist fighters and fighter-bombers with anti-aircraft weapons and fighters based farther back out of range of air strikes from Taiwan, while treating Taiwan and its airfields as a sanctuary, is sure to be an unpleasant one.)

A Communist surprise strike against the Taiwan airfields is probably the most efficient use of their air force as far as kill ratio against Nationalist planes is concerned. Furthermore, the experience they had in 1958, in which, during a purely air battle over the Strait, 30-odd MiGs were quickly shot out of the air by the Nationalist air force (many before the Nationalists got their sidewinder air-to-air missiles), might influence their thinking in the situation. Feeding their precious aircraft into the Fukien area to have them ground up in the air or on any bases they try to maintain in the area, while the Nationalist air force has a sanctuary on Taiwan from which to operate, is not the Chinese Communist method of proceeding.

But, the other alternative (striking Taiwan's air forces on their bases), could trigger much greater things. If the Chinese Communists can really take out that air force and keep control of the air over the Straits, they could quite possibly cross those Straits with a sizeable army. If they are going to knock out the Taiwanese air force, therefore, it would pay them to do it for the larger prize, Formosa itself, not just for Quemoy. Thinking in Taipei, of course, no doubt follows the same pattern. For this

reason, any threat to the air force on Quemoy would look like a possible prelude to a Chinese Communist attack on the main island. Unless abrogated or allowed to lapse (a not inconceivable occurrence, now), our mutual assistance pact covers the large island and the Pescadores, and the Chinese Communists may be risking an involvement with the United States at this point. Furthermore, they may be risking heavy involvement with the Nationalists long before the first Chinese bomb drops on Taiwan. As indicated earlier, with her life on the line, Taiwan is quite likely to strike first. And if the Chinese Communists were to build up a sufficient number of aircraft in the Fukien area to guarantee control of the air over the Straits, it may be hard to hide this activity from the Nationalists. As indicated earlier, the very sign of a buildup may trigger the Nationalist air strike as did the Egyptian buildup trigger the Israeli air strike in 1967.

As long as the U.S.-Nationalist treaty exists, warfare in the Taiwan Straits area always has a chance of becoming something more than a sandlot engagement like the 1962 Chinese Communist attack on India. Even a moderate buildup of aircraft in that area is likely to result in American composite air strike forces flying to this island. With a significant transfer of U.S. air power to that island, the Chinese Communists would be in grave danger. It would be almost a sure thing that they would lose control of the air over the Straits and even if U.S. aircraft did not operate within the three-mile limit, this would allow the Chinese Nationalist aircraft to operate under this friendly umbrella until they were within a few seconds of the coast. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to prevent them from penetrating a considerable distance inland along the whole coast opposite Taiwan. The results could only be disastrous for the Communists

and obviously building up an invasion force under these circumstances would be just about impossible, to say nothing of getting this force across a hundred miles of blue water without control of the air and in the face of the combined fleets of Taiwan and the United States. Even if (or when) the United States-Nationalist treaty lapses, if Nationalist-Taiwanese morale holds, and if the non-communist world does not refuse to sell Taiwan the modern military equipment she needs, any Red Chinese attempt to take Taiwan or even Quemoy, should touch off a real pier six brawl. The communists are not likely to get off as easily in this one as they did in their attack on India in 1962.

The air, naval and ground forces which the Chinese communists will keep in the Fukien area and on the Canton-Wuhan axis backing up Fukien, as long as the Nationalists remain independent on Taiwan, will probably make up the heaviest concentration of their forces, at least through the mid-eighties. These forces will include some of the best units possessing some of the most modern equipment. In the mid-eighties the heaviest concentration of supersonic fighter planes (several hundred of them), about four destroyers, four frigates, a dozen missile patrol boats and about four of the approximately ten armored divisions they should have at this time, will be based in Fukien province or on the Canton-Wuhan line in support of the forces in Fukien. Air defense forces in this area should continue to be the heaviest and most modern in all of China.

If Taipei is abandoned by the free world in the area of defense money and equipment, and eventually can no longer control the air over the Straits, the communist forces opposite Quemoy and Taiwan may change character. They could change to offensive forces and then the surface and air fleets and ground assault forces would look somewhat different. The TU-16's might be

concentrated along the Canton-Wuhan line, the shore bombardment capability and almost all the landing craft of the navy could be based in Fukien, and the first line infantry and armored outfits (five or six "tank" divisions) could be concentrated there.

VI. REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES FROM THE SOUTHERN ANCHOR (TAIWAN) TO THE KURILES

Such a change in attitude by Red China could spell trouble for everyone from Japan to the Philippines. The pragmatic communists would probably not change to this posture without some sense that Taiwan had been abandoned by the West (or was even being pressured not to "plunge the world into World War III" by defending itself, à la Czechoslovakia in 1938) and would fall into their laps without too much resistance. If Taiwan should fall to Communist China, it would have significant consequences for the whole Western Pacific. The key position of Taiwan becomes abundantly clear when one begins to think of the "strategic importance" of the territories near Red China and the U.S.S.R., not from the point of view of the strategic outlook of the United States (with its many thousands of miles of ocean between its nearest state--Hawaii--and the Asian mainland and its many intermediate island bases), but from the point of view of the military security of our "close-in" allies. Whether they are currently alerted to it or not, Taiwan stands as either the key link or the dividing wedge (depending on to whom it belongs or is allied) between the northern and southern defense zones facing communist China. It lies almost exactly halfway between Kyushu and Vietnam at a distance of 2500 miles. Taiwan is closer to the northern coast of Luzon than Manila. The once-powerful, anti-communist bastion of Taiwan in communist hands means that Red China becomes

a Western Pacific power with all this implies politically, militarily and from the point of view of the morale of the small powers of Southeast Asia. Taiwan Straits become a Chinese communist channel, aircraft with only the combat radius of a MiG-21 (375 miles, clean) can dominate northern Luzon, the Sakishima Group of the Ryukyus, and all the islands and sea lanes in between. With Taiwan Red Chinese, a communist subversion/insurgency operation in the Philippines (for example) may feel much closer to the friendly Communist Chinese than the HUKs did in 1950.* In fact, island hopping (by small boat under cover of darkness and bad weather) down from Taiwan to the Bataan Islands (part of the Philippines, but closer to Taiwan than Luzon and a possible future bone of contention between the Philippines and an expanding Red China, which is already acting like a Western Pacific power with claims to islands and the seabed extending over vast stretches of the South and East China Sea)** across the Balintang Channel to the Babuyan Islands and then to northern Luzon (or an airlift run directly from Taiwan) is much easier than the long trip across the expanse of the South China Sea from the mainland to Luzon. Supplying and reinforcing communist

*Even they drew moral strength from that successful communist revolutionary power, however. See Pomeroy, The Forest.

**Red China's claims of offshore waters of Taiwan and southern China include not only waters awfully close to (if not including) the Bataan Islands, but the whole South China Sea to the territorial limits of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya and Vietnam. She also claims vast areas of the East China Sea (see the offshore oil reserve map in Chapter V of this study). They have submitted to the United Nations claims to islands as far south as 8° of longitude (Spratley Island, opposite the southern tip of Palawan in the Philippines (New York Times, March 12, 1972, p. 6); on some very sketchy evidence of sovereignty. Their claims to the Senkaku Islands, claimed by Japan as part of the Ryukyus, has been enough to put a stop to Japanese survey ships calling at these islands. There are those who defend Nationalist and Communist Chinese claims to the Senkaku group, partly on the issue of their being on the continental shelf of China, but this claim does not hold for Spratley Island or the Paracel Islands, which Peking also claims.

guerrillas in the jungles of northern Luzon would now be a much more promising possibility. If pleas for help from a native communist movement in northern Luzon (or other nearby area) were to be directed at Red China (the self-proclaimed leader of the Communist World Revolution), under these circumstances one has some difficulty imagining Peking, before the eyes of the whole communist world, turning a deaf ear. There are those who suggest that such Chinese support would bring everybody running to support the government, and would therefore be counterproductive for the insurgents. This may be so, and if it is, perhaps the Chinese would actually discourage indigenous communist insurgents from starting anything in the Philippines (as the Kremlin used to "turn off" Togliatti when his young firebrands occasionally caused him to bring up the idea of revolution in Italy). The Philippine government (as indicated earlier) has a good record of military/police operations against the HUKs. One cannot help but wonder, however, how much difference would be made by many tons of claymore mines, 106mm recoilless rifles, mortars, AK-47 rifles and machine guns in the hands of hundreds (and eventually maybe even many hundreds) of trained Filipino, insurgent "cadres" from communist Taiwan, along with many tons of sea-lifted and air-dropped ammunition and supplies. Overflights of MiG's and patrols of Chinese surface ships might make it hard for the Philippine government to gather up-to-date intelligence on what was happening in the sea lanes, or even in northern Luzon, without running the risk of an "incident" with Red China. One wonders if a Philippine patrol boat would attempt to board sea-going communist junks off Luzon if a Chinese communist destroyer lay nearby and MiG's circled overhead. Under these circumstances, maybe the jungle bases would no longer depend so heavily on the peasants in the barrios, and could thus survive almost independently; and maybe, therefore, the threat of the devastation of

barrios (at least those in the far north) which did not cooperate, could not be so easily removed; or if "removed" would spring up again, supplied with new equipment, supplies and cadres from Taiwan; etc. This could be an entirely different environment from that of the anti-HUK campaign of 1950, but perhaps it would have no effect on the conflict, and not do much to maintain the morale of the communists and adversely affect the morale of the anti-communists; but then again, it might.

Of course, the communist missile and torpedo boats could now range far into the Pacific from bases on the east coast of Taiwan under a Mach 2+ fighter air umbrella, and if the Nationalist navy should fall into communist hands, a much heavier surface fleet could sortie from the protection of the Taiwan Straits deep into the western Pacific.

All of this at some point may well be of interest to the United States and Japan. This is not to say that we and/or the Japanese could not handle the situation in the Western Pacific even with Taiwan in communist hands, if we put our minds to it. What I am saying is that (like maintaining British influence in the Mediterranean in the 19th Century without Gibraltar), even though it could be done, it would be a much harder job. Furthermore, the job of maintaining a friendly power on Taiwan may in the long run not only be the easier but the more productive of the two jobs.

It would probably not take a very large percentage of the American air power to tip the balance against the Chinese Communists in the Taiwan area today, and probably through the mid-1980's. Furthermore, should the Japanese be interested in Taiwan and should they also negotiate a mutual assistance pact with that island, the addition of units from the Japanese air force (particularly if it were enlarged) could probably also tip the

balance against the Chinese Communists (or at least make an attack on Taiwan much more dangerous "adventurism"). For all these reasons it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists would want to give any large, non-communist powers (with the morale and courage to do so) any excuse to grow even closer to Taiwan in the military area. This is the real deterrent to Red Chinese pressure on Taiwan today, and it takes no increase in current outside commitment. Even additional air support in time of crisis, again, is a kind of "non-involving" support that can be given by an outside power to Taiwan. If the pilots of the foreign power do not actually fly over the Chinese mainland but stay several miles out over the Straits, then even the question of who is flying this new fleet of "Nationalist" planes should remain open, and the question of prisoners of war in the shape of captured pilots should not come up. With air/sea rescue vessels in the Straits under the protection of the allied navy and air forces, and with helicopters on the alert, pilots of planes which go down in the Strait and who survive are quite unlikely to fall into the hands of the communists. There will no doubt be protests about the use of either Japanese or American aircraft in such roles in both homelands, but the momentum of such protests is likely to be much slower to build and harder to maintain if there are few casualties and no American or Japanese prisoners of war. The real danger of a shooting war over Taiwan is more likely to be increased by our foreclosing beforehand the option of outside powers coming to the aid of Taiwan in time of crisis.

A. Japan the Hub of the Regional Security Program

The Japanese are perfectly capable of providing advice and equipment to fill the needs mentioned above; in fact, here, as in Southeast Asia,

the Japanese presence, if only in the form of advisors and liaison personnel, may do much to discourage the Chinese Communists from any outright hostility against Taiwan. Taiwan is much closer to the homeland of Japan than are the areas of Southeast Asia. In fact, it is almost an extension of the Ryukyu Island chain, owned by Japan. The westernmost of the Ryukyu's is considerably closer to Taiwan than is the mainland of China. Taiwan was a province of Japan from 1895 to 1945, and the Chinese Communists are quite likely to be impressed with the seriousness of any renewed Japanese interest in that island, if it should occur.

Japan also has the industrial might and technical know-how to meet almost any requirements for the conventional military defense of any small, East Asian nation, including Taiwan and Korea. Her mills, factories and shipyards are capable of turning out the most sophisticated defense equipment. Only the decision of the Japanese government is needed to use these facilities to keep the Taiwan military forces current as far as the more sophisticated equipment is concerned. It is not even clear that this would be a breach of Article 9 of the Constitution to a degree which would be greater than what they've already done as far as their defense industry is concerned. Today they are building F-4J's and surface-to-air missiles, and have the production capability to build the most sophisticated types of radar and other hardware needed to support the weapons systems they can produce. In fact, supplying Taiwan might be a good way to build up the Japanese "military-industrial complex" without having too great a demonstration of its production to the Japanese public (as adding these planes to the self-defense force inventory would). If the equipment is

shipped to Taiwan, Korea, and perhaps nations in Southeast Asia, the Japanese could have considerable potential ready to turn to supplying their own forces if they should ever make the decision to expand them.

Their interpretation of the Constitution, for example, is that they cannot produce "bombers" for these would be threatening to their neighbors. The F-4, although listed as a fighter-bomber, has a lift capability much greater than four-engine bombers in World War II (with the exception of the B-29s), particularly when these World War II aircraft were on relatively long-range missions. These planes would be extremely effective against the mainland when operating from Taiwan. They can carry 16,000 pounds of exterior ordnance stores hundreds of miles into mainland China, or range up and down the Straits area with considerable time on station, making the area very unhealthy for Chinese surface units. On the other hand, if attacked, they can dump their air-to-ground ordnance and have adequate speed to escape or even to engage the Chinese Communist fighters in combat. There is no reason to believe that Japan will not be capable of building more sophisticated aircraft if required to do so in the future.

The Japanese also have the capability to provide a vast array of the kind of swift, heavily-gunned surface vessels that would supplement the parent Chinese Nationalist navy. Their ability to provide sophisticated, ship-mounted, air-to-surface missiles might not be that easily forthcoming, although the ability of the Japanese to at least build such weapons under license cannot be doubted. The other necessary ordnance, such as artillery tanks and light weapons, obviously are within the capability of the Japanese.

Statements by the Japanese over the past few years by the Chief of Staff of the Defense Forces and others regarding the fact that their job was "to defend humanity," and the more specific statements in the not too distant past about their interest in South Korea and Taiwan by very high-ranking political figures, seem to have been interpreted by the Chinese Communists as a Japanese statement that Japan's sphere of influence and the umbrella of the defense forces extended to these non-Japanese territories. If this were true, the American role in the area north of 22° of latitude off the coast of East Asia might very well be supplemented by a powerful Japan. This supplemental strength would be coming at a very opportune time if the Nixon Doctrine really means that we would welcome "autonomous" Japanese defense of their area. It would be an opportunity to reduce American presence without necessarily reducing non-communist strength of the area to defend against possible communist aggression.

B. The Republic of Korea

The forces available north of 22° off the coast of China are much more impressive than those in the S.E. Asian area. In addition to the armed forces of Taiwan described earlier, which must be included in this section, we have the armed forces of the Republic of Korea.

South Korea also has a very large standing army, 560,000 men. She has 29 infantry divisions, 10 of which are only cadre divisions to be filled out in time of emergency; 2 armored brigades, and 80 artillery battalions. She also has 5 brigades of Marines. Her navy consists of 3 destroyers, 3 destroyer escorts, 4 frigates, 6 escort transports, 11 coastal escorts, 17 patrol boats, 12 coastal mine sweepers, and 20

landing ships. The destroyers are ex-U.S.-Fletcher-types, similar to those owned by the Chinese Nationalists. They have a full-load displacement of 3,050 tons, and they carry five 5-inch, 38-caliber, dual-purpose guns in their main battery and six 50mm gophers in the secondary battery. They also carry an array of 21" torpedo-tubes and two side-launching anti-submarine torpedo launching tubes. They can make 35 knots and have an operational radius of about 6,000 miles. The D.E.'s are ex-Boswick and Ruderow type vessels. The formers' displacement is 1,900 tons full-load and the latter 2,230 tons full-load. The former can make twenty knots, the latter 24 knots. The Boswick type has three, three inch, 50 calibre dual-purpose guns in its main battery and three, forty and eight 20 mm automatic guns in its secondary battery. The Ruderow class have two 5-inch, 38-caliber surface-to-surface guns in their main battery and two 40mm and six 20mm guns in the secondary batteries.

The frigates are all ex-U.S. Tacoma types, mounting three 3-inch, 50-caliber dual-purpose guns in their main batteries and two 40mm and nine 20mm. in their secondary batteries. These ships can make 18 knots and have an operational radius of 9,500 miles.

The six escorts and transports are ships that displace 2,130 tons full-load, have one 5-inch, 30-caliber all-purpose gun and six 40mm anti-aircraft guns. They can make 23 knots and have a range of 5,500 miles.

The Republic of Korea's air force has 235 combat aircraft, 18 of which are F-4 fighter-bombers, 110 are F-86 "F" fighter bombers, 77 are F-5 tactical fighters, 20 are F-86-D, equipped with sidewinder air-to-air missiles. These aircraft all have a considerable lift capability in a fighter-bomber mode, the details of which have been covered earlier in a

discussion of the uses of such aircraft on Taiwan, but none of them is a match for the MiG-21 in a fighter mode.

There is also a para-military force made up of local defense militia which is being formed and when completed should have one to two million men enrolled.

C. The Armed Forces of North Korea

Facing these military forces across the border in North Korea is an army of 360,000 men, composed of two armored divisions, twenty infantry divisions and five independent infantry brigades, as well as 15,000 men in special commando teams. In fact, the North Koreans have a distinct edge in the air (built up with the help of the Soviets and Red China in violation of the truce agreements, and not countered by the United States) and probably in armor. There is a definite effort on the part of the United States to deny South Korea a capability for any offensive operations against the North. As mentioned earlier, we force our allies to be strictly status quo, even in declaration. This is not true of the communist countries facing them. There is also a communist Korean navy, which has no surface ships of heavy gun capability. It does have three ex-Soviet W-class submarines and fifteen fast patrol boats with Styx surface-to-surface missiles on them, three torpedo boats and forty high-speed, light torpedo boats. There are also twenty-two patrol vessels and eleven mortar-gun boats.

The air force is much more impressive, with 555 combat aircraft. Seventy of these are IL-28 light bombers and 380 obsolescent MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers, but they also have 100 MiG-21 supersonic interceptors as well as five of the older MiG-19 supersonic interceptors.

North Korea also has paramilitary forces which include 25,000 members of security forces and border guards, and a civilian militia which is said to be 1,250,000 strong.

South Korea is well over twice as big as North Korea. North Korea has about fourteen million people in it--South Korea almost thirty-three million--but, as the above data indicate, the armed forces of South Korea are not overwhelming compared to those in the North. This is an area where despite the demilitarized zone with its guarded and fenced border between these two countries, guerrilla activity is attempted occasionally and commando teams do come down from the North to the South. Nevertheless, the danger from such paramilitary and guerrilla activity is not as large in Korea as it is in Southeast Asia. At least at the moment the Republic of Korea runs a taut ship and keeps rather good control of its area.

The smaller area of North Korea is not really threatened by the larger half (the Republic of Korea) in the South, and not just because of the strength of North Korea. The very credible deterrent of the Chinese forces in the Chien-Yai military region across the border in Manchuria is the real counter to an attack on North Korea. These Chinese forces also provide the real threat to the Republic of South Korea from the North. Should they move into North Korea and support the North Korean forces in attacking in South Korea, South Korea would need help. The presence of American forces just below the military zone, which make up one infantry division with Korean fillers, are the trip-wire which, it

is assumed, would bring aid to Korea in case of major attack from the North. Their presence and our status quo policy also presumably discourage South Korean incursion into North Korea.

The threat to this area from North Korea is presumably less today than it was in 1950, when there were no American troops in the area and the U.S. Air Force had no "ready" units (like the 5th Air Force based in Japan) in the area to come to the defense of South Korea when it was under attack, nor were there in the area units of the 7th Fleet as powerful as those which exist in East Asia at the moment. In 1950 there were no composite airstrike force units which could be readily moved from the United States to Japan and Korea, or the Strike Command ground forces which could now be more rapidly moved to that area. In those days, also, the Republic of Korea Army was not the fighting organization it is now, and the same could be said for their air force and navy. The North Korean army, of course, has also been improved since the 1950's as has the Chinese army which stands ready behind it; but the numerical edge they have today in that area is not nearly what it was in 1950, and then their experiences were anything but encouraging from the point of view of Chinese military commanders.*

* Industrial Manchuria, and the Korean extension of it which had been built up by the Japanese during the thirties, has the best logistic net of railroads and roads of any area of China. Yet, when the Korean war started and the U.S. began to come to the aid of that country, the power of the American logistic forces was quickly felt. We sent troops and aircraft and naval vessels to the area and the entire situation changed completely. The North Korean army attacked in June of 1950; "the prize" was supposed to be South Korea, but within four months of the North Korean invasion, the North Korean army was in ruins and fleeing through its own country toward the Chinese border. At this point, fresh Chinese armies, which had been massing in Manchuria, crossed the Yalu in

The leaders of the People's Liberation Army were apparently very concerned during this critical period when the U.N. forces were in full attack, and statements by the leaders of that army have since been interpreted to mean that the People's Liberation Army should not be used for this kind of "adventurism" outside the zone of the interior of China.

force. The Chinese exploited the opportunity offered by MacArthur's controversial deployment of his forces, and the allied army was soon caught in a precarious position. The U.N. forces drew back into South Korea; but by May, under Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet, the U.N. forces had turned on the enemy once more. This new textbook counterattack, heavy air attacks along logistic lines and at the front, artillery bombardment, then armored and infantry drives, quickly chewed up the Chinese army, and they too reeled back into North Korea. It was estimated that up to this point, less than a year after the initial North Korean attacks, the communists had suffered 1.2 million casualties, including half a million Chinese lost in the eight months they had been involved. In the last two weeks of May alone, 17,000 Chinese surrendered. Histories of the war talk of the precarious position of the communist armies at this time. It really appeared that parts of the People's Liberation Army front were collapsing. Without control of the air space, the Chinese could not support their soldiers with enough supplies to produce sufficient divisional combat days to withstand a sustained drive by the high fire-power, high morale, well-trained, free-world-type divisions. Under these conditions, Chinese numerical superiority on the battlefield lost much of its significance. The Chinese had simply lost the logistics race; they couldn't supply the fire-power required to stop the Western-type divisions even though they were so close to their sources of supply in Manchuria, and the trans-Siberian railroad, which was pouring in materials from the Soviet Union. At the time of the dwindling of the Chinese Spring Offensive and the American counterattack, this weakness in logistics showed up spectacularly. While the Chinese only had a few artillery rounds per division front to try to stop the American counterattack, the Americans were pouring in a drumfire of artillery fire ahead of their attack. For example, "the battalion-supported second division fired 12,000 rounds in one day."

The Soviet United Nations representative, Jacob Malik, indicated that negotiations were in order. At this point, the Chinese army was largely being routed, pursued by U.S. armor and harassed constantly by American aircraft, and even the Republic of Korea forces had swept forty miles north of the 38th parallel. It must have been quite clear to the communist commanders that there was nothing humanly possible they could do to save that army if the U.S. leaders refused to negotiate at this point. We did agree to negotiate, however, and we stopped our drive, thus preventing an even greater disaster for the Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army.

The Chinese had lost the logistics race by a wide margin and the combined drive by the U.N. ground forces plus our interdiction attack by our air force had run them out of gas very quickly; and this in an area of their greatest logistic capability. ("China in Crisis," op. cit.)

"China's military leaders clearly consider the capability for ground combat as a deterrent to invasion. They recognize important limits to offensive use of ground forces. They probably do not see these forces as enabling them to engage in prolonged, high-level actions that would require extensive logistic support."* Lin Piao's statement, fifteen years later in 1965 regarding the active intervention of China in People's Liberation wars, seems to bear this out. In that statement, he declared that these liberation wars, which made up the revolution of the countryside against the cities, must stem from these countrysides themselves.

From the purely military balance point of view, South Korea is not an inviting area for communist attack, as long as there is a credible sponsor for South Korea. Apparently that sponsor is still thought to be the United States. We don't know how our credibility looks in the eyes of the Chinese at the moment, however. Furthermore, we don't know how our credibility will look after the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine sinks in and his visit to Peking underscores it, and therein may lie a new danger. In any event, as U.S. presence is decreased, our credibility in the far Pacific might also decrease. The Japanese presence, however, cannot be decreased in the far Pacific, since she is part of it. The old Japanese saying that Korea is a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan resulted from geographic reality, which has not changed. There is the continuing possibility, therefore, that the Japanese are likely to become concerned about South Korea under a communist threat just as the British traditionally have

*Alice Langley Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy," China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June, 1964), p. 95.

been concerned about an unfriendly power on the Scheldt estuary of Holland, which they have described with Western symbolism as a pistol pointed at the heart of Britain. One also has difficulty in convincing oneself that the geographic reality of the position and importance of Taiwan to Japan's security will never arise in the decades ahead.

D. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces

In dealing with the Chinese Communists, however, and for that matter the communists of North Korea, the number of battalions of the sponsor are probably what really counts. The current battalions of the Japanese are not that impressive: they have an army of 175,000 men with one mechanized division and twelve infantry divisions; but these are small divisions--from seven to nine thousand men each. They have one airborne brigade and one artillery brigade, and the normal support troops, engineers and so forth for an army.

Their air force has 375 combat aircraft, about equally divided between interceptor squadrons of F-104J's and fighter-bomber squadrons of F-86F's which are being replaced now with F-4's. As mentioned earlier, the F-4 series aircraft is being manufactured in Japan. Once these fighter bomber squadrons are filled out with the F-4's, the strike capability of that air force will increase considerably. When they replace the F-104's with F-4's, they will not only increase their interceptor strength, but because of the dual purpose capability of this aircraft, greatly increase their iron bomb lift once more. If they use just half of a fleet of approximately four hundred of these aircraft, they have a

capability of delivering about 1,600 tons of bombs on targets up to 1,000 miles from their base in a single raid. That is the same tonnage that 600 flying fortresses could deliver on Berlin in a raid. A strike by this air force, using half the aircraft in a fighter-bomber role and the other half flying protective cover in an all out Israeli-type first strike against the Chinese air fields, could probably take out the entire North Korean air force and that portion of the Red Chinese air force facing Japan. The firepower of the 20 mm. Vulken guns (6,000 rounds a minute) and the air-to-surface rockets would kill most aircraft they could find if they were not in some extremely strong revetments. Of course, this air force could also sweep the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea of all communist surface ships once the communists had lost control of the air.

The Japanese navy, next to the Far East fleet of the Soviet Union, is the largest fleet of a Western Pacific power. She has 37 destroyers, all of them quite modern and many of them quite large. Some of them displace over 3,000 tons and many of them carry 5-inch, 54-caliber guns. Their oldest destroyers are 2 ex-U.S. Fletcher-type and 2 ex-U.S. Gleaves-Livermore-type destroyers. She also has 16 frigates carrying 3-inch guns and displacing between 1500 and 2400 tons standard.

The Japanese have a strong tradition as a naval power and a huge capacity for building new ships in her shipyards. It would be quite normal for the Japanese to look on her air force and her navy as a first line of defense against threats from Communist China. It is not even inconceivable for them to look upon their air arm and naval arm as the defenders of "humanity" (if "humanity" is taken to mean Korea and

Taiwan), as the chief of the Japanese self-defense forces once proclaimed the mission of these forces to be.

Perhaps more important than the hardware of the Japanese navy and air force is the organizational and training ability that they have. This is a nation quite capable of the very complicated staff and logistics work needed to coordinate and direct an allied force in defensive operations for Taiwan, The Ryukyus, or the Japanese homeland itself. Furthermore, they have all kinds of capability to plan and direct support of an army in Korea.

VII. CONCLUSION

In summary, from a purely military balance point of view, the situation on the East Asian periphery of China is not hopeless. The countries of Southeast Asia, Taiwan and Korea have armed forces of a size adequate to cause a "pause" in any communist military adventure in that area, which may be as much as can be expected from small nations. Whether or not we or someone else will be willing and able to come to their assistance during that pause is another issue.

We have seen that, from the point of view of surface navies, the North Vietnamese and even the Chinese and North Koreans cannot possibly match the surface fleets of the non-communist countries without a significant building program. The one area where a Chinese communist fleet might function successfully against a potential enemy may be across the Formosa Straits in an attack against Taiwan, in the event that the Nationalists lost control of the air. Elsewhere, the communist navies are not a threat to the lands further off shore, such as Japan and the Philippines, as long as Taiwan is denied to them. Of course, as pointed out earlier, if Taiwan should come under the jurisdiction of the Chinese communists, then the Philippines would be in some danger of having control of the air over the ocean fall into the hands of the Chinese communists up to and including northern Luzon, and both this area and the Ryukyus would be in some danger of at least communist guerrilla and subversive activity originating and/or supported from Taiwan.

The Chinese communist air force presents an entirely different kind of threat to the nations on China's periphery. This is a big air force, with a capability to put up large numbers of modern and quasi-modern fighter aircraft, with some fighter-bomber and even medium-bomber capability to go

with it. In fact, this air force is so large that if the Chinese were allowed to concentrate it in any given area of the periphery, they could dominate the air out to the extent of the range of these aircraft. Since the rough combat radius of their better fighters is about 350-375 miles, obviously large sections on non-communist territory could be put in jeopardy by such concentrations. The range of their medium bombers, the TU-16s, gives them a "reach" of about 1500 miles out into the Pacific and over the Philippines and Japan, but as yet these aircraft are not numerous (about 30). By the mid-eighties, however, they may have hundreds of these planes with a significant iron bomb delivery capability against undefended or lightly defended targets.

The ground forces which oppose the North Vietnamese and Chinese military and para-military forces are numerically adequate to give opposition to any moves by those communist forces against non-communist regions around them. The geography is such in Indochina and on the southern border of China that really large numbers of ground troops are hard to move into any area in a short period of time, particularly in the face of determined opposition by a large, competent air force and opposition by high morale ground troops and some naval forces. The same holds true for the Taiwan Straits area, and even North Korea does not offer an ideal situation as far as moving a large segment of the People's Liberation Army into attack position against South Korea and a high-resolve, large power; at least it is not an ideal situation without complete control of the air by the Chinese communists.

As indicated earlier, there is enough military potential among the non-communist powers of East Asia to make possible, at least from a largely military point of view, "non-committal" type of joint forces,

particularly naval and air arms capable of coping with at least the lower levels of warfare. Nor does one have to assume that China will devote so much effort to naval shipbuilding, the manufacture of tanks, artillery, aircraft, etc., that within ten years this balance will have shifted that drastically. In fact, assuming Red China will continue her emphasis on civilian, economic progress rather than an all-out arms drive, with relatively little effort on the part of the free world, these non-communist forces could be upgraded to prevent the balance from shifting dramatically in favor of China. As indicated earlier, such free world military aid is not a sure thing for all areas of East Asia.

The real difficulty in all these areas is to guarantee opposition by competent forces of high resolve at the time when a communist attack is imminent, or underway. This has less to do with numbers of forces available on the non-communist side in many respects, than it does with morale. Nor is this a unique problem in East Asia. In Europe, under the joint pressure of the detente and Ostpolitik on the one hand (which made the danger from the communist side look less and less important) and the pressure from the United States for a status quo position for all powers in Europe, including Germany; and on the other hand, a feeling (fostered by the United States, again, particularly in the case of West Germany), that these countries could prosper without being concerned about their military security (which would be underwritten by the United States) has led to a very strange development. Western Europe has well over 200 million people and a huge capability as far as industrial and military strength are concerned, yet this giant acts as though it were inferior, not only to the Soviet Union, but to the smaller members of the Warsaw Pact. At present, a demoralized Western Europe, with belief in its own principles wavering, shrinks before

an organized, dynamic, committed group of communist, absolutist governments to the east, and the thundering Brezhnev Doctrine.

One cannot but have the feeling that the American policy over the past twenty-odd years, which featured a pacifist Japan and a status quo situation for all our allies, and which now features a pull-out by the United States under the Nixon Doctrine, will have the same effect on the security situation in East Asia. Here again, the tremendous might of Japan has been successfully hobbled and the smaller nations have been made to see that the thrusts across the bamboo curtain will always be in one direction--against the non-communist nations. It has been made abundantly clear to the governments and peoples behind the bamboo curtain that any difficulties there will not be the concern of the non-communist world and that those communist governments will be able to settle any internal difficulties at their leisure, free from interference by the free world. This milieu which makes a sanctuary out of the areas behind the bamboo curtain, but at the same time allows the non-communist areas to be constantly harassed by the communists, so that non-communist governments are forced to settle all their internal difficulties under forced draft for fear of interference by the communists, makes for a very difficult milieu in which such governments are expected to exist, let alone form together in security alliances against the threat of communist incursion.

What the Nixon Doctrine may have done is to create an even greater power vacuum in certain of the threatened areas. Since our policy of the past twenty-odd years and apparently our current policy does not look to any

large, friendly nation to fill this vacuum, we can expect an expansion of Chinese communist influence and perhaps an increase in the feeling that communism is the "wave of the future." (As one West European observer stated, "The disappointment over the foreign policy of the democracies has also influenced the evaluation of democracy as a form of government."¹²) This makes a situation which may tend to do something quite the opposite from having small powers cling together in a tight alliance with adequate force to oppose that strong communist bloc. Faced with a choice of joining a non-communist security alliance (which did not include a large power) to oppose Red China and this "dynamic" bloc of communist nations (including Red China) and revolutionary forces led by unwavering communists (men of "principle"), or somehow remaining neutral or making a deal for its own benefit with this threatening bloc, a small country is likely to choose the latter. The rationalization of foreign policy, or even domestic policy, so that it is more in line with the demands of a communist neighbor, is quite easy under the very credible internal and external threats which may now become apparent to individual small nations on the periphery of communist China and her "proxy" states. Finlandization under these circumstances may not look like a bad deal at all to these small nations, if the "communist bloc" begins to "lean" on them, and even allowing a "coalition" government to come into being with ever-increasing communist influence may look like the lesser of two evils (if the other is a quick, communist takeover or invasion, without even a chance for those who had been involved with the non-communist government to be able to move their families and some belongings out). Western Europe has been led to understand, by the Brezhnev

Peter Bender (political editor of the West German radio in Cologne) in his book, Aggressive Relaxation, as quoted in an article by George Bailey, "West Germany's Economic Romantics," in The Reporter, September 23, 1965.

Doctrine and our own attitudes, that the way things must now be handled between East and West Europe is by way of Moscow, but not necessarily by way of Washington. The word may now be out, because of the Nixon Doctrine and the Peking trip, that Asian issues involving things which are of "interest" to the Chinese communists must be handled through Peking. Nor can we hope that the "sphere of interest" of Moscow and Peking won't soon tend toward "Finlandization" of their non-communist as well as their communist neighbors.

Even if the small, non-communist Asian countries should try to face the communist powers down, it would be very difficult to convince themselves and other non-communist nations around the world, that the Chinese couldn't "take them any time they wanted to." This lowers the credibility of any and all security arrangements and even the credibility of the governments in power.

In point of fact, however, these governments may be able to hold out longer than some might think against pressure from the communists, if they are not isolated by the rest of the free world. We have been told for years that the moment United States forces gave up their combat role in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese would swarm all over South Vietnam and just take the country over. The facts are that it is not that easily done, as long as the morale of the Saigon government holds up and their forces are capable of maintaining maneuver battalions in the field. Furthermore, since the South Vietnamese people have now been armed, individual villages have guns, and here again, rather than turning the guns on the government, they use the guns to defend themselves against the communists. The combat potential of these people is adequate to handle low-level threats, and, as long as their morale is not undermined, "taking" them is not going to be too easy.

The difficulty is that once small governments feel alone and they are really left to stand alone against the political and diplomatic pressure brought to bear on them by their large opponents, then their ability to stand up to both military and para-military attacks and subversion (and at the same time keep their political and social structure and their economy viable) is likely to be adversely affected.

Of course, this need not necessarily be true, if there is no imminent military threat. Countries like South Africa and, for a long time, Rhodesia, stood alone against everybody else, and were able to maintain their morale against all kinds of outside economic and political pressures. But, Rhodesia and South Africa were not in danger of imminent invasion and diplomatic and political pressure was all that could be brought to bear against them. When these pressures are combined with an ability to bring considerable amount of military pressure against an unsupported, small country, and when there is a quite clear threat that when political pressure doesn't work, military pressure will be resorted to, then the morale of the victim state is likely to be undermined.

Looking at the "bright side" of things, however, there comes a point where small countries are better off without the commitments of larger states. The morale of the "sponsor" state(s) could be so undermined that there could develop a de facto "unholy alliance" between the aggressor state(s) and the sponsor state(s), both of which would then bring pressure upon the victim nation(s) to give in to the demands of the communist state. (This is precisely what happened to Czechoslovakia in 1938. In the negotiations at Munich, actually Chamberlain, Hitler and Baldwin were all allied against the "trouble some" Czechoslovakia.) The small state becomes a "bother" because

its desire for liberty makes things difficult for its larger allies, and eventually the timid "allies," in league with the aggressor nation, force concessions out of the smaller state for the greater good of "world peace." From the point of view of the smaller nations, therefore, it is better that such "allies" have no strong commitment to the small state, when they become a de facto ally of the aggressor nation. It is unlikely that the United States will find itself in such a role in East Asia,* but, to the extent that the Nixon Doctrine reduces the amount of "commitment" this country has to small countries in Asia, it reduces the incentive for communist states to attempt to get us involved so that we can "lean" on the small states for the benefit of the communist objectives. This reduces the temptation of "summitry," which reduces our involvement in these areas and this, after all, is the aim of the Nixon Doctrine.

* It is interesting to note, however, that from the beginning of the "rapprochement" between Washington and Peking, the assertion has been made by some people that the President was going "in search of peace," which could be taken to imply that war between China and the United States was likely. This, of course, is patent nonsense, but such inferences have a two-pronged effect: first, the new diplomacy and the President's visit are bound to "succeed," for he will have "prevented a war" between two great powers; and, second, any sacrifices our allies in Asia will be asked to make will be a small price to pay for avoiding the holocaust of a war between China and the United States. It is also of interest to note that, in the New York Times of March 2, 1972, (page 14) in describing how every word of the joint statement was carefully weighed, Max Frankel said about the United States' position on Taiwan:

And the essence of the American position was to strike a posture that might have political repercussions on the island and thus encourage both Chinese governments to adjust to the idea of gradually bargaining for some form of association.

Since our ally on Taiwan wants no "association" with Red China unless the Nationalists can rule China again (an outcome hardly likely to come about through negotiation because of the almost absolute lack of leverage by Taiwan, now more alone than ever, on Red China), our efforts to create "political repercussions on the island" seem more in line with the desires of the Tiger on the mainland, who has all kinds of plans for "association" forced on the buffalo calf on the island.

This Doctrine presents a politically relatively painless way in the short run for the President to ease the United States out of her recent strong commitment posture in the Western Pacific. This can be done, moreover, without the imminent collapse of the whole "arc of crisis," simply because Red China and her "proxies" do not as yet have the military wherewithal to easily conquer the non-communist areas. (This could change, particularly in Southeast Asia, and particularly if long-term American and Japanese loans and technical know-how replace the Russian "Marshall Plan" for Red China.) Meaningful, long-term, regional security against communist pressure, however, has, under the current ground rules (i.e., without Japanese military might), probably been dealt a body blow in this area of the world. Some type of at least "shadow" regional security arrangements among the small nations will always be possible, but if we and Japan insist upon continuing these ground rules, we must start now to shape our policy to deal with Red China in the eventual role we have at least made possible for her (i.e., dominant ideological, political, and finally, conventional military force in East Asia, and perhaps even the Western Pacific), for she will no doubt be a hard and adamant bargainer. Furthermore, if eventually we or our proxy try to belatedly stand between her and one of her objectives, she is once again likely to be a ruthless enemy. This new reality is the most important element in any consideration of regional security among the small powers of East Asia.

VI. FOUR "WHAT IF'S" FOR VIETNAM*

These post-election days of 1972 would seem an appropriate time to consider the consequences of America's involvement in Southeast Asia. We are far enough away from some of the events to attain a higher degree of objectivity, and, more important, events themselves have brought some increase in knowledge; this improvement in perspective may also be helpful in dealing with both current and future issues, both there and here. I propose to attempt to illuminate both possibilities and issues by outlining four different Vietnam scenarios, each of them predicated on various assumptions and divergent courses of action taken by the United States. First, what would have happened if the United States had not escalated its commitment in Vietnam in 1965? Second, what would happen if the United States precipitously and unilaterally withdrew from Vietnam? Third, what are the likely consequences of a negotiated cease-fire? And fourth, what would it take to achieve a "military victory" in Vietnam if negotiations prove ineffective?

Before plunging into these scenarios let me start by pointing out that while the U.S. Government has often done badly in judging what was happening and in estimating the impact of its programs and policies, an examination of the record demonstrates equally clearly that liberal progressive critics have, if anything, done worse. If, for example, I believed many of the liberal critics I would have to believe that the U.S. intervention is comparable to the Nazi genocidal policy toward the Jews, which essentially destroyed European Jewry. Yet when the United States intervened in South Vietnam in 1954 there were about 8 million

*By Herman Kahn.

people in South Vietnam with a per capita income of about \$100. Today there are about 12 million with a per capita income of about \$200. I would currently judge that, with reasonable luck (such as envisaged in some of the scenarios to follow), this per capita income will be maintained and perhaps grow rapidly even after the Vietnamization program has been completed and the massive U.S. presence has diminished to a small group of 20,000 or less. Whatever the U.S. has or has not been doing in South Vietnam simply cannot be compared to Hitler's policy of repression and extermination.

Consider also the issue of "optimism" and "pessimism" with regard to the U.S. and S.V.N. governments' efforts to prevent a VC victory in South Vietnam. If one thing was disclosed by the Pentagon Papers, it is that, with some exceptions, most government officials did not have such optimistic ideas of what was going to happen in Vietnam as most critics thought they did. On the other hand, many of the critics put themselves on record as incredibly pessimistic. Many, for example, argued from about March 1968 (just after the Tet Offensive by the National Liberation Front) until around March 1970 that the United States was going to be out of Vietnam in a short period of time. The usual period given was three weeks to three months, but occasionally some of these analysts suggested as long as six months. As an example, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, one of the more articulate and prestigious critics of the government's policies in Vietnam, stated in the Washington Star (February 15, 1968) that, "Anything that can effectively be called a government" in South Vietnam would collapse within a few weeks and anticipated within the same period "the effective dissolution of the South Vietnamese Army." Many of them continued making estimates of three or six months, from a moving

present, for about the next two years or more. Since I personally had expected that the American effort in Vietnam would continue, and that the Thieu government or the legitimate successor to it would not only survive but might even "win," I was very aware of, and critical of, these estimates.* One would have thought that those who kept repeating the three month or six month figure would gradually become embarrassed or discredited, but this did not happen.

What would have happened if the United States had not escalated its commitment in Vietnam in 1965?

It is possible that Vietnam will prove to be the last pivotal battle in the Cold War, the battle that confirms the success of our worldwide containment policy and ushers in an era of relative stability--or at least of different problems. This hypothesis is not provable in any final sense, but I will argue that it is a perfectly defensible one. In order to make that case, I would like to recall another time when the world faced the need to contain an aggressive power--March 7, 1936, the day that German troops occupied a piece of indubitably German territory, the Rhineland. Many historians now believe that British and French intervention on that fateful day would very likely have resulted in the overthrowing of Hitler--perhaps by his own generals--or at least proved so severe a blow to his charisma and authority that World War II could never have occurred.

But even if Britain and France had intervened successfully, they would hardly have escaped criticism. Any subsequent instabilities in the

*See, for example, my paper, "What if Negotiations Fail?" in Foreign Affairs, July 1968, Volume 46, pp. 627-641, or the book, Can We Win in Vietnam by Frank Armbruster, et al. (Frederick Praeger), 1968.

German government or feelings of grievance among the German people would doubtless have been blamed on this "premature and unnecessary" action-- particularly since the world would not know (and could hardly be able to conceive in its most far-flung imaginings) what this action had averted.

Of course, one might argue that World War II had some positive effects: a successful worldwide move toward decolonization and the rapid rise of Europe and Japan to new levels of prosperity were partly due to the after-shock of the war. But these are conjectural matters, and I would guess that today most people would agree that France and Britain should have intervened in the Rhineland. They did not, and as Churchill said in a speech two weeks later, the result was "an immense gain in prestige to the Nazi government."

Its new prestige spread well beyond the borders of Germany. In Latin America quite disparate forces began to coalesce around fascist ideologies of one sort or another, probably less because these ideologies were intrinsically attractive than because fascism seemed a likely winner against democratic and capitalist alternatives modeled on England and the United States. In much the same way anti-Soviet and anti-democratic factions in Eastern Europe began to rally to Hitler's banner. And extremist elements in Italy and Japan were also encouraged by the prevailing indications of France's and Britain's weakness.

I would argue that similar "domino" effects were avoided because President Johnson was not willing to practice appeasement in Vietnam.*

* I should make clear that I do not believe the consequences would have been anywhere near as severe if Vietnam had fallen to Communist subversion early in the mid- or late fifties or even possibly in the early sixties before the U.S. had escalated very much. But once the decision had been made to put 14,000 advisors in Vietnam, then U.S.

Shortly after the election of Lyndon Johnson in 1964, there were 20,000 American "advisers" in Vietnam. What would have happened if President Johnson had let the number of American troops remain at that level and had not begun to bomb the North?

In retrospect, it seems almost certain that South Vietnam would have fallen within a few months. Indeed, between Election Day in the United States and the assumption of power by Generals Ky and Thieu in mid-June (and even perhaps for some time afterward), few sober observers in the United States would have given great odds that even such drastic reinforcement as President Johnson did undertake could prevent the collapse of the Saigon regime. In their hearts most American officials and nearly all of the U.S. and foreign press corps on the scene were almost totally pessimistic in their appraisal of the situation.

In the wake of the likely collapse of the Saigon regime, there would have been a hasty withdrawal of all U.S. advisers--perhaps after some bloody incidents. Most observers concede that Hanoi would have moved quickly to unite the two Vietnams, possibly under the cloak of holding, somewhat belatedly, the referendum on reunion originally scheduled for 1956.

prestige was so strongly committed that a North Vietnamese victory now partook of a character of an American defeat--and also took greater efforts by the VC and North Vietnamese. This makes both the internal and external impacts of an NVN victory much greater--internal in a manner similar to a Toynbee challenge and response situation and the subsequent extreme high morale that comes with successful response and externally almost the exact opposite--at least in terms of the morale of the Americans and their allies and well-wishers.

The above does not imply that escalation was essential to avoid defeat. I believe the exact opposite to be true in the sense that if appropriate tactics had been used in a sustained fashion at any point in the late fifties or early sixties, there probably would not have been any later need for escalation. (See Can We Win in Vietnam by Frank Armbruster, Raymond Gastil, Herman Kahn, Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff.)

The government of this newly united country of more than thirty million people would have enjoyed the highest morale. (Had it not, after all, just beaten the United States--triumphed over the strongest power in the world despite all its efforts?) Such a nationalist and communist Vietnam would doubtless have been anxious both to settle scores with some of its neighbors--and to extend the revolution. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then head of the neutralist Cambodian government, has said on several occasions that under these circumstances his country would have been forced to come to terms with the communists and might even have been absorbed by Vietnam. Laos would clearly have gone under, too, unless the United States had tried to make a stand there--a much more difficult and hopeless job than in Vietnam. In both these cases the victorious North Vietnamese could appeal to the current concept of the sanctity of the former colonial boundaries--i.e., of the basic natural integrity of French Indochina. (This principle of integrity of colonial boundaries is largely accepted in Afro-Asia where it is often the only legitimizing principle available.)

But things would not stop there. Thailand would clearly be put under great pressure. While today the Thai government looks relatively strong and legitimate, the many points of strain that existed--and still exist--in that country would clearly have been increased; and at least in Northeast Thailand a serious communist rebellion would have been entirely feasible. Perhaps the United States would have sent troops to help put down this rebellion or given other major support--that cannot be presumed. But it is entirely possible that Thailand, which throughout its history has not been known to sacrifice itself in the service of a consistent policy, would have attempted to switch sides under increased

communist pressure. We can almost safely presume that the minimum the Thai would have to do to satisfy the North Vietnamese would be to switch sides to one degree or another and to allow sanctuary for Communist insurgents on the Thai-Malaysian border.

Many readers may be surprised at my estimate that North Vietnamese would even be interested in such external issues. After all they would seem to have enough to occupy themselves in reconstructing the damage and in taking care of the internal problems of their newly enlarged state of 50 million people or so. The answer to that is that almost every successful radical revolutionary nationalist movement, if the leaders are of high morale, seems to take an intense interest in foreign subversion (in much the way that Napoleon did in France, the Communists did in 1917 in Russia, Castro did in 1959 in Cuba and indeed almost all messianic religions or intense ideologies do when they have a sense of being a wave of the future).

Flanked by a united Communist Vietnam, a communist leaning Thailand, and Sukarno's fellow-traveling Indonesia--and with a sanctuary for insurgents along its borders--Malaysia would have been in a tight spot indeed. Presumably, the 500 or so Communist guerrillas still left in northern Malaysia would have been greatly reinforced, creating a serious threat to the government. Doubtless, also, many of the country's Malays, realizing that they now faced a Hobson's choice between a revival of civil war or acquiescence to a people of the same race and religion, would have pushed for a settlement with Indonesia. Such an eventuality, in turn, might have sufficiently altered the balance of power within Indonesia for the local Communists to have staged a successful uprising--similar to the one that was thwarted in that country in September 1965--with the result that

Indonesia would probably have gone Communist or at least firmly aligned itself with Peking.

At this point we can assume that leftist dissidents around the world would have sought advice from China and Vietnam on "how to do it." Certainly, the kind of person in Latin America whose politics are motivated principally by an anti-American bias (and who was thus pro-fascist in the thirties, pro-Soviet in the late forties and early fifties, and pro-Chinese in the late fifties) would have turned pro-Chinese again. Forced to compete with a worldwide resurgence of Chinese influence, the Soviet Union might have been driven to a more extreme position in international affairs, particularly since extremist tactics might now pay greater dividends.

While the above scenario may seem as if it has many contingent elements, I would argue that the first events described: the creation of a new Indochina, the changes in Thailand, the pressure on Malaysia and even the effects on Indonesia, are all of a more or less high probability. The fact that many have argued otherwise probably illustrates more the tendency not to ask seriously what would have been the most obvious consequences of hypothetical events. The biggest uncertainties are not, in my judgment, the predicted events in Southeast Asia, but rather the effect of these events on the rest of the world. I feel relatively sure that the American escalation in 1965 sharply reduced the substantial possibility that Southeast Asia would have gone Communist. Whether this situation would have created an overwhelming "wave of the future" psychology in the worldwide Communist movement--and greatly discouraged its opponents--remains a more debatable proposition--but one which cannot easily be dismissed as completely without merit.

What would happen if the United States precipitously and unilaterally withdrew from Vietnam?

Imagine that the United States instituted the policy of withdrawal suggested by Senator McGovern during the recent campaign. That is, if after all these years of fighting and preventing the catastrophes enumerated above, we simply informed the South Vietnamese government of our intention to evacuate all American troops and equipment, while simultaneously letting the Thai government know that we were going to keep our bases in Thailand until the North Vietnamese released our prisoners of war and then we would pull out of their country as well. It seems to me that this approach overlooks the near certainty that the Thais and South Vietnamese, whose lives we were playing with, would be furious at these actions, viewing them with good reason as a double-cross. Such a separate peace is always an extremely unpleasant betrayal. In this case the South Vietnamese would have nothing to lose by executing their legal rights to the limit. Even if they didn't try to interfere physically with the departure of American troops, Saigon would almost certainly insist that we leave most or all of our equipment behind. South Vietnam is, after all, their sovereign territory, and they can nationalize anything on it. They could even, if they wished, charge a head tax for departing American soldiers. And if they really wanted to cause trouble, they could charge individual Americans with all kinds of crimes, which many soldiers have no doubt committed. All of this is completely legal, and I fail to see how the Americans could prevent it, short of shooting up our allies and turning a withdrawal into an escape--or ganging up with the VC and North Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese.

As for the Thais, in the event of a hasty American withdrawal, it would be important for them to make some kind of a deal with Hanoi as fast as possible. After all, the North Vietnamese have been furious with them for allowing us to use their bases so freely during the war. Hanoi's minimum requirement would probably be the installation of a pro forma Communist regime in Thailand--the Thais have done this kind of thing in the past--and our immediate expulsion.

At that point we would have no hold at all on the North Vietnamese. Now, it is quite clear that the North Vietnamese have suffered severely during the war. My own conjecture is that something like one out of every four young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four have died. What would encourage them to send back American prisoners when the mere announcement of our unilateral withdrawal is a sign that they have won everything that they could have hoped for? In the past the North Vietnamese have indicated that they would insist on trying certain Americans for war crimes. Even if they released some of our prisoners, they would keep others for these show trials. They would presumably want indemnities as well, especially since by our mode of withdrawal--and the rhetoric that would accompany it--we would have clearly admitted our guilt. In other words, we can't pull out this way. It would leave us defenseless against our enemy's worst accusations.

Besides being damaging to our own self-interest, a hasty withdrawal would be cruelly unfair to our South Vietnamese allies, many of whose lives would be in great peril. To understand the so-called "bloodbath" theory of reprisals, it is important to realize that the killing which occurs through legal government channels is far worse than the random

killing due to war or other circumstances. As an American, ask yourself which you would prefer--the current situation in which some 50,000 people a year are killed in automobile accidents or a situation in which only 5,000 were killed at the selection of government officials for political purposes? And more than such minimal reprisals by the North Vietnamese would almost be bound to follow an American withdrawal. For if the North Vietnamese controlled South Vietnam, it would only be a matter of time before they took Laos and most probably Cambodia. They will then be forced to incorporate into a single communist society diverse populations that share little but their hatred of the North Vietnamese--and to do this, they will have to impose strict Communist discipline on a society in which social cohesion has been greatly disrupted. Nor would there be a lack of civilian government officials--both high and low--and military--both enlisted and commissioned--against whom the North Vietnamese have very serious grievances. In addition, almost everybody in recent years--city people, prosperous farmers, landlords, villagers in South Vietnam's popular forces, and millions of the anti-Communist ethnic and religious minorities have registered their opposition to the Vietcong by accepting rifles from the Saigon government and lending it their support in various ways. Finally, considering just the hundreds of thousands of Chieu Hoi (defection to the government cause) who have left the Communist cause to become Kit Carson scouts or Armed Propaganda Teams, or just to cling to the government cause and started a new life away from their original villages (while many in the first two groups have died heroic deaths for the government cause, many still live, and in all groups the families would be hostages to a terrible revenge). To put it simply and bluntly, directly or through their immediate families, at least half the population

is now in more or less active opposition to the Vietcong; indeed, some member of one out of every three families is on the government payroll.

If the North Vietnamese try to run a normal government they will have an infinite amount of trouble with the pacification of the rest of Indochina, but if they are willing to impose a strict communist discipline on their 50,000,000 or so subjects then the fact that the normal social order has been disrupted will probably not give them great difficulties. In fact, there is no example anywhere in the world of reasonably disciplined Communist parties backed by a loyal army having trouble in imposing an intense reign of terror on the population. Their troubles usually come when they try to get the willing or economically efficient cooperation of the populace and relax the terror, but that is a long-term problem which itself may encourage the use of draconian measures in the short run. Many revolutions have faced this kind of imperative, and those that have succeeded in the face of this kind of problem have more often than not accepted this need for an "interim" reign of terror. In other words, they will both desire to and be under great pressure to cleanse and terrorize the population. Many revolutions have faced this kind of imperative--and the successful ones--whether of the left or right--have usually accepted the need for terror.

Although the number of people who would be killed in a North Vietnamese purge is strictly conjectural, informed estimates have ranged from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand--my guess would lie somewhere in the middle. Certainly, if they were forced to choose between convicting all the "guilty" at the cost of convicting many who are innocent and saving the innocent at the cost of missing many who are guilty, the North Vietnamese would be acting entirely out of character if

they did not opt for the former. Whether or not they are killed, something like the majority of the population is going to be regarded with suspicion and hostility by the elite minority that claim to represent the "true will of the people" and these are going to have to maintain a high level of authoritarian terror for a long time, both because of pressure from the real world and from their own very likely paranoia and desire for punishment. Whether the terror kills but a few per year or much more, most people in South Vietnam would prefer risking their lives to accepting such an existence for the indefinite future. Doubtless, many would eventually change their minds once they experienced this Communist society, but it is also likely that there are many who do not today realize what it will be like and would change their minds the other way.

Nor would a precipitous American withdrawal do damage only to the fabric of South Vietnamese society. It is unreasonable to assume that a country such as the United States can lose this kind of war--particularly at a moment when its professional military think they are close to victory--and not pay a heavy price. While I would not expect a revolt in the U.S. armed forces similar to the French military revolt in Algeria, I would not be surprised if many of the officers who were deeply involved in Vietnam resigned their commissions and entered the political arena in some capacity. Certainly, a large number of Americans would share their resentment, feeling that to abandon South Vietnam at the present moment would be to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. I myself would have nothing but contempt for the government that did it and to some degree for the populace which supported this government.

I can imagine a deeply conservative trend sweeping the United States in the wake of such a withdrawal. In 1976 we might see Gov. Ronald Reagan

and Gen. Creighton Abrams running on the Republican ticket. Abrams could talk about what a stab in the back the American people received by our withdrawal--a perfectly legitimate view. Reagan could talk about pornography, pot, and permissiveness and the need for going back to basic American values. Indeed, most likely these issues of middle America to which Reagan would be addressing himself would likely also be a very high level of frustration and dissatisfaction if McGovern had won the election. I can even imagine in 1976 a semi-authoritarian government being elected to sort out the mess--much as happened in France when it pulled out of Algeria. Fortunately for France, de Gaulle was able to put the pieces together and to preserve democracy. We may not have a man of his caliber available. In any case one can imagine a very unpleasant period for at least the New Left and the Counterculture (for example, 20-year sentences for the possession and use of marijuana). I am not suggesting here concentration camps and a naked reign of terror, but simply relatively stern legal measures and harsh maximum penalties and other enforcements of the law against those identified with creating a need for such stern measures.

What are the likely consequences of a cease-fire?

The outcome of the cease-fire will hinge on innumerable details, so I shall not try to cover all possibilities. The following scenarios, one optimistic and one pessimistic, suggest some of the main features.

Optimistic Scenario:

There is a cease-fire and partial political settlement with the North Vietnamese that results in their exclusion from power in South Vietnam--that is, it results in the defeat of their attempt to unify the country under their leadership. This defeat is, of course, only a

temporary one; yet it could become permanent. But why should the North Vietnamese enter into an agreement that results in their defeat? The answer is a combination of two factors. The first is that they overestimate their chances of political take-over under the terms of the cease-fire. Such an overestimate is by no means an unreasonable possibility. In the Tet offensive in 1968, for example, it became clear that the North Vietnamese expected a great deal more support from the South Vietnamese population than they, in fact, received, and in the attacks of last May they once again greatly underestimated popular resistance. While they may have learned their lesson, it is also possible that they may make the same mistake, or a variant of it, once again. The second factor that might lead the North Vietnamese to accept a settlement resulting in their defeat would be the realization on Hanoi's part that its current situation and immediate prospects are very unfavorable. For one thing, the recent bombing and blockade seem to have hurt. Further, they seem to be genuinely worried about the threat of betrayal by their Chinese and Russian allies. And finally, there is some possibility that the American public and government might develop a much more escalatory mood now than has been the case for a long time. (Certainly Hanoi has by now learned to distrust those American and European critics of the war who assured them--often in person--that U.S. morale was collapsing and that there was now a "light at the end of the tunnel.") Under these circumstances Hanoi might be most anxious to negotiate at least a temporary settlement. But they can scarcely be genuinely interested in giving up permanently their intention to take over South Vietnam.

There are two versions of the optimistic scenario at this point. In one, Thieu stays in power because he has shown over the last eight years

an ability to create stable government (a major feat as the chaotic eighteen-month situation that followed the fall of Diem clearly showed), because he genuinely has at least a plurality, if not a majority, of the population behind him, and because the others realize that they must stick with him. Government activities, control, administration, power and influence are all maintained reasonably well, even though at various times the VC and the North Vietnamese try to wreck it. Fortunately the scope and intensity of the tactics used by the VC are so limited by the agreement that the South Vietnamese can deal with it adequately or the agreement is so recklessly violated that the Canadians and Indonesians (or other cease-fire supervisors) denounce the state of affairs. If this last happens the Americans put in between 10,000 and 30,000 volunteers and make their Navy and Air Forces available as needed to the South Vietnamese. Further, as time passes, South Vietnamese capability increases rapidly so that less and less American aid is needed, though at no point is it completely unnecessary--at least so long as the Chinese and the Soviets aid the North Vietnamese.

It is also possible to conceive of an optimistic scenario even if Thieu resigns or is otherwise forced out, but it is more difficult. One of the really difficult problems in the third world generally, and in South Vietnam particularly, is the inability of such areas to throw up national leaders who don't achieve stability by the suppression of all opposition through an almost total use of terror and violence (i.e., the successful suppression of all visible political opposition--as has happened in the various Communist countries, but not in South Vietnam). Even such a genuine leader and folk hero as Ho Chi Minh felt it necessary systematically to assassinate leaders and elites of all the opposing

nationalist and other groups in 1952 who might compete with him for the nationalist banner. This, of course, is a large part of the reasons why--when the Americans made it safe to do so--that so many of the ethnic and religious minorities turned out to be very hostile to the VC. We can nevertheless assume that, despite the absence of any clear-cut substitute for Thieu, the South Vietnamese army at least holds together--governs cohesively--and remains the dominant power in the area of the country in which the overall majority of the population live. If enough of the various political groups in Saigon and elsewhere realize that it is only the army that protects them from communist execution, it makes possible the preservation of non-violent politics in much of the country. Therefore, everyone supports the army. The army, in turn, holds together and gains in morale, perceiving that it has the backing of the population. The situation could be so stable that some degree of democratic and representative government would be possible--though it is by no means certain.

In this situation, though in some ways the government will be partly paralyzed by internal disagreement and external threats, it would be able to act with sufficient effectiveness to survive. As long as such a government is assured of adequate external support and as long as it is not painted, rightly or wrongly, as a facade behind which a Communist take-over could proceed, it might well survive and grow in power and legitimacy and the country might even operate reasonably normally in the interim.

Pessimistic Scenario:

In some ways it is easier to write pessimistic scenarios. One need only assume that Thieu is forced out and no substitute can be found. When the army tries to hold together, internal bickering and partisan politics destroy whatever effectiveness it might have had. Let us assume that neither of these happen immediately and that there is a cease-fire and some interim arrangement for government. The South Vietnamese government still controls the great bulk of the populated territory, and the great majority of people strongly oppose a communist takeover. The Communist forces control only a small majority of the population. All are agreed on the thesis that they will not cooperate with the Communists, even if they can't cooperate with each other. The Communists, however, in addition control border areas in Cambodia and the Ho Chi Minh trail area of Laos--and the cease-fire commission does not prevent this or force the abrogation of the agreement. Initially, whatever acts of violence the North Vietnamese and the VC initiate they do very carefully, and deny doing so. Since they control access to the territory it is difficult to check up on them. On the other hand, many acts of violence occur directed against the VC and the North Vietnamese in the territory controlled by the South Vietnamese government. This territory is open to reporters generally so that these acts are well reported--indeed overreported. The North Vietnamese make a whole deluge of complaints, some well documented, some obviously made up. But none clearly wrong, at least to those who are somewhat friendly to them. The North Vietnamese make a number of violations of agreement, particularly in terms of moving military supplies to forward positions and generally building up in their Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries (in violation of the cease-fire agreement) their

stores of tanks, artillery, fuel, ammunition, and so forth, in preparation for what looks like a major offensive. Everybody more or less knows what is going on, but the International Control Commission finds it too difficult to fight over every separate minor violation. While it corrects some and reports more, on the whole it is ineffective in both action and in making the situation clear. Finally Cambodia falls, the old Sihanouk road supply lines are reopened, and as a result the balance of power clearly changes and South Vietnam collapses--with or without a fight.

Even if this last (reopening of the old Sihanouk road) does not happen, the South Vietnamese, of course, are not unaware of what is going on elsewhere, accordingly, many VC opponents come to believe that they have been betrayed by the United States and that the Army and SVN government are--or will soon be--helpless to protect themselves, much less to protect them. On top of all this the North Vietnamese make it clearer and clearer that the agreement, which made possible the cease-fire, represents a surrender by the United States, that they do not have to comply with the terms of the agreement because U.S. forces will never return, that they intend to win control over the entire country, and that the "enemies of the people" will then be punished. At this point each group in the South--the religious sects, the labor unions, the political parties, and the Army officers--begins to wonder how it can ensure its individual survival. Each citizen, in fact, attempts to predict the winner of the political-military contest that will continue under the guise of the cease-fire. It becomes clear that, if one supports the government and the government falls, then that person will be killed. On the other hand, the Communists offer safety and protection to leaders who are willing to support the "neutralist" faction--promising to forgive and

forget past transgressions against "the people" but not current and future transgressions. In these circumstances most groups and most individuals, naturally enough, try to hedge their bets. While not all will "sell-out" few will take the initiative in opposing the Communists.

Finally, a spectacular yet ambiguous event occurs. Vietcong cadres seize control of a major area in the Mekong Delta which they have always claimed but in fact did not control. The local South Vietnamese popular and regional forces are warned by the Communists not to interfere under pain of retaliation against their families, and are told that the South Vietnamese Army will not attempt to restore the official government of the village. The local Army commander, although ordered by the government in Saigon to restore the government presence, decides that obeying the order would be imprudent and delays moving in. During this delay the Vietcong try, "convict," and execute local officials and call for an election to select new ones. The communists win, of course, and declare themselves the local government. When the South Vietnamese Army unit finally decides to take control, the new government refuses to allow it to enter and orders the local popular-force unit to oppose the Army if necessary. This is sufficient basis for the Army commander to question his orders and stand aside. At that point the neutralist faction in the Saigon government moves to prevent the Army from trying to restore the former local government, especially since its officials are now all imprisoned or dead--or have even switched sides.

Word of this event travels throughout the country and other areas fall. If there is any serious resistance heavy units from the Laos or Cambodian sanctuary make a surprise attack and exact a terrible retribution on local government units which had the courage to attract attention

to themselves. All this makes similar efforts by Vietcong cadres more and more easy and resistance by local units more difficult. The impression that the Communists are the ultimate victors in the war gains momentum, resulting in increased political support for the neutralist faction. That faction is thus able to gain a significant voice in controlling the Army's movements and seriously hampers its ability to ensure the safety of political leaders. It is now easy for all to see that this scenario can have only one ending, the complete communist domination of Vietnam.

The interesting point about this pessimistic scenario is the light it sheds on a dilemma that both President Thieu and President Nixon must wrestle with now. The outcome of peace negotiations depends not only on the terms of the settlement but also on the way in which they are perceived by all sides. If the Saigon government remains unified and free Communist sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia is denied, it is likely to be able to survive almost any agreement. The government's ability to remain unified depends, in turn, upon its confidence that South Vietnam's interests are reflected in the settlement and that reasonable American support will continue to be forthcoming. Thus, President Thieu has a great interest in making it look as though any agreement with Hanoi is completely satisfactory to him and does not represent an American betrayal. But if the issue is at all in doubt, he would try to convince the United States not to sign the agreement or at least to alter it to South Vietnam's benefit. He would claim that the proposed agreement is totally unsatisfactory to him, and if adopted, would doom his regime, for he can have no other argument against peace. If it becomes known that we have forced Thieu to accept an unsatisfactory agreement by threatening to

remove our support for his government (for example, by slowing down the flow of funds and letting the ammunition supply of the South Vietnamese Army become depleted), then South Vietnam will feel betrayed by us and might feel compelled to surrender to a seemingly victorious North Vietnam. Or if it becomes clear that there will be no limitations on communist activity in Laos and Cambodia, then much the same result may be achieved-- perhaps after the effectiveness of such "free ride" forces have been demonstrated.

What would it take to achieve "military victory" in Vietnam?

I believe that we are about to win the war in Vietnam. By thus announcing our imminent victory, I do not mean to imply that we will achieve complete peace in Indochina; nor do I mean that the South will become totally independent of American support. I mean that South Vietnam can achieve a degree of "pacification" similar to which Israel achieved in 1967. As long as two or three years after the last Israeli-Arab war, the Israelis had an uncomfortably high risk of being killed or injured by the Arab terror -- there being about 200 such casualties per year at that time. Even so, the chance of being killed or injured by an Israeli driver was still about four times higher. Now, in terms of population, 200 casualties per year in Israel correspond to about 2,000 deaths in South Vietnam, or 20,000 in the United States. This situation is unpleasant but not unlivable. Prior to the North Vietnamese offensive last spring about 80 to 90 percent of the South Vietnamese population lived under conditions similar to or only slightly worse than conditions in Israel. Unless South Vietnam is sold out

those conditions should return rapidly, and though they may be disrupted again, the South Vietnamese are rapidly acquiring the capability to deter or defeat large conventional attacks -- as the battles of An Loc and Hue have already demonstrated.

Instead of realizing the importance of those victories, nearly all the liberal commentators in this country pointed to the North Vietnamese invasion as an indication of the failure of Vietnamization because its repulsion required American assistance. But until recently, the Vietnamization policy was not intended to enable the South Vietnamese to prevent the massive Korean-type attack that Hanoi launched, complete with 500 or so tanks and large numbers of 130 mm. artillery and Strella missiles, any one of these new weapons being by itself a very major technological escalation in the war. Indeed, this eventuality was so unexpected that we had evacuated all but seventy-two of our heavy tanks from South Vietnam and the American response - partly because it was unprepared - was not large compared with the magnitude of the enemy offensive. In fact, if I myself had realized how big the North Vietnamese attack was, I probably would not have stated, as I did on an NBC television broadcast at the time, that the South Vietnamese would hold, and hold quite well. They did indeed hold well. In part I believe it is correct that in the fifty-five years since the Battle of Cambrai in 1917, (when tanks were first used properly) no unprepared infantry anywhere has held up against a surprise attack by tanks except at two places -- An Loc and Hue. (It may yet turn out that these two battles will go down as turning points in world history. For example, suppose the current rapprochement between the United States

and the Soviet Union has great success. I would argue that Nixon could not have gone to Moscow if An Loc and Hue had fallen.)

Almost all the liberal commentators argued that the U.S. counter-offensive was useless, irrelevant, and maybe even immoral -- one rationale for this position being that American blockade and bombing could have no effect on the North Vietnamese offensive for at least three months. This argument implied either that we did not care what happened in Vietnam three months hence or that the issue would be decided in the enemy's favor by then. Of course, we did care, and the South did hold. Although I admit that, if the North Vietnamese had used their tanks properly, they would not only have taken An Loc and Hue but probably have won the war, a good deal of credit must still be given to the heroism and fighting capabilities of the South Vietnamese, and their ability to take advantage of North Vietnam's mistakes. South Vietnam has basically twelve divisions (the Marines, Airborne and Special Forces being considered as one division). Two of these (the First and the previously mentioned Marines, Airborne and Special Forces) are probably about as good as any divisions anywhere. The fifth is also a reasonably good division. The next four are poor and the next five have tended to be awful. (The Vietnamese Minister of Defense once characterized the division commander of the 25th as the worst division commander of any division in any country of any period of history, and many Americans shared this judgment.) Almost everybody knows how well the first and the Marines and Airborne held around Hue. While a regiment of another division (the newly formed 3rd) broke, there was an almost uniformly good performance by them. But let me make a few comments about the 5th division and An Loc. It

is reported that Giap once told visitors that had the French held on two extra weeks at Dien Bien Phu he would have been forced to retreat. In effect, the 5th division in An Loc held out for four extra weeks under a bombardment some five to ten times greater than that suffered by the French at Diem Biem Phu.

It is often said that American air won all the battles. It is my understanding that during the first two or three weeks almost all of the tanks that were stopped were stopped by Vietnamese propeller driven aircraft (Sky Raiders) carrying rocket firing weapons, and by brave individuals (also Vietnamese) who used short range shoulder fired weapons. Both groups took enormous casualties. The American air did take over a major portion of the battle from about the third week on, but we should still not take away the crucial credit that belongs to the South Vietnamese (and similarly for the Battle of Tet four years earlier). Even after U.S. air became important it was essential that the South Vietnamese should hold on the ground if the air tactics were to work. It is also interesting to note that this help by U.S. air was not a sign of any failure in the President's Vietnamization program. In the original Vietnamization program there was no expectation that the Vietnamese would largely fight with their own air force until about 1975.

To be sure, as I mentioned, a regiment of a brand new division, the 3rd, broke and ran, leaving the road to Hue temporarily open, but almost all of the men of the 3rd (and other units that retreated in a disorganized fashion) later reformed. It might also be noted in this connection that in World War II our inexperienced troops broke at

Kasserine Pass. Likewise, the 21st Division, which is often thought to be one of the poorer divisions, did fail to open up the road to An Loc, but it took about 50% casualties in the effort. While it may not have been militarily efficient, it was clearly heroic. One must also note that the 22nd, another one of the poor divisions, and one which was supposed to collapse at Kontum, did not perform as well as many Americans would have liked, but it held; it did not collapse. As a result the North Vietnamese took only one provincial capital, which they later lost. My own guess is that while the South Vietnamese took enormous casualties they will now have both higher morale and improved performance of the kind which often comes with victory. (We first really saw this kind of effect countrywide after the 1968 Battle of Tet.) While there are many important questions and uncertainties, we have every reason for expecting them to do well in the future -- at least if we do not, by our actions, destroy either this morale or capability.

Many in the liberal press are now putting forth the unbelievable proposition that the North Vietnamese deliberately sacrificed most of their new military equipment and took enormous casualties simply to attrite the South Vietnamese army. To assert that NVN would bear such costs for such temporary gains is to assert that NVN is almost incredibly foolish and thus almost to assert an optimistic view of South Vietnam's situation. I, myself, have no hesitation in arguing that the North Vietnamese army has suffered a disaster.

This is not to say that South Vietnam could survive without American assistance, at least as long as the North receives help

from China and the Soviet Union. But neither could Israel survive without U.S. aid under similar conditions, and liberals do not ordinarily condemn Israel for failure to achieve such independence. If I understand the current Vietnamization program we plan on having 20,000 to 30,000 U.S. advisers (presumably all volunteers) stay and this number would decline gradually in the coming years. South Vietnamese pilots would take over air operations as they become trained, and by 1975 there should be no need for American pilots.

In addition to military assistance, South Vietnam will require considerable economic aid. About \$100 billion per year should not only ensure South Vietnam's continued survival but also make possible an extraordinary economic take-off. In fact, this take-off has already begun. With the continuation of a successful pacification program, the economy should become more and more dynamic. For, as the survival of South Vietnam becomes increasingly evident to other countries, investment -- particularly Japanese investment -- will be attracted there and development will accelerate. Despite the current no-growth enthusiasm in some quarters, the resulting prosperity in South Vietnam will look very impressive to the world.

Moreover, such a program of military and economic development would permit the United States to carry out its long-range policy of containing communism and preserving American credibility in the eyes of other nations, which was exactly what our intervention in Vietnam was intended to accomplish in the first place. Vietnam might then prove to be the last major battle in the Cold War, a struggle that began in another small country, Czechoslovakia, and was continued in

such seemingly unimportant places as Korea and Cuba. If this is the case, then success in Vietnam is a prerequisite to the coming era of stability that all of us desire.

An Interpretive Post Script

I now believe that it will soon become clear to every American that we have achieved a reasonable degree of victory (i.e., successful Vietnamization), if we define success as the creation in Vietnam of a situation analogous to, or superior to, the Arab-Israeli balance. I would further add that this victory has been achieved as much or more by the South Vietnamese as by the Americans, though of course American help was essential. Despite the usual U.S. reporting it is the South Vietnamese who have done most of the fighting and taken most of the casualties. Yet there is almost nothing in the reporting in the literate U.S. press and journals that could prepare the American people for this eventuality of a US/South Vietnam victory. The situation abroad is not so bad. In describing the events of March 1972, and subsequent events, the London Economist, and rather surprisingly such French journals as Le Monde, Match and Le Figaro have all given extremely good accounts -- accounts which in my judgment do in fact correspond with the events that actually occurred in South Vietnam. But these journals are about the only exceptions that I could find (though I do not claim to have examined the world press systematically). I am generalizing here, with regard to what might be called "the upper middle class literate press."

It now seems likely that reality will intrude, that it will become clear to almost all that most of the critics have systematically

misunderstood and misinterpreted Vietnamese events. Some of this "revisionism" will doubtless gradually percolate to some portions of the U.S. high culture -- indeed to many in the liberal left, literate, upper middle class groups. This reality testing is made more likely as a result of the Nixon landslide -- another important experience -- indeed another shock of reality. One of the most important results of the war may be a rehabilitation of the conservative position by a kind of process of default; that is, the extreme liberal, literate critics will look so wrong that it may have the impact of reversing many of the trends of the '60's, or at least of reinforcing certain forces at work in our society that are pressuring for such a reversal. If we think of the '60's as characterized by an attempt to reform American society by the counterculture (a broad term which includes advocates of "The Greening of America", a good deal of the drug culture, some of the extremist protest groups, many of the joy/love advocates, many but not all of the self-actualization enthusiasts, and so on), then the main thing going on in the United States - at least since 1967 or 1968 - is a counter-reformation. That is, in many ways the Vietnamese War increased the strength of the reformation movement as advocated by the counterculture, but a U.S./S.V.N. "victory" may reinforce reverse pressures and tendencies. In fact this result of the Vietnamese War may have a great enough impact to penetrate what I have called elsewhere the "educated incapacity" of upper middle class intellectuals who have failed to understand some of the simple issues of American politics -- as well as many complex foreign policy issues.